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How emotion influences the ability to control what we remember and forget remains 
unclear. The objective for the work described in this thesis was to develop a better 
understanding of the links between emotion, memory and memory control. This was achieved 
by acquiring behavioral and ERP data in a series of directed forgetting (DF) experiments. The 
DF item-method was used throughout, with different retrieval task requirements. These 
different retrieval requirements permitted an analysis of how emotion links to memorability, to 
directed forgetting, and to two different retrieval processes – recollection and familiarity.  
A key goal in this work was to exert tight control over stimulus parameters and maintain 
that control consistently over studies. The intention was to permit contrasts between outcomes 
across the set of experiments with fewer degrees of freedom than is the case when comparing 
outcomes among published experiments from different researchers. This is an important 
consideration because the relevant literature contains many contradictory findings for which 
there are several competing explanations. Alongside several parameters over which control is 
commonly deployed, in the experiments described here semantic relatedness was also 
controlled for. This has not been done consistently in studies of the links between emotion and 
memory, and the outcomes here and elsewhere suggest that controlling for this factor, which 
likely co-varies with emotion, is important.  
Key behavioral findings in these experiments were: mixed evidence for superior 
memory for emotional materials (with this term being used here to refer to positive and negative 
valence words); no evidence that DF varies according to valence, a consistent liberal response 
criterion for emotional materials, with the exception of Experiment 1 and when valence is 
manipulated at study only (Experiment 5); and mixed findings for the influence of emotion on 
recollection and familiarity. In addition, and for the first time, the data in the final experiment 





suggest that the liberal response criterion associated with emotional materials can be attributed 
to processes that occur at the time of retrieval rather than at the time of encoding. 
In three event-related potential (ERP) experiments the test phase data provided no new 
insights over and above what can be inferred from the behavioral data described above. There 
were, however, informative outcomes from study phase data where ERPs were acquired time-
locked to the cues to remember/forget that followed the critical items. Neural activity elicited 
by remember and forget cues varied according to emotion, implicating valence in the strategies 
people use to remember and forget material. 
In summary, across a series of experiments there was no behavioral evidence that 
memory control (operationalized as control over remembering and forgetting) varied with 
valence, but the ERP data indicate that remembering and forgetting does vary with emotion. 
Moreover, in what is perhaps the other substantive new insight in this thesis, the data in the 
final experiment suggest that the liberal response criterion associated with emotional materials 
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Remembering and Forgetting Emotional Material 
The focus of the research described in this thesis is on the links between emotion and 
memory control, the ability to exert control over what we remember and what we forget . This 
is motivated by theoretical and practical perspectives. It is uncontroversial to state that the links 
between emotion and memory control have been investigated and are not thoroughly 
understood (Blaney, 1986). One reason for this is the variability in findings in the literature 
focused on emotion and memory control. Although it is generally accepted that emotion 
enhances memory, sometimes referred to as EEM (the Emotion Enhanced Memory effect; 
Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992), whether emotional information is more difficult to 
forget than neutral material remains unclear. A general assumption is that emotional material 
is more resistant to forgetting compared to neutral material (Kensinger & Kark, 2018), however 
this is not always supported by empirical findings in the literature (Brandt et al., 2013; Harris 
et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2012). 
The ability to forget is considered to be essential in service of efficient memory 
processing and goal-directed behaviour (Engen & Anderson, 2018). In the context of emotion, 
emphasis has been placed on the forgetting of emotionally negative information as a motivation 
to preserve our emotional state or to protect the sense of self (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). 
When forgetting, or memory control, fails, then emotional memory intrusions can disrupt daily 
functioning. For example, in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) an impairment of voluntary 
memory retrieval has been implicated (Brewin, 2018). 
A key motivation for the work in this thesis, however, is the variability in findings in 
published work. This variability means that it is challenging to draw strong conclusions over 
how remembering and forgetting of emotional information may come about. To anticipate the 





fuller articulation in later sections, some studies have found emotional material to be more 
resistant to forgetting compared to neutral material (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Blix & Brennen, 
2012; Liu et al., 2017; Minnema & Knowlton, 2008), while others have found no differences 
between emotional and neutral material in the ability to forget (Barnier et al., 2004; Gallant & 
Yang, 2014; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006).  
 
1.1.1 Issues Concerning the Variability in Findings 
1.1.1.1 Stimulus Properties 
In order to improve understanding of the links between emotion and memory control, 
and the variability in published findings, several issues have been addressed in the experiments 
discussed below. Briefly, care was taken to control for specific stimulus properties in order to 
avoid potential confounds. This was done consistently across all experiments, recognising that 
a likely explanation for disparate findings across published studies is inconsistency in control 
over stimulus properties.  
From the perspective of the work in this thesis, foremost among these properties is 
semantic relatedness. The degree of semantic relatedness facilitates memory retrieval (Tulving 
& Pearlstone, 1966). Emotional words tend to be higher in semantic relatedness than neutral 
words, thus if this factor is not controlled for, then effects due to emotion and relatedness may 
be confounded. Control over relatedness has not been exercised consistently in the literature 
(for discussion, see Minnema & Knowlton, 2008). Previous studies have found no differences 
in memory performance when semantic relatedness did not differ between emotional and 
neutral material (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Maratos et al., 2000; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). 
Based on these findings, the prediction in this thesis is that there will be no effect of emotion 
on memory control when comparable control over stimulus properties is exerted (as it is in all 
experiments reports in this thesis).  






1.1.1.2 Response Criterion 
When examining memory for emotional materials it is important to consider response 
criterion as well as sensitivity (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988; 
Windmann et al., 2002; Yonelinas, 1994). When criterion changes across conditions, measures 
of memory sensitivity (d’) are difficult to interpret if single-point measures are used (for a more 
detailed discussion, see section 1.2.1) (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008; 
Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). There are several studies of the links between emotion and 
memory where single-point measures have been employed and where criterion has varied 
(Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Hauswald et al., 2011; Kapucu et al., 
2008). Dougal and Rotello (2007) have argued that differences ascribed to memory may 
commonly reflect differences in criterion instead, which challenges the EEM assumption. This 
will be tested rigorously in this thesis. 
One way to disentangle criterion and sensitivity is by using Receiver Operating 
Characteristics (ROCs) (Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). A commonly used method to plot ROCs is 
by acquiring multiple data points using confidence judgements. This was done in two of the 
experiments presented in this thesis; in one by collecting confidence judgements and in the 
other one by using a combination of confidence judgements and the Remember/Know 
procedure in a recognition memory test. 
The third, overlapping, question that has received somewhat less attention in the 
memory, emotion and memory control literature (although see Liu et al., 2017) is whether 
changes with emotion (referring here to both criterion and sensitivity) are a result of processes 
operating during encoding and/or retrieval. Attributes of a retrieval cue may influence what 
information is retrieved (Keele, 1972; Moscovitch, 1992; Schacter et al., 1978). Thus, 
emotional attributes of the retrieval cue may influence the information to be retrieved. 





Alongside this, however, several theories linking emotion and memory focus on operations 
occurring at the time of encoding. In fact, the predominant focus has been on operations 
engaged at encoding (Brandt et al., 2013; Gallant & Dyson, 2016; MacLeod, 1975; Van Hooff 
et al., 2009). Given the fact, however, that retrieval operations clearly influence measures of 
memorability (Liu et al., 2017; Maratos & Rugg, 2001; Smith et al., 2004; Taylor, Cutmore, et 
al., 2018), Experiment 5 in this thesis tests the possibility that operations at the time of retrieval 
influence measures of memory for emotional content.  
 
1.1.2 Experimental Approach 
 This section covers the primary task employed in the experimental work in this thesis, 
and the main outcome measures as well. There are several tasks and variants that have been 
employed to investigate memory control (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Anderson & 
Spellman, 1995; Levy & Anderson, 2002). The directed forgetting paradigm is the task of 
choice in this thesis (MacLeod, 1975, 1999; Muther, 1965) (the rationale for this choice is 
described in section 1.4.3). Briefly, the task has been widely employed, it is one where there 
are inconsistencies in the published emotion/memory literature, and it is widely accepted that 
it can assess retrieval control, because it requires people to attempt to remember and forget 
memoranda they are presented with. 
 In terms of outcome measures, a combination of behavioural and electrophysiological 
measures was used in this thesis. Some of the behavioural measures have been anticipated in 
earlier sections: sensitivity and criterion, receiver operating characteristics (ROCs), and 
variants of the remember/know (R/K) paradigm. These comprise relatively standard tools for 
measuring memory and the contributions of specific processes. The preceding section 
described the links between emotion, control and memory only in terms of outcomes and not 
in terms of the retrieval processes that might be involved in those outcomes. Two processes 





that are likely implicated are recollection and familiarity. The use of ROCs and the R/K 
paradigm was motivated in order to ask specific questions about how emotion and memory 
control are linked. Recollection, but not familiarity, is considered to be a process over which 
control can be exerted. This motivates the general two-part hypothesis tested in this thesis, 
which is that, while any general influences of emotion on memory can influence recollection 
and familiarity, control will only influence recollection. 
 In specific experiments in this thesis, behavioural measures are complemented by 
event-related potentials (ERPs). Their use was motivated by observations in prior literature of 
ERPs being sensitive to changes in recollection and familiarity (Friedman & Johnson, 2000; 
Rugg & Curran, 2007; Sanquist et al., 1980; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008). Implementing the use of 
ROC curves not only created the opportunity to disentangle measures of sensitivity and 
criterion (see section 1.1.1.2 above and section 1.3.2 below), but also allowed the extraction of 
measures of recollection and familiarity. In this thesis this was also achieved in a follow up 
study using the Remember/Know (R/K) procedure (Tulving, 1985b). The objective of 
measuring recollection and familiarity using the R/K procedure was to investigate the 
generality of the findings obtained using ROCs. Although built on somewhat different 
assumptions, according to Yonelinas (2002) the R/K measures generally correspond well with 
the estimates derived from ROCs. 
 The rationale for using a combination of electrophysiological and behavioural measures 
is because when using ROCs and the R/K procedure, the extent to which participants rely on 
recollection and familiarity may differ compared to when using a simple old/new recognition 
task (Tulving, 1985b). Changes in the amplitudes of ERP old/new effects can be used to assess 
whether familiarity or recollection changes, and these can be employed in an old/new 
recognition memory task. The ERPs provide, therefore, a means of assessing whether estimates 
gained via ROCs and the R/K paradigm generalise to standard recognition paradigms. It is 





generally assumed that estimates acquired via these different tasks do not influence the 
contributions the processes make. On this basis, the prediction tested in this thesis is that the 
ERP markers of recollection and familiarity will permit similar conclusions about the links 
between these processes, emotion and memory control as the outcomes of the ROC and R/K 
experiments. 
Briefly, the left-parietal old/new effect has been found to be a correlate of recollection 
and the mid-frontal old/new effect as a correlate of familiarity. If memory control and emotion 
have some influence on these processes, there should be some divergences in these old/new 
effects between conditions. The detailed justification for using ERPs to predict process 
contributions is provided in section 1.6. 
 
1.1.3 Overview Introductory Sections 
The preceding sections identify the key motivations and questions that are pursued in 
this thesis. The detailed elaboration of each of these is contained primarily in the General 
Introduction that immediately follows this section. The Introduction has several components 
and provides an overview of key literature and an account of how literature leads to the 
empirical work that is reported in subsequent chapters. 
This starts with a focus on general memory process and systems, and the key separation 
between encoding and retrieval, as well as the recognition of the dependencies between them. 
The subsequent focus on recognition memory and the processes and measures commonly used 
in combination with this task reflects the importance of this task and variants for the empirical 
work in this thesis. This task has been employed – with changes in instructions – to investigate 
control over retrieval as well, and the next phase of the Introduction elaborates on that content, 
as well as providing the background and justification for the use of the directed forgetting 





manipulation in much of the empirical work in this thesis. Several other means of investigating 
memory control are also accounted for. 
This set of sections provides the building blocks for then considering the links between 
memory systems and processes and their interactions with emotion, and then an extension into 
the links between memory control and emotion. Finally, the summary and reiteration of key 
predictions at the end of the Introduction is preceded by a detailed account of how ERPs can 
be employed in memory tasks to complement conclusions and recollection and familiarity that 
are derived from behavioural data. These sections also include (i) methodological and 
theoretical considerations germane to the use of the cognitive electrophysiology in this way, 
and (ii) a specific focus on the directed forgetting literature in which ERPs have been employed 
alongside behavioural measures. In later chapters, the use of ERPs to also make inferences 
about the processes engaged at the time of memory encoding and control is returned to. The 
somewhat smaller literature on encoding, emotion and memory relative to retrieval explains 
this organisational decision. Finally, as already anticipated the General Introduction concludes 
with a summary of the key issues to be addressed in this thesis. 
 
 
1.2 Memory Processes and Systems 
It is broadly acknowledged that human memory can be separated into several systems 
and processes (Squire, 2004; Tulving, 1972, 1985a). One of the most common separations is 
between episodic and semantic memory. Episodic memory supports memory for specific 
personally experienced events (Tulving, 1972), and has been described as memory that allows 
recovery of information about ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘what’ occurred (Tulving, 1972; Clayton 
& Dickinson, 1998; but also see Easton & Eacott, 2008). Semantic memory supports general 





knowledge about word meanings and other verbal symbols and is necessary for the use of 
language (Gardiner, 2001; Tulving, 1972, 1985b). 
The focus in this thesis is on episodic memory and specifically how emotion is linked 
to control over episodic memory. Episodic memory – as is the case for all types of memory - 
can be conceived of as having three stages: encoding, storage and retrieval. First, it is necessary 
for received information to be encoded, and this can happen with varying degrees of efficiency 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Storage refers to the creation of a stable and possibly permanent 
record of encoded information, which is also referred to as consolidation (McGaugh, 2000). 
Retrieval involves both reactivating stored information and using it in service of task demands 
(Eustache et al., 1999; Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998). The processes of encoding and 
retrieval, as well as the links between them, are of specific interest in this thesis. 
 
1.2.1 Encoding Frameworks 
There are several accounts of the relationship between memory encoding and memory 
retrieval (Buchanan, 2007; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). The encoding specificity principle is 
one such account (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). The key premise of this account is that how 
information is encoded determines what retrieval cues will be most successful in retrieving 
stored information. Tulving and Thompson (1973) conducted a set of three experiments using 
a cued-recall task and interpreted the results as support for this principle. In all three 
experiments, participants studied 2 lists of weak cue-target word pairs (e.g. ground - cold). 
They were instructed to study the target words and pay attention to the cues. After each list 
participants were presented with the weak cues and instructed to report any target words they 
recalled from the encoding phase. A third list of cue-target word pairs was then presented, and 
in each experiment the instructions and the tasks differed. For example, in one experiment 
participants were presented with strong cues (e.g. hot), replacing the weak cues presented 





during the encoding phase. These strong cues were not presented earlier during study. During 
the test phase, participants were instructed to generate free association responses to half of the 
strong cues and indicate which of these generated words they recognized as target words. They 
were then presented with the weak cues (previously presented during the encoding phase) in a 
cued-recall test and instructed to report the target words of the cue-word pairs. There was higher 
recall of target words when participants were presented with the weak cues than when 
presented with strong cues (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). This is consistent with the encoding 
specificity principle because strong cues should be more likely to elicit related targets, but the 
specific way in which pairs were encoded resulted in an outcome that is counter to this 
prediction (for similar findings see Higham, 2002). In other words, the circumstances under 
which information is encoded and stored, determines what retrieval cues are most effective in 
gaining access to the stored information (Tulving & Thomson, 1973).  
According to a second principle - the transfer-appropriate processing principle - the 
likelihood of successful retrieval is higher when information is processed in a similar manner 
during encoding and retrieval (Morris et al., 1977) than when there is not the same degree of 
correspondence between encoding and retrieval operations. Morris et al. (1977) reported the 
outcomes of experiments in which participants studied some words in a semantic encoding 
condition, and others in a rhyming condition. When they were tested in a retrieval task focusing 
on rhyming information their memory was better for the information encoded in the rhyming 
condition. The reverse was true when the testing condition focused on semantic information.  
 
1.2.2 Retrieval Frameworks 
Several models have been proposed to explain how the process of retrieval works 
(Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Schacter, Eich, & 
Tulving, 1978; Tulving & Thomson, 1973), in which retrieval cues play a crucial role (Keele, 





1972; Moscovitch, 1992). A retrieval cue can be generated by an external stimulus (e.g. a 
picture or word during a memory task) which then generates an internal retrieval cue - a mental 
representation of the stimulus. This cue might activate a memory trace (cue-trace interaction), 
depending upon the quality and form of the cue, the qualities and forms of memory traces, and 
the overlap between the cue and memory traces (Morris et al., 1977; Tulving & Thomson, 
1973). While as stated cues can be generated by external events, they can also be generated by 
internal thought processes (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984).  
Semon’s theory of memory provides one starting point for considering how retrieval 
processes operate (Schacter et al., 1978; Semon, 1904). According to Semon, information is 
processed in fragments that are linked together. Which fragments are attended to influences 
which information is most likely to be retrieved, and only a fragment of information needs to 
be retrieved in order to enable retrieval of linked fragments. In his theory, Semon (1904) also 
describes two different laws that are fundamental for memory. The first, the law of ecphory, 
explains that an interaction between a retrieval cue and the stored fragments of information is 
necessary for the retrieval of memory. This retrieval of memory enhances or creates new 
memory traces (engrams). The second law, the law of engraphy (memory storage), explains 
that every time information is stored in memory, some retrieval is involved (Schacter et al., 
1978). Anderson, Bjork and Bjork (1994) refer to this phenomenon as the retrieval-based 
learning assumption – that is, the process of retrieval enhances the likelihood of recall of that 
specific information at a later point in time. According to Anderson et al. (1994), the 
combination of the retrieval-based learning assumption, the competition assumption (memories 
linked with the same cue compete when retrieval processes are engaged) and the strength-
dependence assumption (the strength of memory traces increases when retrieval occurs and at 
the same time the strength decreases for other information linked to the same cue), explains 





how retrieval of information will strengthen the memory traces of that information, sometimes 
at the expense of other related information (Anderson et al., 1994). 
 
1.2.3 Neural Structures Supporting Memory 
Besides behavioural research examining memory systems and processes, there has also 
been extensive research into the neural structures supporting encoding and retrieval. This 
research spans lesion and neuroimaging studies in humans, rats and nonhuman primates 
(Aggleton, 2012; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). The standard neural 
model of episodic memory identifies the medial temporal lobe (MTL) as a critical structure 
(Aggleton, 2014; Eichenbaum et al., 1994; Squire & Wixted, 2011; Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas 
et al., 2010). In the context of this thesis, the role of the hippocampus, a structure within the 
MTL, is potentially of particular importance.  
 The hippocampus plays a critical role in binding fragments of item and context 
information of an event into a stable memory trace (Eichenbaum et al., 1994). This is assumed 
to be the basis for recollection. Familiarity, by contrast, has been proposed to be supported by 
the perirhinal cortex (Yonelinas, 2002), supporting the processing of item information only. 
While the specific contributions of components of the temporal lobe to recollection and 
familiarity remain contested, the strong link between hippocampus and recollection is 
established. 
 For the formation of emotional memories, another important brain structure involved is 
the amygdala (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Phelps & Sharot, 2008; Ritchey et al., 2008). An 
influential proposal is that for emotional information an interaction between the amygdala and 
hippocampus stabilizes hippocampus-dependent binding resulting in stronger memory traces 
(Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). This can be regarded as the neural 
basis of the EEM, and could explain why emotional memories might be more resistant to 





forgetting in comparison to neutral memories that are solely dependent on hippocampus 
binding (Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). The specific links between amygdala and hippocampus, 
and the importance of the latter for recollection, is another reason that the focus for many 
questions about emotion and memory focus on the process of recollection rather than 
familiarity. Moreover, as the hippocampus is involved in reactivating memory traces during 
retrieval, this would suggest that this region is also critical at the time of retrieval. 
 The measures used in this thesis do not permit any claims about the roles of specific 
brain systems in emotion, control and memory, none the less it is reasonable to assume that 
modulation of hippocampal activity, at either encoding or retrieval, likely in tandem with the 
amygdala will be central to how this is enacted neurally. The mid-frontal old/new effect may 
reflect activity in the perirhinal cortex, either indirectly or directly. Patients with hippocampal 
damage show decrements in the left-parietal ERP old/new effect, but the scalp distribution of 
this effect suggests generators in parietal cortex, and it has been proposed that the effect might 
act as an indirect index of hippocampal integrity (Düzel et al., 2001). 
  The reason that these assumptions about how retrieval works, and about how encoding 
and retrieval are linked, are relevant here is because they emphasise the ways in which 
remembering and forgetting are associated, which is a key question driving this thesis. 
Remembering and forgetting can be linked via relatively automatic processes – such as those 
involved in the competition assumption - as well as those that involve conscious attempts to 
exert control over our memories. One possibility is that memory traces are increased in memory 
strength for emotional memories and because of this are prioritised during retrieval under the 
competition assumption. This would lead to increased difficulty in forgetting emotional 
memories. It may also be the case, however, that enhanced and prioritised processing during 
encoding for emotional information (Bowen et al., 2018) compared to neutral information 
makes it more challenging to forget (and easier to remember). In the experiments in this thesis, 





the primary manipulations that might be considered to involve exerting control are engaged at 
the encoding stage. The effect on memory is assessed via how people complete recognition 
memory tasks and variants. Hence, in the following section a consideration of the processes 
engaged during recognition memory is provided. 
 
 
1.3 Recognition Memory Models 
Several models have been proposed to explain the processes of recognition memory 
and these will be discussed in more depth below. Although the focus on memory control in this 
thesis is primarily during encoding, what happens during retrieval may also be crucial in 
memory control for emotional material.  
Recognition memory tests are a common method for measuring memory performance. 
In the standard form a recognition memory test involves viewing old items (presented during 
a previous encoding phase) and new items (not presented at encoding). Participants are 
instructed to respond whether they have seen the item in the preceding encoding phase or not 
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).  
There are various models based on different assumptions that attempt to account for 
processes that are responsible for recognition memory, and linked methods that have been used 
to measure these processes. Prominent accounts are discussed below. 
 
1.3.1 The Signal Detection Theory (SDT) Account of Recognition Memory 
The Signal Detection Theory (SDT) account of recognition memory assumes that 
memory test items lie on a continuum of memory strength. Old items vary in memory strength, 
as do new items, but new items have a lower memory strength mean compared to old items 





(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). The assumption is that the greater mean memory strength for old 
items is a consequence of their presentation in a preceding study phase. 
Sensitivity, in recognition memory tests, is usually measured by calculating the distance 
(difference) between the means of correct and incorrect old and new responses (memory 
accuracy) for studied and unstudied items, which is referred to as d-prime (d’) (Dougal & 
Rotello, 2007; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), and is calculated 
by subtracting the z-scores for false alarms (incorrect judgements to unstudied items) from the 
z-scores for hits (correct judgements to studied items): 
d’ = zH – zFA. 
The SDT assumes that participants adopt a response criterion (c; a level of strength) 
that an item must exceed to attract an old judgement. When this criterion is not exceeded the 
item is judged to be new. According to the SDT, a participant’s criterion can be measured by 
the following formula:  
c = 0.5 (zH + zFA). 
The measure of criterion locates the criterion relative to the intersection of the old and 
new distributions (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Three 
descriptors of criterion are commonly employed: conservative, neutral and liberal criterion. A 
liberal criterion is a higher tendency to respond old, regardless of whether the item has been 
shown before or not, and a conservative criterion is a lower tendency to respond old (Snodgrass 
& Corwin, 1988).  
The standard SDT model assumes that distributions of old and new items overlap (at 
least when performance is not at ceiling) and that the distributions have the same shape (see 
Figure 1.1A). However, this is not the case in recognition memory tasks. Empirically, it has 
been shown that old and new item distributions do not have equal variance, as the distribution 
for old items is commonly more variable (see Figure 1.1B; Yonelinas, 2001a; Yonelinas & 





Parks, 2007; Wixted, 2007; for a review of such findings see Yonelinas, 1994). As a result, 
when the equal variance assumption is violated conclusions based on memory sensitivity alone 
can be inaccurate (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988; Yonelinas, 1994).  
Under these circumstances, when response criterion changes across experimental conditions, 
d’ and response criterion become confounded and d’ cannot be meaningfully interpreted 
(Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008; Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). This is an 
important consideration for the experiments that are described in this thesis, and it will be 
returned to in subsequent chapters and discussions. 
 



























1.3.2 Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROCs) 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are a set of measures where 
sensitivities at different response criteria can be inferred. In memory studies, the cumulative 
Figure 1.1. Examples of a distribution of equal variance (A) and unequal 
variance (B) for old and new responses in a recognition test and the 
resulting Receiver Operating Characteristic curves (C). f(x) = the frequency 
of evidence = x; cx = criterion for accepting items as “old”. Taken from 
Pazzaglia, Dube and Rotello (2013). 





proportions of correctly recognized old items (hits) are plotted against the proportions of 
incorrectly recognized new items (false alarms) separated according to the level of confidence 
in the judgements (Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). Asking participants to indicate their confidence 
in their judgements is one way of plotting a ROC. Different levels of confidence can be 
regarded as different criteria for yes/no decisions. As already noted, ROCs are commonly 
plotted as a cumulative function, where the left-most point is the highest confidence hit against 
the highest confidence false alarm. The second point is the sum of these outcomes with the data 
for the next level of confidence, and so on.  
Regarding the interpretation of ROCs, the curves represent levels of memory sensitivity 
(see Figure 1.1C). Curves that fall more towards the upper left in the ROC space indicate 
superior sensitivity (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). The points that are 
located on a curve represent a range of hit and false alarm pairs for a level of memory sensitivity 
as a function of response criterion. The closer the points are to (1, 1) the more it reflects a 
liberal criterion and a decrease in confidence (see Figure 1.2).  
The use of ROCs has been influential in investigating the processes that underlie 
recognition memory, and whether single process or dual process models are the best fit to 
explain recognition memory (Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; Stretch & Wixted, 1998; Wixted, 2007; 
Yonelinas, 1994, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 1996; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). The reason for this 
is in large part because of how the shapes of ROC curves should vary according to different 
accounts. 
According to the SDT model (that assumes equal variances for old and new item 
distributions), a typical ROC has a characteristic concave shape (see Figure 1.1C). The SDT 
model also predicts ROCs will be linear when plotted in z-scores, with a slope of 1.0 (Snodgrass 
& Corwin, 1988; Wixted, 2007). However, the typical shape of ROCs in recognition memory 
tasks is asymmetrical and usually appears in the upper left of the ROC space (i.e. it does not 





drop below the chance diagonal; see Figure 1.3) (Yonelinas, 1994). This is because old and 
new distributions, in general, do not have equal variances, hence the slope of zROCs is 
commonly less than 1.0 (Wixted, 2007). There are different process models that can explain 
this ROC shape. 
 
Figure 1.2. An illustration of three different levels of response criterion in a standard Unequal Variance Signal 
Detection (UVSD) model. On the right the ROC curve illustrates the ROC points that correspond with the 
response criterions, point A is a liberal criterion, point B a neutral and point C a conservative criterion. Taken 
from Wixted and Mickes (2014). 
 
One such model is the Unequal Variance Signal Detection (UVSD) model (Snodgrass 
& Corwin, 1988; Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). The UVSD model recognizes that 
the variability of the old item distribution can be greater than the variability of the new item 
distribution. This may arise because of variability during encoding (Yonelinas & Parks, 2007), 





thus memory strength may vary between studied items more than between unstudied items 
(Wixted, 2007). As a result of these assumptions the model can produce asymmetrical ROCs 
(Yonelinas & Parks, 2007), and produce linear zROCs with a slope less than 1.0 (Wixted, 
2007). 
 
1.3.3 The Dual Process Signal Detection (DPSD) Account of Recognition Memory. 
The Dual Process Signal Detection (DPSD) model also assumes, similar to the UVSD 
model, that the variance for old and new item distribution may vary. It differs, however, by 
assuming that recognition memory is based on two distinctive processes. One of these 
processes, in common with standard SDT models, is an index of the strength of an item and is 
commonly referred to as familiarity (sometimes implemented as d’) (Heathcote, Raymond, & 
Dunn, 2006; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Yonelinas, 1994, 2002). Familiarity has been described as 
a feeling of knowing without the presence of contextual details (Voss et al., 2012), but perhaps 
the critical component is that it operates as a graded strength signal (Yonelinas, 1994). The 
second process that is involved in recognition memory is memory judgements that are made 
on the basis of retrieval of contextual (qualitative) information, which is referred to as 
recollection (R) (Mandler, 1980; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Voss et al., 2012; Yonelinas, 1994, 
2002). Recollection has been formalised by some as a discrete process with an all-or-none 
outcome (i.e. a threshold process), meaning that the processes of recollection can either 
succeed, when exceeding a threshold, or fail (Harlow & Donaldson, 2013; Murray, Howie, & 
Donaldson, 2015; Parks & Yonelinas, 2007). In dual-process accounts, familiarity is the basis 
for old judgements only if recollection has failed (Heathcote et al., 2006; Wixted, 2007; 
Yonelinas, 1994).  





According to the DPSD model, recollection can increase high confidence hits without 
influencing the false alarms (the leftmost points on a ROC curve), which will result in an 
asymmetrical ROC (Yonelinas, 1994; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). Changes in response criterion 
are, therefore, assumed to result in changes in familiarity based judgements (Yonelinas, 1994). 
The DPSD model predicts that ROC curves will increase in intercept and decrease in slope 
when only recollection differs across conditions (see Figure 1.3 (top ROCs)). When both 
recollection and familiarity differ across conditions, the DPSD predicts the slope of the ROC 
curves will remain constant while the intercept will increase (Yonelinas, 1994; see Figure 1.3 
(bottom ROCs)). Furthermore, because, according to the DPSD, recollection is an all-or-none 
process, zROCs can produce a slight U-shape. This is commonly found when recognition relies 
heavily on recollection (Yonelinas & Parks, 2007), whereas when recognition relies heavily on 
familiarity zROCs are more linear (Parks & Yonelinas, 2007).  







Both the UVSD and the DPSD models can account for the majority of the empirical 
evidence provided by data from ROCs in recognition memory tasks (Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; 
Wixted, 2007). Although the UVSD model describes only the memory strength variable as 
responsible for recognition memory, it has also been proposed that there may be two processes, 
recollection and familiarity, underlying this strength component (Rotello, Macmillan, & 
Reeder, 2004; Wixted, 2007; Wixted & Stretch, 2004). The UVSD model assumes that these 
two processes are combined whenever making a memory judgement to provide a single 
strength signal (Rotello et al., 2004; Wixted, 2007; Wixted & Stretch, 2004), whereas the 
Figure 1.3. Examples of ROC curves generated by the Dual 
Process Signal Detection (DPSD) model taken from Yonelinas 
(1994). The top ROCs illustrate ROC curves when only 
recollection differs across conditions and familiarity remains 
static. The bottom ROCs illustrate when both recollection and 
familiarity change across conditions. 





DPSD model describes recollection and familiarity as two memory processes with different 
properties that act independently (Yonelinas, 1994).  
Wixted (2007) argued that even though the DPSD model fits well with many empirical 
findings, the UVSD model is a better fit based on direct comparisons of both models. For 
example, Glanzer, Hilford, Kim and Adams (1999), tested the curvilinear zROC assumption of 
the DPSD model and found that this assumption does not hold in old/new recognition memory 
tests, which has been confirmed by other studies as well (for a review of findings see Wixted, 
2007). This observation has been linked with the argument that recollection is not a threshold 
process, which is an assumption of the DPSD model. When recollection is treated as a graded 
process, akin to familiarity, then the DPSD model provides a better fit to the data (Wixted, 
2007). A demonstration of this is provided by Rotello, Macmillan, Hicks and Hautus (2006) 
who used a Remember/Know procedure combined with confidence judgements, allowing 
recollection judgements to be based on different levels of response confidence, which is in 
contrast with the assumption that recollection is only represented by high confidence 
judgements. They observed that this ‘extended’ DPSD model (i.e. allowing recollection to be 
a graded process) provided a better fit to the data than the standard DPSD model, even though 
the UVSD model still provided the best fit. According to Parks and Yonelinas (2007), however, 
the assumption that recollection is best described as a threshold process has been 
misinterpreted. They argue that some have interpreted this assumption as being that 
recollection is all-or-none, whereas they conceive of the process of recollection as being graded 
but the experience of recollection might occur only when an activation threshold is reached 
(Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; Yonelinas et al., 1996).  
Parks and Yonelinas (2007) have argued that in order to explore which model is 
superior, it is necessary to examine data that relies heavily on one of two processes. This can 
be done using relational recognition tasks such as source or associative recognition tests, which 





rely mostly on recollection (even though familiarity can still contribute to judgements to a 
degree in some circumstance (Yonelinas, 1999, 2001b; Yonelinas et al., 1999)). If the data 
provides a more U shape zROC when memory relies heavily on recollection, this would 
provide evidence for the DPSD model. By contrast, if the zROCs remain linear this would 
provide evidence for the UVSD model. Several studies have provided evidence for U-shape 
zROCs in source and associative recognition memory tests (for a review of findings see Parks 
& Yonelinas, 2007), thereby supporting the predictions of the DPSD model. Yonelinas and 
Parks (2007) have argued that the DPSD equally explains the empirical data in item recognition 
relative to the UVSD model, and additionally provides a better fit for relational recognition 
memory, and so should be preferred on that basis. In light of these outcomes, in some of the 
experiments in this thesis estimates of recollection and familiarity based on the assumptions of 
the DPSD are employed to investigate the links between emotion and memory control. 
 
1.3.4 The Remember/Know (R/K) Paradigm 
During the Remember/Know (R/K) paradigm, participants, whenever an item is 
identified as ‘old’, are asked to identify whether they recognize the item based on conscious 
recollection of contextual information (via a ‘Remember’ response) or based on a feeling of 
having seen the item before in absence of any recollection of contextual information (via a 
‘Know’ response) (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985b; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). Contextual 
information commonly includes any recollected information about what happened or what was 
experienced at the time the item was studied (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). Findings from early 
studies using the R/K paradigm support the idea that Remember (R) and Know (K) responses 
are based on distinctive processes, mapping on to recollection and familiarity respectively 
(Dunn, 2004; Gardiner, 1988; Rajaram, 1993). The most common outcome in experiments 
designed to assess how Remember and Know responses are sensitive to different manipulations 





is a change in Remember responses alongside no change in Know responses (Dunn, 2001, 
2004; Yonelinas et al., 1998; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).  
Assumptions about the relationship between the processes of recollection and 
familiarity are key for answering the question of how recollection and familiarity can be 
estimated in the R/K paradigm. The earliest assumption underlying the R/K procedure was that 
recollection and familiarity are mutually exclusive (Gardiner, 1988; Rajaram, 1993; Tulving, 
1985b; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). Under this view the probability of recollection is the 
probability of a Remember response, while the probability of familiarity is the probability of a 
Know response: recollection and familiarity can never co-occur (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). 
However, based on empirical data, Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995) argued against the exclusivity 
model as an explanation of the relationship between recollection and familiarity. They 
suggested that recollection and familiarity are not mutually exclusive, rather, the two processes 
are independent. The independence assumption means that although Remember responses 
should in theory provide a pure measure of recollection, Know responses will not provide a 
pure measure of familiarity. This is because, under independence, a proportion of items can be 
both recollected and familiar and, in this case, will receive a Remember response (if it is 
assumed that when both processes occur a Remember response will result). Consequently, the 
level of familiarity based responses is underestimated by the proportion of Know responses, 
because some items that elicited a Remember response would have attracted a Know response 
if recollection failed (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). Therefore, according to the independence 
assumption, Remember responses can be taken as a measure of recollection (R) and familiarity 
(F) is measured by dividing the proportion of Know responses (K) by the opportunity the 










Another assumption that might in principle explain the relationship between 
recollection and familiarity is the redundancy assumption, which is often best described in a 
source memory test (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). In a source memory test, participants are 
instructed to indicate whether an item is old or new, a basic item recognition test, followed by 
whether they recognize the source of the recognized items. In such a task, participants must 
recognize the item in order to be able to recollect its source. Therefore, recollection (source 
memory test) is always accompanied with familiarity and responses based on recollection 
cannot increase beyond the responses based on familiarity (Yonelinas et al., 1996; Yonelinas 
& Jacoby, 1995).  
Moreover, the redundancy assumption is consistent with the view that recognition 
memory is based on a single memory process, similar to the standard signal-detection models 
(Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Hintzman, 1986; Murdock, 1982; Yonelinas et al., 1996). As 
illustrated above, however, the empirical evidence in recognition memory tests does not 
support strongly a single process model. Moreover, the redundancy assumption does not 
account for the ROC shapes generally found in recognition memory tests (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
1995). The independence assumption, however, does seem to account for the general findings 
in recognition memory using the R/K paradigm and ROC curves. For this reason, the 
independence model is used in this thesis for estimating processes of recollection and 
familiarity in the R/K procedure.  
 
1.3.5 Recognition Memory and Memory Control 
 Based on prior evidence supporting the DPSD model (Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; 
Yonelinas, 1994, 2002), recollection and familiarity have been measured based on this model 
throughout this thesis. As noted earlier in the introduction, it may be that memory control can 
only be exerted over recollection. An argument supporting this proposition from an emotion 





perspective is that retrieving contextual information is what specifically needs to be controlled, 
in particular to avoid re-experiencing negative memories. Breakdowns in this process might 
lead to pathological intrusions and disruptions to memory. These observations reinforce the 
general prediction tested in this thesis: that control over memory for emotional material will be 
evident on measures of recollection only. 
 
 
1.4 Control of Memory 
This section provides an overview of proposed mechanisms and frameworks that 
explain how memory control works. This is followed by a description of paradigms commonly 
used to investigate memory control. 
It is widely held that the operation of the human memory system can only be explained 
via recourse to control processes that operate at multiple stages, including encoding and 
retrieval (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Moscovitch, 1992; Schacter et al., 1998). In order to 
recover past experiences appropriately, it is commonly assumed that memory depends on 
constructive processes during retrieval, which are prone to errors. For example, retrieval cues 
may match with information other than what needs to be retrieved, resulting in retrieval of 
irrelevant information that might be mistakenly assumed to be relevant (Schacter et al., 1998).  
As already highlighted, for successful retrieval a cue-trace interaction is central 
(Schacter et al., 1978; Semon, 1904). Anderson et al. (1994) argued for three different 
mechanisms that can influence the cue-trace interaction: cue bias, target bias and attention bias. 
Cue bias involves processes that influence internal representations so that they are more likely 
to interact with some traces rather than others, or to fit with specific traces (Mecklinger, 2010). 
Target bias refers to processes that increase the accessibility of memory representations 
(Mecklinger, 2010). For example, the activation levels of some representations might increase 





or decrease, making them more or less accessible. A demonstration of target bias may also be 
found in the preparation processes in perception. When preparing to attend to colour for 
example, baseline levels change in neural activity in the V4 brain region (linked with the 
perception of colour) even before an object has been perceived (Driver & Frith, 2000). Meaning 
that some representation of colour has been increased making the perception of colour more 
accessible.  
For both cue and target bias, the outcome – retrieval of specific information – would be 
the same. Attention bias refers to allocating attention towards the outcomes of specific relevant 
cue-target interactions. This attention allocation increases the likelihood of reporting relevant 
information. So, whilst a retrieval cue may activate several competing targets or memory 
traces, attention bias enables selection of task-relevant information amongst task-irrelevant 
information. Anderson et al. (1994) have acknowledged that some or all these biases may 
operate in different circumstances in parallel or separately. This framework provides a broad 
explanation as to how selective memory may come about, and, if this framework is accurate, 
then a remaining challenge is to consider which biases operate in which contexts. It may also 
be the case, however, that biases work at only some of these stages, and if this were to be the 
case then a linked question is whether the outcomes of the work in this thesis can speak to the 
accuracy of the framework. In this regard the opportunities afforded by the work in this thesis 
are limited. In ERP studies of memory and memory control it has been proposed that the time-
course of processes during retrieval can be used to separate processes indexing retrieval and 
post-retrieval processing (Doidge et al., 2017). This offers a means of distinguishing attention 
bias (post-retrieval) from other forms of bias. These post-retrieval ERP indices, however, are 
not commonly observed in studies where only old/new judgments are required, as is the case 
in the ERP studies in this thesis. As already described above, the best evidence for the existence 





of target bias processes has also come from a combination of brain imaging and behavioural 
data. 
For these reasons, the data to be presented here do not have much leverage for assessing 
the accuracy of this framework. The focus on the encoding/retrieval separation in Experiment 
5, however, is relevant. In that case the question at issue is whether any processes operating at 
retrieval are influential in respect of the links between memory control and emotion. To 
anticipate, the findings in that experiment indicate the importance of processes engaged at the 
time of retrieval for the response criterion that accompanies memory judgements for different 
emotional materials. This outcome does not, however, align the behavioural outcomes in that 
experiment with any particular kind of bias. 
As already alluded to in the preceding paragraph, one way of describing the bias 
framework is that it recognises the importance for memory retrieval of what processes precede 
and what processes follow cue-trace interactions. This separation between pre- and post-
retrieval processing is also included in other process descriptions of memory retrieval, and in 
this context, one particularly influential proposal was provided by Tulving (1972). According 
to Tulving (1972), in order for retrieval to be successful it is necessary to enter a cognitive set, 
the purpose of which is to ensure that subsequent stimuli will be treated as retrieval cues. This 
cognitive set is referred to as retrieval mode, which is a tonically maintained state which 
ensures that processes are activated in service of retrieval when a retrieval cue is presented 
(Tulving, 1972; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; Wilding & Nobre, 2001). Rugg and Wilding 
(2000) argued for a second cognitive set similar to retrieval mode that may be necessary for 
successful retrieval: retrieval orientation. While retrieval orientation is considered to be a 
tonically maintained state as well (Herron & Wilding, 2004), it can be described as a strategic 
source monitoring process (Wilding, 1999). The difference between these two cognitive sets is 
that, while retrieval mode will be engaged whenever there is a requirement for episodic 





retrieval, orientations will vary according to what kind of episodic demands are imposed: for 
example, on recall versus recognition tasks, or on tasks where different memory contents are 
the focus for retrieval judgments. 
Adopting a retrieval set (which could be mode or orientation) is assumed to have 
positive consequences for memory judgments – these could be more accurate judgments, or 
they could be judgments made more quickly (Rugg & Wilding, 2000; Tulving, 1972). How 
does this characterisation of sets link to the proposals about bias discussed previously? Sets 
might in principle influence cue-, target- and/or attention bias, and for retrieval orientations 
this might vary in different circumstances. Preparing for episodic retrieval might influence the 
way cues are processed, as described by Tulving (1972), which would fit with the idea of cue 
bias (Mecklinger, 2010). It is also possible, however, that the function of retrieval sets is – 
either in whole or part – to enable selective attention to some of the products of retrieval rather 
than others (Dzulkifli et al., 2004), which is of course a re-description of attention bias. 
Similarly, increasing accessibility of specific (target) information may facilitate the initiation 
of a task specific retrieval orientation (Mecklinger, 2010), which illustrates the links between 
target bias and retrieval sets.  
 Another framework that considers the cue-trace interaction to be central to the 
likelihood of retrieval is the constructive memory model (Schacter et al., 1998). The model 
emphasises that for successful retrieval it is necessary for stored information to be integrated 
into a unified representation during encoding, and form a comprehensive memory 
representation (Schacter et al., 1998). When this integration of information fails, the retrieval 
of such information may only be partially successful in that some critical information may not 
be retrieved. Hence, in order for successful memory retrieval, what happens during encoding 
is important (Schacter et al., 1998). The model also assumes that because retrieval cues can 
activate memory traces that involve information other than the to-be-retrieved information and 





interfere with memory retrieval, it is necessary to select relevant information from among the 
activated memory traces. This process is referred to by Schacter et al. (1998) as focusing, a key 
requirement for the constructive memory model, and this set of processes has been described 
elsewhere as post-retrieval processing (Rugg & Wilding, 2000), and is of course also related 
to the earlier description of attention bias (Anderson et al., 1994). According to this model, 
irrelevant information may compete with relevant information and when the process of 
focusing fails, irrelevant information may come to mind (Schacter et al., 1998). Similarly, 
based on a study in which participants were asked to comment on their thoughts while 
simultaneously recovering autobiographical memories, Burgess and Shallice (1996) proposed 
a set of processes that are responsible for veridical memory retrieval. Editor processes are 
necessary to check whether the output from memory storage is relevant to the retrieval 
requirements, which is then controlled by mediator processes to ensure that the relevant 
information is being retrieved. These processes are comparable with the process of focusing 
and are in place to encourage retrieval of relevant information. 
 In summary, the previous descriptions of various forms of bias that can affect memory, 
of processes that might be engaged before retrieval occurs, and processes that operate 
downstream of memory retrieval, emphasise that control over memory can be exerted at 
multiple stages. In addition, it has also been emphasised that what happens at the time of 
encoding is important (see section 1.1.1). In the next section the focus moves to a description 
of paradigms that have been used to investigate the ability to control remembering and 
forgetting. They include paradigms where key manipulations are at either the retrieval phase, 
the encoding phase, or both. 
The predominant focus in this thesis is on the Directed Forgetting (DF) paradigm, but 
other paradigms, namely the Retrieval-Practice Paradigm (examining Retrieval Induced 
Forgetting (RIF)) (Anderson et al., 1994), and the Think/No-Think (TNT) paradigm (Anderson 





& Green, 2001), are also described here. Common to each of these is that they include measures 
of remembering and forgetting, and there is some overlap between the processes that are 
thought to be responsible for them (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Levy & Anderson, 2002). 
One of these common processes is inhibition, which can operate during encoding and/or 
retrieval (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). 
Control over memory can come about in different ways, and at different stages, for 
example by selecting from among retrieved information, or by stopping or inhibiting retrieval 
(Levy & Anderson, 2002). Selecting relevant information may be particularly necessary when 
information related to the to-be-retrieved information is also available. Inhibiting retrieval can 
achieve the same outcome, albeit via a different route by preventing retrieval of some contents 
from occurring.  
During encoding, inhibition may disrupt the consolidation of information and 
subsequently prevent retention. When inhibition occurs during retrieval, by contrast, the 
information has already been encoded and stored, and inhibition processes might conceivably 
prevent retrieval cues from activating associated unwanted information, thereby decreasing 
their accessibility (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Levy & Anderson, 2002). Findings in the 
memory control paradigms discussed below have all been explained by appealing to inhibitory 
accounts that operate during either encoding (Directed Forgetting (DF)) or retrieval (DF, 
Retrieval-Practice and Think-No-Think (TNT)). 
 
1.4.1 Retrieval-Practice Paradigm 
Anderson et al. (1994) showed that retrieving certain items from memory decreased the 
likelihood of other, similar items being retrieved subsequently. The Retrieval-Practice 
paradigm, in which this was first characterised, consisted of a study phase, a retrieval-practice 
phase and a test phase. In the study phase participants were first instructed to study a set of 





category-exemplar pairs (e.g. fruit-orange, drinks-rum, fruit-banana). The study phase 
consisted of eight categories with six exemplars in each. Participants then engaged in retrieval 
practice on half of the exemplars from half of the categories. Each category was presented with 
the stem of an exemplar (e.g. fruit-or__), and participants were instructed to retrieve the 
exemplar that was shown with this in the study phase. After a distraction interval (20 minutes), 
a surprise cued-recall test followed. All the categories were presented, and participants were 
instructed to recall any exemplars they remembered from the study phase. The common finding 
in this paradigm is that retrieval practice improves recall for the practiced exemplars (orange) 
compared to the unpractised exemplars (banana) of the practiced categories and unpractised 
categories (drinks-rum). More important, however, is the finding that memory for the 
exemplars (rum) from the unpractised categories was improved compared to memory for the 
unpractised exemplars (banana) from practiced categories. Anderson et al.'s (1994) 
interpretation of these findings was that the increase of memory strength for certain information 
through retrieval causes a decrease in memory strength for competing information with a 
common retrieval cue – other items in the same category. This is referred to as retrieval-induced 
forgetting (RIF) (Anderson et al., 1994; Levy & Anderson, 2002). 
This interpretation rests on three assumptions; the competition assumption, the 
strength-dependence assumption and the retrieval-based learning assumption (Anderson et al., 
1994). The competition assumption holds that memories associated to a common cue compete 
for access to conscious recall when that cue is presented. The strength-dependence assumption 
holds that the cued recall of an item will decrease as a function of increases in the strengths of 
its competitors’ associations to the cue. Finally, the retrieval-based learning assumption holds 
that the act of retrieval is a learning event in the sense that it enhances subsequent recall of the 
retrieved item (Anderson et al., 1994).  





An alternative interpretation, however, is that inhibition during retrieval, as a resolution 
for the competition between active memory traces, is responsible for RIF (Anderson et al., 
1994; Anderson & Spellman, 1995). Anderson et al. (1994) proposed that when participants 
are presented with a cue, all associated targets are activated. During the retrieval-practice 
phase, however, participants may inhibit targets that are not cued with the exemplar stem, 
causing a decrease in relative memory strength and subsequent recall of these items during a 
later memory test. This inhibition of unpracticed exemplars may be sufficient to cause RIF 
(Anderson et al., 1994; Anderson & Green, 2001; Dehli & Brennen, 2008).  
In a set of experiments, Anderson and Spellman (1995) investigated the role of 
inhibition in RIF. They presented participants with category-exemplar pairs in which some 
exemplars (e.g. strawberry) could be paired with different categories (e.g. food and red). They 
argued that if a non-inhibitory account is responsible for RIF, memory for non-practiced 
exemplars (e.g. strawberry) from non-practiced categories (e.g. food) should not be impaired. 
However, if inhibition does play a role in RIF, memory for unpracticed, similar exemplars from 
an unpracticed category should be comparable to the memory performance for unpracticed 
exemplars in the practiced category, which is exactly what they found (Anderson & Spellman, 
1995). In another study, Hellerstedt and Johansson (2014) presented participants with high and 
low category-exemplar associative strengths. They found that RIF was greater for exemplars 
with a high associative strength rather than a low associative strength. This finding is consistent 
with the view that competitive activation is necessary for the inhibitory account of RIF, because 
when the level of competition increases (high associative strength), so does the level of RIF. 
Presumably, this is a result of inhibition (Anderson et al., 1994; Hellerstedt & Johansson, 
2014).  
 





1.4.2 The Think/No-Think Paradigm (TNT) 
Participants in the modal TNT paradigm study cue-target pairs, after which they are 
presented with some cues in the TNT phase. They are instructed either to retrieve targets (Think 
items), or to not retrieve targets (No-Think items). After the TNT phase, participants are 
commonly tested on all the studied items using a cued-recall test (Anderson & Green, 2001; 
Anderson et al., 2016). The key finding in this paradigm is that memory for no-Think items is 
impaired compared to baseline items (cue-target pairs shown only in the study phase). And, as 
expected, memory for Think items is increased compared to the no-Think and baseline items 
(Anderson et al., 2016; Anderson & Green, 2001; Lambert, Good, & Kirk, 2010; Murray, 
Anderson, & Kensinger, 2015; Vito & Fenske, 2017). One interpretation offered for this 
outcome is that being cued to not retrieve certain items (i.e. no-Think items) decreases the 
accessibility of this information, and one mechanism that could be responsible for this is 
inhibition (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Levy & Anderson, 2002).  
Examining the inhibition account in the TNT paradigm, Anderson and Green (2001) 
instructed participants to study a set of cue-target pairs. In the TNT phase, the cue-target pairs 
were repeated 1, 8 or 16 times. They observed an impairment of No-Think items relative to 
baseline items on a subsequent recall task, which increased in magnitude along with the number 
of trials on which they were instructed to not be retrieved. Anderson and Green (2001) argued 
that this outcome is consistent with an inhibition account, because if inhibition is responsible 
for the decrease in memory for no-Think items relative to Think and baseline items, memory 
should decline even more when increasing the number of no-Think trials. This is what they 
observed. By this view, the suppressed information is progressively less accessible due to a 
weakening of the cue-target interaction (Levy & Anderson, 2002). 
 An alternative interpretation of these findings, however, is that, instead of inhibition, 
participants use a strategy in which they generate diversionary thoughts (i.e. thought 





substitution), creating new associates between the cue and substituted thoughts (Anderson & 
Green, 2001). These thoughts may interfere during later recall of the targets, thereby causing a 
decrease in memory for no-Think items. However, this strategy cannot explain a decrease in 
recall for no-Think targets even when participants were presented with a novel cue in a cued 
recall test (Anderson & Green, 2001). They argued that if inhibition impairs the memory for 
no-Think items itself, then this should be the case even when the no-Think items are cued with 
a novel cue during a cued recall test. In a second experiment, Anderson and Green (2001) using 
a cued recall test, cued participants with novel cues, semantically related to target items. 
Memory was decreased for no-Think items compared to Think-items and baseline items, 
consistent with an inhibition account. 
Using event-related potentials (ERPs), Bergström, de Fockert and Richardson-Klavehn 
(2009) assessed the processes responsible for the memory outcomes in the TNT. In the TNT 
phase, participants were either instructed to suppress (i.e. not retrieve) or to substitute thoughts 
in the no-Think trials. ERPs were recorded during the TNT phase. Behaviorally, in both groups 
(suppression and thought substitution condition) memory was decreased for no-Think items 
relative to Think and baseline items. Electrophysiologically, they focused on a parietal 
positivity that is considered to be an index of recollection (Rugg, 1995a; Rugg & Curran, 2007). 
This effect was smaller in the no-think (i.e. suppression) than in the thought substitution 
condition. They interpreted this outcome as evidence that inhibition is involved in the 
suppression of memory retrieval, as previous research has shown this ERP effect to be reduced 
when attempting to stop retrieval (Bergström et al., 2009). Because, behaviorally in both 
groups, memory for no-Think items was decreased relative to Think and baseline items, their 
data are consistent with the view that there are two distinct mechanisms that can lead to 
forgetting in the TNT paradigm.  
 





1.4.3 The Directed Forgetting Paradigm 
Although several paradigms have been used to examine memory control, such as the 
Retrieval-Practice and TNT paradigms, the Directed Forgetting (DF) paradigm has been 
selected in this thesis to examine the links between emotion and memory control for several 
reasons. First, the DF paradigm is applied to investigate intentional forgetting. Linked with the 
motivation of this thesis is the practical importance of the ability to control memory for 
emotional challenging memories, which is presumably impaired for people suffering from 
PTSD or depression (Brewin, 2018; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003). In light of this consideration, the 
Retrieval-Practice paradigm would not be an appropriate method to use as this paradigm 
focuses on unintentional forgetting. Finally, another option would be to use the TNT paradigm. 
However, there have been extensive discussions over the reliability of the TNT effect (Bulevich 
et al., 2006). There is considerable variability in findings: some studies do not report TNT 
effects, suggesting that forgetting in the TNT paradigm is not robust. This has been reported 
without the manipulation of emotion (Bulevich et al., 2006). In order to examine the links 
between emotion and memory control it is critical to have some effect of forgetting as a 
baseline. In the absence of such a baseline, it would not be possible to make inferences about 
the effect of emotion on memory control. For these reasons, the choice has been made to use 
the DF paradigm to examine memory control. 
There are two commonly used variations of the Directed Forgetting (DF) paradigm: the 
item-method and the list-method (MacLeod, 1975, 1999; Muther, 1965). In the item-method, 
participants are presented with items and are instructed to either forget or remember them on a 
trial-by-trial basis. The specific point in time at which participants are alerted to the 
requirement to remember or forget an item varies across studies. For example, some present 
the instruction simultaneously with the item (e.g. a word presented in colour which represents 
the instruction; Bailey & Chapman, 2012), but more often the instruction is presented after the 





item (MacLeod, 1999; McNally et al., 1998). Following the study phase, participants complete 
a test of memory for items they were directed to remember or forget.  
In the list-method, participants are given two lists of items to study and most commonly 
are instructed to forget the first list of items after memorizing the list and to only memorize the 
second list. As for the item-method, this is followed by a test of memory for items they are 
directed to remember or forget. The common finding in the DF paradigm is superior memory 
(most often assessed by recognition or recall) for items followed by a remember cue (TBR) 
than items followed by a forget cue (TBF) (MacLeod, 1975; MacLeod, 1999; Chiu et al., 2010), 
which is referred to as the DF effect.  
In the experiments described in this thesis the item-method is employed. Although 
emotion and memory control have been investigated using both methods, the majority of DF 
studies have used the item-method. One important goal of this thesis was to try and understand 
at least some of the variability in the literature. Hence, in order to do so, comparing results with 
previous studies is essential. Taken together, using the item-method would be a sensible way 
to start, and this was done consistently across all experiments in this thesis. A potential 
downfall of restricting the DF manipulation is that only one set of processes are investigated in 
these studies. The assumption is that a DF effect in both methods is a result from a different set 
of processes. In the item-method, processes during encoding are proposed to be responsible for 
a DF effect and in the list-method this has been linked with processes operating during retrieval. 
Of course, it is interesting to understand both sets of mechanisms as emotion may influence 
memory control at different stages. Particularly having in mind the challenges that people 
experience in certain pathological developments such as in PTSD. Therefore, investigating the 
list-method using a similar approach as taken in this thesis would be a sensible next step. 
However, implementing the item-method here may hopefully result in understanding the 





variability in findings, therefore the following description of processes supporting DF is 
restricted to that method. 
 
1.4.3.1 Processes Responsible for Directed Forgetting in the Item-Method 
Several explanations have been offered for the DF effect. Bjork (1972) argued that it is 
mainly caused by the selective rehearsal of TBR items, similarly MacLeod (1975) argued that 
the encoding of TBR items is enhanced compared to TBF items. An alternative account is that 
the differences in memory strengths between TBR and TBF items are due to reduced 
motivation by participants to retrieve TBF items and not because of differential processing at 
encoding (MacLeod, 1999). This latter possibility was examined by using a reward system in 
the item-method (Macleod, 1999). Participants were instructed to try and remember all TBR 
and TBF items in an initial recall test. To determine whether there was a motivational factor in 
play, participants were offered a reward for every additional TBF item that was remembered 
in a second recall task. A directed forgetting effect remained evident in the second recall test, 
with no additional TBF words that were remembered relative to the first recall test. This 
suggests that differential processing of TBR and TBF items does contribute to the directed 
forgetting effect and motivational factors do not play a role (MacLeod, 1999).  
  MacLeod (1975) considered two different accounts for the DF effect in the item-
method. The selective rehearsal account (Basden et al., 1993; Bjork, 1972), according to which 
all items are initially processed, but processing is discontinued when a forget instruction is 
presented. This results in TBR items being rehearsed and encoded more extensively than TBF 
items. The other account, the selective search account, proposes that TBR items are given a 
higher priority when searching for items (MacLeod, 1975). The former seems the most likely, 
since DF effects occur both in recall and recognition tasks in the item-method (MacLeod, 
1975). The reason for this observation is the fact that there is not typically considered to be 





much opportunity for, or indeed engagement with, selective search in recognition memory tests 
(Basden et al., 1993). Moreover, the selective search account assumes that all items have 
already been encoded and stored before receipt of DF instructions, which is not the case in the 
item-method (MacLeod, 1975). If it is the case that the selective search account is applicable, 
a DF effect would be absent under a recognition memory test. 
Arguably, if the selective rehearsal account is correct then it should be more effortful 
to remember than to forget, because TBF items should not be attended to or encoded as 
extensively as TBR items. However, in studies examining this, slower reaction times during 
forgetting were observed compared to remembering (e.g. Fawcett & Taylor, 2008), suggesting 
that forgetting is more effortful than remembering (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). This 
outcome suggests that different processes are applied to TBR and TBF items, and this 
possibility is supported by evidence provided in brain imaging studies (Anderson & 
Hanslmayr, 2014). In these studies, greater activity in the right superior and middle frontal 
gyrus and right inferior parietal lobe was observed for TBF items (that were subsequently 
forgotten) compared with TBR items that were subsequently forgotten (e.g. Nowicka, 
Marchewka, Jednoróg, Tacikowski, & Brechmann, 2011; Rizio & Dennis, 2013). Taken 
together, these findings suggest that processes during intentional forgetting are different from 
processes during incidental forgetting. Anderson and Hanslmayr (2014) concluded that a 
combination of processes operate upon TBR and TBF items during encoding, and that selective 
rehearsal and active inhibition, respectively, are responsible for the item-method DF effect. 
The evidence for inhibition being the process involved is indirect, in so far as it relies on the 
brain regions engaged in response to a TBF cue, but it is none the less an interesting proposal.  
 
 





1.5 Emotion and Memory 
The main research question that drives the empirical work in this thesis is the links 
between emotion, memory and memory control; more specifically, how does emotion influence 
the ability to exert control over what we remember and what we forget? A common finding is 
that memory for emotional material is enhanced compared to neutral material (Buchanan, 2007; 
Hamann, 2001; Reisberg & Heuer, 1992; for reviews see Kensinger & Kark, 2018; Levine & 
Edelstein, 2009). Memory enhancement for emotional material, it has been argued, may 
function to direct attention to threatening stimuli to facilitate rapid and appropriate responses 
(Bowen, Spaniol, Patel, & Voss, 2016; Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002; Yang, Lei, & Anderson, 2016). 
Linking this with the earlier descriptions of memory processes in section 1.4, one possibility is 
that attention bias works in favor of emotional information which as a result leads to enhanced 
memory. It may be that this is not a sufficient explanation in and of itself, however, and pre-
retrieval processes (that is, those that precede cue-trace interactions) are in play as well. This 
provides a mechanistic link to occasions when emotional memories  disrupt daily functioning 
and become intrusive or traumatic (Barnier et al., 2004; Eftekhari et al., 2009). This can be 
conceived as a failure to exert control over emotional memories. Therefore, the ability to forget 
certain memories is crucial and may help prevent to avoid such intrusive or traumatic 
memories.  To reiterate, links between emotion and memory are well-documented, although 
not thoroughly understood, and this is at least equally true for the links between emotion and 
control over memory. 
Emotional material can be recovered and reported more frequently than neutral material 
(Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). This has been referred to as the emotion-enhanced memory effect 
(EEM) (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992; Cahill & McGaugh, 1995; Kensinger & 
Corkin, 2003; Ochsner, 2000; Talmi, Anderson, Riggs, Caplan, & Moscovitch, 2008; Talmi, 





Schimmack, Paterson, & Moscovitch, 2007; for reviews see Levine & Edelstein, 2009), and 
might be due, in whole or in part, to better encoding and consolidation of emotional material.  
One explanation for the EEM is that emotional information reminds participants more often of 
personal experiences compared to neutral information. By associating this information with 
personal experiences, the consequence is enhanced memory for emotional material (Kensinger, 
& Corkin, 2004). 
 
1.5.1 Effect of Emotion on Encoding and Consolidation Processes 
Consolidation is a post-encoding process by which memories become more permanent 
and more resistant to loss (McGaugh, 2000). According to Bradley et al. (1992), there may be 
increased post-encoding elaboration for emotional material during consolidation. By this 
account, when arousal levels (a component of emotional material) increase, the likelihood that 
this information is rehearsed and elaborated upon increases as well. Moreover, because 
consolidation is considered to be a process that requires time, the enhanced effect of emotion 
on the consolidation process is thought to increase with time, making these memories more 
memorable than neutral ones (Hamann, 2001). However, often an immediate effect of emotion 
on memory is also observed in studies (e.g. Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Talmi et al., 2008). Hence, 
processes during consolidation alone might not be responsible for EEM. Rather a combination 
of processes during encoding and consolidation may offer a more accurate account.  
 The attention mediation hypothesis (Hamann, 2001) states that the enhanced allocation 
of attention towards emotional materials at the time of encoding underlies the EEM (Dolcos & 
Cabeza, 2002). Linking this to earlier observations in this thesis as well as the literature, Semon 
(1904) suggested that information is processed in fragments and the likelihood of retrieval 
depends upon which fragments we attend to (Schacter et al., 1978; Semon, 1904). The links 
between fragments of emotional material may be enhanced compared to neutral material, which 





offers a mechanistic explanation for why emotional materials are better remembered (Bowen 
et al., 2016; Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002), or more resistant to forgetting (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; 
Lambert et al., 2010). This enhanced allocation of attention towards emotional material has 
been argued to be modulated by increased levels of arousal (Bradley et al., 1992), based on a 
fairly common assumption that the arousal level of emotional information has an effect on 
memory (a detailed account on the effects of arousal on memory is described below). 
Emotional material has also been considered to be prioritized by processes that operate upon 
the information during encoding, at the expense of neutral material (Bowen et al., 2018). 
Taking these together, emotional material benefits from enhanced processing compared to 
neutral material, which consequently results in better memory.  
 
1.5.2 Effect of Emotion on Retrieval Processes 
   The discussion in section 1.2.2 of this thesis, however, also emphasizes that processes 
operating at the time of retrieval can be important with respect to what is retrieved from 
memory. The influence of emotion on retrieval processes may occur in at least two different 
ways; either at the level of the item or at the level of the state of the person who is attempting 
to remember.  
At the level of the item, some kinds of memory advantage for emotional content can be 
explained by the encoding specificity principle (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) or the principle of 
transfer-appropriate processing (Morris et al., 1977). In both cases, what happens during 
encoding is critical for whether retrieval cues are successful subsequently for retrieving specific 
information (Levine & Edelstein, 2009; Maratos & Rugg, 2001). In addition, it has been 
proposed that retrieval cues themselves can elicit the affective states that are comparable with 
those experienced during encoding, which may then facilitate retrieval of emotional material 
(Buchanan, 2007). It might also be the case, however, that the processing of emotional material 





at retrieval results in the engagement of additional processes, such as greater allocation of 
attention or prioritizing of resources in working memory such as rehearsing, which influences 
retrieval (Levine & Edelstein, 2009). In combination, these considerations offer several 
process-level possibilities for how encoding specificity or transfer-appropriate processing 
might be recruited to explain the EEM. 
At the level of the participant, mood state might also contribute to what is more likely 
to be retrieved, and more specifically to what kinds of emotional information are retrieved. Key 
concepts here are mood-dependent memory and mood-congruent memory (Bower & Mayer, 
1989; Eich, 1995). Mood-dependent memory refers to memory advantages when the mood-
state is similar during retrieval and encoding (e.g. retrieving information that has been encoded 
in a positive mood, during the experience of a positive mood). Bower et al. (1978) used 
hypnosis to induce a happy or a sad mood. Participants were instructed to learn a list of words 
in one of these mood states, after which they learned a second list either under the same mood 
or the opposite mood state. During a final recall test, participants were asked to recall words 
from both lists while being in a happy or sad mood. They observed better memory for words 
that were encoded and retrieved under the same mood state (Bower et al., 1978).  
Mood-congruent memory refers to memory advantages when the emotional component 
of information is similar to the mood state during retrieval (e.g. retrieving positive information 
in a positive mood) (Bower & Mayer, 1989; Buchanan, 2007). For example, Teasdale and 
Fogarty (1979) instructed participants to study a list of positive, negative and neutral words, 
and during the test phase they manipulated the mood state. Positive mood facilitated the recall 
of positive words, and negative mood the recall of negative words.  
In the experiments in this thesis, the primary focus is on item-level influences on 
emotion, remembering and forgetting. Notable exceptions are the additional individual 





difference measures acquired in Experiment 1, and the manipulation of emotion via context in 
Experiment 5. 
 
1.5.3 Response Criterion in Emotional Memory 
Despite the potential influence of response criterion on memory performance, response 
criterion has often been regarded as no more than a nuisance variable, which when determining 
memory performance should be corrected for. However, developments in the emotional 
memory literature have indicated this not to be the case (Windmann et al., 2002). A common 
finding in studies of memory and emotion when recognition memory is used as the test measure 
is a relatively more liberal criterion for emotional material compared to neutral material (Bailey 
& Chapman, 2012; Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008; Ochsner, 2000). As a result, 
in some instances it has been argued that apparent differences in memory for emotional 
material are in fact solely due to changes in response criterion (Kapucu et al., 2008; Windmann 
& Kutas, 2001). When response criterion changes across conditions, differences in memory are 
difficult to interpret (Dougal & Rotello, 2007). The reason for this difficulty has already been 
explained in section 1.3.1, and to anticipate, there will be a strong focus on changes in criterion 
and changes in sensitivity (memory performance) in this thesis, because many inconsistencies 
among published findings might be related to the links between these measures.  
One explanation for differences in criterion with emotion is that emotional materials 
are likely more prone to be associated with personal experiences, which can enhance the ‘sense 
of familiarity’ (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). This increased sense of familiarity, relative to 
neutral material, would result in a more lenient response criterion (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; 
Kapucu et al., 2008; Kensinger & Kark, 2018). By manipulating the level of categorical 
similarities within lists between negative and neutral words, White et al. (2015) examined the 
effects of categorical similarities on response criterion. The categorical level of words is the 





degree to which words share similar features (White et al., 2015). A liberal response criterion 
for emotional words was only observed when lists contained a high number of words that fell 
into similar categories (e.g. death, pain, failure). They proposed that a liberal response criterion 
for emotional material may be a consequence of categorical effects within an emotional 
category:  when a large number of words that share features are studied, old words as well as 
new words that appear during a test phase that share these features are more likely to be judged 
as having seen before (White et al., 2015). If this is the case, the categorical level of words 
within a list is what influences response criterion rather than the emotionality of a word, and in 
so far as these category influences promote a sense of familiarity or ‘gist’ (Koutstaal & 
Schacter, 1997; Schacter et al., 1998), they align changes in criterion with changes in 
familiarity. 
 
1.5.4 Valence and Arousal Effects on Memory 
Valence and arousal are two dimensions along which emotions can be considered 
(Russell, 1980). Valence is the pleasure or displeasure property of an item (Kensinger & 
Corkin, 2003), and arousal is the state of being physiologically alert, awake and attentive, and 
varies from calm to excitement (Dolcos & Denkova, 2008; Thayer, 1978). It has been argued 
that only arousal plays a role in enhancing memory for emotional material (Buchanan et al., 
2006; Ochsner, 2000). However, differences along the valence dimension have been shown to 
elicit memory enhancement, beyond the effects of arousal (Kensinger & Kark, 2018). Opinion 
is divided: while some have argued that EEM is a result of increased levels of arousal alone 
(Hamann, 2001; Mather, 2007), others emphasize that EEM may also be explained by effects 
of valence (Dolcos et al., 2004; Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003, 2004).  
In a study that examined whether arousal and valence predicted recognition memory, 
Adelman and Estes (2013) reanalyzed data from Cortese, Khanna and Hacker (2010). Memory 





was equivalent for positive and negative words and superior for both compared to neutral 
words. Assuming that arousal was equivalent for the emotional words, this suggests that 
differences in memory for emotional materials are due to arousal, because valence had no 
influence. Differences in memory, however, have also been observed between negative and 
positive material (Kensinger & Kark, 2018). For example, details of negative memories tend 
to be better remembered than details of positive memories (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006), and 
positive emotions are often associated with a feeling of familiarity, whereas recollection has 
been shown to be enhanced for negative emotions (Ochsner, 2000).  
Despite the evidence for differential effects of negative and positive emotions on 
memory, the majority of studies investigating the effect of emotion on memory (and memory 
control) have focused on differences between negative and neutral material (Brandt et al., 2013; 
Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Xie et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2016; 
Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). This may be explained by the general finding of enhanced 
memory for negative material relative to positive and neutral material (Minnema & Knowlton, 
2008; Ochsner, 2000; Otani et al., 2012). From a clinical perspective as well, examining the 
effects of negative emotions on memory may further the understanding of emotional disorders, 
such as PTSD (Engen & Anderson, 2018; McNally et al., 2004; McNally et al., 1998).  
There are two dominant explanations for why negative material is often associated with 
better memory than positive material (Ochsner, 2000). First, it may be that attentional biases 
are more pronounced for negative than positive information for the purpose of attending to 
threatening stimuli (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Yang et al., 2016), which may be survival-
relevant information (Bradley et al., 1992; Ochsner, 2000). Perhaps for the same reason, 
negative information may also benefit from prioritization or facilitated processing (Kensinger, 
& Corkin, 2004), leading to superior memory. This has been referred to as natural selective 
attention (Dolan et al., 1999). Using a Stroop task, Pratto and John (1991) examined differences 





in attentional bias between negative and positive personality traits. They observed longer 
reaction times for negative traits, which they interpreted as negative valence receiving more 
attention relative to positive valence.  
A second explanation is that negative material elicits more rumination and extensive 
elaboration (Engen & Anderson, 2018; Ochsner, 2000). Xie et al. (2018) examined the ability 
to remember and forget emotional material in participants with depressive tendencies, who 
experienced an increased difficulty to forget negative material. This provides some support for 
the rumination argument, because rumination is linked with depression (Garnefski & Kraaij, 
2007; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Nørby, 2018). 
 Turning to arousal, this physiological factor is considered to elicit an autonomic 
response and typically attracts attention (Dolan et al., 1999; Kensinger & Kark, 2018), which 
can result in enhanced encoding and consolidation (Madan, Shafer, et al., 2017; Maratos et al., 
2000). Examining the links between arousal and attention in EEM, Talmi et al. (2007) 
compared memory under a full attention condition and divided attention condition. In the full 
attention condition, participants commenced with an auditory discrimination task, followed by 
an encoding phase in which participants were presented with negative, positive and neutral 
images. After this, they were tested on their memory using a recall test. In the divided attention 
condition, the auditory discrimination task and the encoding phase of the images occurred 
simultaneously. During this phase participants were instructed to pay attention to the auditory 
discrimination task. When attention was divided, performance on the discrimination task was 
worse when participants viewed emotional images. Based on these findings, Talmi et al. (2007) 
concluded that arousal modifies attentional levels. In addition, mediator analyses indicated that 
attention mediated the effect of arousal on memory. In other words, superior memory is a result 
of enhanced allocation of attention due to increased levels of arousal. 





 The level of arousal tends to be higher in emotional material compared to neutral 
material (Buchanan et al., 2006; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). Although other stimulus 
properties may influence the memorability of emotional material as well, arousal is considered 
to be one of the main factors explaining enhanced memory for emotional material (Buchanan 
et al., 2006; Cahill & McGaugh, 1995; Ochsner, 2000; Phelps & Sharot, 2008; Sharot et al., 
2004).  
 
1.5.5 Item Properties of Emotional and Neutral Material 
The preceding section contained a detailed account of how arousal and valence might 
play a role in memory for emotional materials. There are also several other factors to consider 
when investigating factors that might influence memorability. Word properties and the 
properties of word sets are important considerations (Buchanan et al., 2006; Glanzer & Bowles, 
1976; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996; Madan et al., 2017; Maratos et al., 2000; Rugg & Doyle, 
1992; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004).  
In the experiments described in this thesis, four word properties are controlled for: word 
length, word frequency, semantic relatedness, and arousal. Word length is the measure of the 
number of letters a word consists of. Word frequency is the measure of the probability of 
occurrence of a word (Madan et al., 2012) and semantic relatedness is the level of inter-item 
associations within a set of words (Buchanan et al., 2006).  
 
1.5.5.1 Word Length 
The word length effect is the finding that short words are easier to remember than long 
words (Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975). This is most commonly observed when 
assessed via short-term memory tasks (Baddeley et al., 1975), and in long-term recall tasks 
(Russo & Grammatopoulou, 2003; Tehan & Tolan, 2007). However, the reverse of this word 





length effect has also been reported in lists where short and long words were intermixed 
(Katkov et al., 2014). This reversed word length effect has also been reported in recognition 
tasks (Tehan & Tolan, 2007). Hendry and Tehan (2005) argued that this reversal in recognition 
tasks is the result of long words taking longer to be processed and being more elaboratively 
processed in such a way that subsequent memory is better for long relative to short words. In 
studies of memory and emotion, word length is an important property to control for because 
emotional words tend to be longer relative to neutral words (Madan et al., 2017).  
 
1.5.5.2 Word Frequency 
The same reversal applies for word frequency. In recall tests, high frequency (HF) 
words are better recalled, whereas in recognition memory tests, memory is enhanced for low 
frequency (LF) words (Glanzer & Bowles, 1976; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996; Rugg & Doyle, 
1992). There are several accounts that attempt to explain this effect for LF words. One is that 
because people encounter LF words less than HF, they are relatively less familiar and receive 
more attention (Mandler, 1980). Another is that the degree of automaticity of processing a word 
decreases for LF words (MacLeod & Kampe, 1996), which ultimately leads to increased 
recognition of these words relative to HF words (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). A common 
assumption is that encoding processes for LF words are more extensive and elaborate relative 
to HF words, resulting in increased memory strength for LF words compared to HF words 
(Glanzer & Bowles, 1976; Kinsbourne & George, 1974; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996; Rugg & 
Doyle, 1992). Because emotional words occur less frequently relative to neutral words (Madan 
et al., 2017) it is important to remove this confound when investigating the influence of emotion 
on memory.  
 





1.5.5.3 Semantic Relatedness 
According to Tulving and Pearlstone (1966), because semantically related words are 
more accessible in memory, search parameters during retrieval are reduced. Hence, the degree 
of semantic relatedness between items within a word set can influence memorability. The 
degree of semantic relatedness for emotional words tends to be elevated relative to the semantic 
relatedness of neutral words (Buchanan et al., 2006; Kensinger & Kark, 2018), which in turn 
may facilitate memory for emotional words (Kensinger & Kark, 2018; Maratos et al., 2000; 
Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). To test the effect of relatedness on memory, Talmi and 
Moscovitch (2004) tested memory for emotional, random neutral and categorized neutral 
words. The categorized neutral words were words that were increased in the degree of 
relatedness (e.g. category kitchen). The degree of relatedness was equated between the 
emotional (negative) and categorized words and differed from the random neutral words. 
Memory for emotional words was enhanced relative to random neutral words, however this 
memory benefit was absent between emotional and categorized neutral words. Thus, equating 
the level of relatedness eliminated the memory benefits for emotional words. Talmi and 
Moscovitch (2004) concluded that enhanced memory for emotional words is linked to semantic 
relatedness. Dougal and Rotello (2007), conducted two experiments using the 
Remember/Know procedure, looking at memory for emotional and neutral words. The first 
experiment showed enhanced memory for negative words compared to positive and neutral 
words when semantic relatedness was not controlled for. In the second experiment, where 
semantic relatedness was controlled for between emotional and neutral words, no enhanced 
memory for emotional words was observed. Similar to other word properties, these patterns of 
data suggest that, when the degree of semantic relatedness is not controlled between emotional 
and neutral words, it can contribute to any differential memory outcomes that are observed.  
 





1.5.6 EEM in Memory Control 
Besides the effects of emotion on memory, the effects of emotion on memory control 
have also been examined. Emotional material is considered to be more resistant to forgetting 
compared to neutral material (for a review see Kensinger & Kark, 2018). It remains unclear, 
however, why this is the case (Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). One way of explaining this is 
perhaps a combination of enhanced encoding and consolidation processes that increase 
memory strength for emotional material and consequently make it more difficult to forget. 
Memory control paradigms (including DF, RIF and TNT) have been used to investigate 
whether, and if so how, memory for emotional materials can be controlled. Findings for the 
links between emotion and memory control in RIF (Barnier et al., 2004; Dehli & Brennen, 
2008; Harris et al., 2010; Hauer & Wessel, 2006; Moulds & Kandris, 2006) and TNT (Chen et 
al., 2012; Lambert et al., 2010) are mixed. In RIF for example, Dehli and Brennen (2008) used 
emotional and neutral category-exemplar pairs and instructed participants to make old and new 
judgments in a recognition memory test after a retrieval-practice phase. They observed only a 
RIF effect for neutral items, indicating that emotional words were resistant to retrieval-induced 
forgetting (for similar findings see Blix & Brennen, 2012; Moulds & Kandris, 2006). Other 
researchers have found inconsistent differences in RIF between positive and negative valence 
stimuli. While some have found a RIF effect for negative material compared to positive 
material (Harris et al., 2010), others have found the reverse (Hauer & Wessel, 2006). There are 
also reports of no differences in the RIF effect between emotional and neutral material (Barnier 
et al., 2004). These mixed findings in the effects of emotion on RIF have been explained by 
the use of different types of measurements (Barber & Mather, 2012). For example, Blix and 
Brennen (2012) highlighted that different memory tests have been used in these studies which 
might explain the inconsistencies in the effect of emotion on RIF (recognition memory: Blix 





& Brennen, 2012; Dehli & Brennen, 2008; recall memory: Harris et al., 2010; Hauer & Wessel, 
2006). 
In the TNT literature, the general findings are that emotional words are more resistant 
to attempts to forget (‘not thinking’) than are neutral words (Chen et al., 2012; Lambert et al., 
2010). Chen et al. (2012) used face-picture pairs as cue-target pairs in which the faces had 
neutral expressions and images were manipulated in valence (negative and neutral valence). 
After the TNT phase, participants were presented with faces from the study phase and were 
instructed to recall the images that were previously paired with these faces in a cued-recall test. 
They observed that negative images were resistant to forgetting, suggesting that participants 
were less successful in ‘not thinking’ about the negative images compared to neutral images 
(Chen et al., 2012). 
 
1.5.6.1 EEM in Directed Forgetting 
Examining the effect of emotion on DF has been done using the two widely used DF 
methods; the item-method and the list-method. The materials used in these studies have 
included words and/or images (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Brandt et al., 2013; Gallant, Pun, & 
Yang, 2018; Gallant & Yang, 2014; Hauswald, Schulz, Iordanov, & Kissler, 2011; Liu, Chen, 
& Cheng, 2017; Marchewka et al., 2016; Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; Nowicka et al., 2011; 
Otani et al., 2012; Payne & Corrigan, 2007; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006; Xie et al., 2018; 
Yang et al., 2016).  
Table 1.1 provides a summary of outcomes in critical studies. The table shows there is 
variability in findings: there have been studies observing similar DF effects for emotional 
material relative to neutral material, which indicates that, at least in those cases, emotion did 
not affect memory control (Gallant & Yang, 2014; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006). Other 
studies, however, have found a reduced DF effect for emotional material relative to neutral 





ones, suggesting that emotional material is more resistant to intentional forgetting (Bailey & 
Chapman, 2012; Hauswald et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2017; Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; Nowicka 
et al., 2011; Otani et al., 2012; Payne & Corrigan, 2007; Yang et al., 2016). These studies differ 
in the type of stimuli (e.g. words or images) that were used and to what extent the stimuli used 
had controls for critical factors (e.g. word frequency). The differences in findings are unlikely 
to be due completely to the factors controlled for in these studies, as inconsistent findings have 
been observed in studies where similar control has been exerted. In addition to providing an 
overview of the inconsistent findings in DF studies investigating the links between emotion 
and memory control, the table gives a full description of which types of stimuli were used and 
which factors were controlled for. 
 





Table 1.1  
An Overview of Previous Findings on the Effects of Emotion on Directed Forgetting, Memory Sensitivity and Response Criterion 
Study Stimulus Valence Stimulus control Findings 
    
DF effects Memory sensitivity Response criterion 
Wessel & Merckelbach, 
(2006) 
Words Negative and neutral   Similar DF effects for negative  
and neutral words 
Equal memory for negative and neutral  
words 
  
Payne & Corrigan, (2007) Images Negative, positive and  
neutral 
Arousal (negative and 
positive) 
Smaller DF for emotional relative to 
neutral images 
Superior memory for emotional relative 
to neutral images 
 
Minnema & Knowlton, 
(2008) 
Words Negative, positive and  
neutral 
Arousal (negative and 
positive), length, 
frequency, syllables and 
semantic relatedness 
Smaller DF for negative relative to 
positive and neutral words 
Superior memory for negative relative to 
positive and neutral words 
 
Nowicka et al., (2011) Images Negative (fear & 
disgust) and neutral 
 
Smaller DF for negative relative to 
neutral images 
Superior memory for negative relative to 
neutral images 
 
Bailey & Chapman, 
(2012) 
Words Negative, positive and  
neutral 
Arousal (negative and 
positive) 
Smaller DF for emotional relative to 
neutral words 
Superior memory for neutral relative to  
emotional words 
Liberal criterion for emotional 
words 
Hauswald et al.,( 2011) Images Negative and neutral 
 
Smaller DF for negative relative to 
neutral images 
Equal memory for negative and neutral  
images 
Liberal criterion for negative 
images 
Otani et al., (2012) Images Negative, positive and  
neutral 
Arousal (negative and 
positive) 
Smaller DF for negative relative to 
positive and neutral images 
Superior memory for negative relative to 
positive and neutral images 
 
Yang et al., (2012) Images Negative and neutral Arousal Similar DF effects for negative and 
neutral images 
Equal memory for negative and neutral  
images 
Liberal criterion for negative 
images 
Brandt et al., (2013) Words Negative and neutral Frequency   Greater DF for negative relative to 
neutral words 
Superior memory for negative relative to 
neutral words 
 
Gallant & Yang, (2014) Words Negative, positive and  
neutral 
Arousal, length and 
frequency 
Similar DF effects for emotional  
and neutral words 
Superior memory for emotional relative 
to neutral words  
 
Yang et al., (2016) Words Negative and neutral Frequency and 
familiarity 
Smaller DF for negative relative to 
neutral words 
Superior memory for negative relative to 
neutral words 
 
Marchewka et al., (2016) Images Negative (fear, disgust & 
sadness) and neutral 
 
Similar DF effects for negative  
and neutral images 
Superior memory for negative relative to 
neutral images 
Liberal criterion for negative 
images 
Li, Wang, & Han, (2017) Phrases Negative, positive and  
neutral 
Arousal (negative and 
positive) 
Smaller DF effects for negative relative 
to positive and neutral phrases 
Superior memory for emotional relative 
to neutral phrases 
 











Berger, Crossman, & 
Brandt, (2018) 
Words Negative, positive and  
neutral 
Arousal (negative and 
positive) and word 
frequency 
Similar DF effects for emotional  
and neutral words 
Superior memory for neutral relative to  
emotional words 
Liberal criterion for emotional 
words 
Gallant et al., (2018) Words Negative, positive and  
neutral 
Arousal, length and 
frequency 
Similar DF effects for emotional  
and neutral words 
Equal memory for emotional and neutral  
words 
Liberal criterion for emotional 
words 
Taylor, Cutmore, & Pries, 
(2018) 
Images Negative, positive and  
neutral 
  Similar DF effects for emotional  
and neutral images 
Superior memory for emotional relative 
to neutral images 
  





The degree of semantic relatedness between words in a set influences the memorability 
of the words (Buchanan et al., 2006). It may also be the case that when relatedness is matched 
between emotional and neutral words, this manipulation eliminates effects of emotion on DF. 
However, Minnema and Knowlton (2008) conducted a list-method DF study using negative, 
positive and neutral words and observed the opposite. They used free association norms for 
each word to control for any words that were strongly related within a list. The association 
norms measure the likelihood that a word generates other words, which is presumably increased 
when words are elevated in the degree of relatedness (Nelson et al., 2004). Words that had some 
degree of association (i.e. words that generated existing words in a list) were placed in different 
lists. In addition, words were matched for word frequency, length, and number of syllables, as 
well as for arousal between negative and positive words. Recall for negative words was superior 
compared to positive and neutral words, and there was a diminished DF effect for negative 
words. In a second experiment, to examine the effects of arousal on DF, arousal levels were 
elevated for half of the participants. Again, they found a reduced DF effect for negative words 
relative to positive and neutral words. Minnema and Knowlton (2008) argued that the 
diminished DF effect for negative words is caused by a higher arousal level of negative words 
relative to neutral words. However, this does not explain why negative words were better 
remembered compared to positive words since arousal levels were controlled for between 
negative and positive words. 
The most common approach in the item-method DF paradigm, is to present the 
instruction cues (remember/forget) after each stimulus. For emotional material, the period 
between stimulus and cue presentation may result in extensive encoding relative to neutral 
material, which perhaps explains the diminished DF effects for emotional material (Bailey & 
Chapman, 2012). To test this possibility, Bailey and Chapman (2012) reduced the encoding 
opportunity by presenting the stimuli (words) and instructions simultaneously. The colour of 





the words served as the remember or forget cue. They used negative, positive and neutral words 
and controlled only for arousal levels between negative and positive words. Participants were 
later tested using recall and recognition tests. A diminished DF effect was observed for both 
negative and positive words relative to neutral words in both tests. However, they found 
memory sensitivity to be superior for neutral words compared to emotional words. Thus, the 
extended encoding of emotional material due to a gap between stimulus and cue presentation 
does not explain a diminished DF effect for emotional material, although they did not directly 
compare both approaches in their experiment. 
Other item-method studies in which the remember and forget cues were presented after 
the stimulus, using emotional and neutral images, have revealed similar DF findings when using 
a recognition test (e.g. Nowicka, Jednoróg, Wypych, & Marchewka, 2009), and when using a 
recall test (e.g. Otani et al., 2012). They differ, however, in finding better memory sensitivity 
for emotional relative to neutral material. One reason for these discrepancies might be that 
participants in Bailey and Chapman's (2012) study were more focused on the instruction 
because these were presented simultaneously with the study material and diminished the 
emotional effect on memory, which was not the case in the other studies (Nowicka et al., 2009; 
Otani et al., 2012). 
In contrast to the above findings for DF, in some other studies there has been no effect 
of emotion on DF effects. Using the list-method, Wessel and Merckelbach (2006) presented 
participants with either two negative word lists or two neutral word lists. Which word properties 
were controlled for was not reported. After the study phase participants were tested using both 
a recall and a recognition memory test. They observed equivalent memory and DF effects for 
both negative and neutral words in the recall test. In the recognition test, there was no DF effect, 
which replicates findings in other comparisons of the item- and list-method where no DF effect 
was visible when applying a recognition test in the list-method  (Basden et al., 1993; MacLeod, 





1999). Moreover, memory did not vary according to emotion. Similarly, Gallant and Yang 
(2014), using the item-method, observed no effects of emotion on the DF effect but did observe 
better memory for emotional words after a recognition memory test. These findings were 
replicated by Gallant et al. (2018), who observed no effects of emotion on DF. Also, they did 
not find any differences in memory between emotional and neutral words. In both studies the 
authors controlled the three valence categories (negative, positive and neutral) for word length, 
frequency, and arousal. Gallant et al. (2018) suggested that because the words were matched 
for arousal, no enhanced memory was observed for emotional words, and emotion did not have 
an effect on the DF effect, which has also been argued by Minnema and Knowlton (2008). 
However, this still may not be enough to explain the inconsistencies in the DF literature for 
emotional material. Brandt et al. (2013), using negative and neutral words that were matched 
on frequency but differed on arousal levels, found a larger DF effect for negative relative to 
neutral words.  
Wessel and Merckelbach (2006) argued that the inconsistent findings described above 
are a product of timing and stimulus presentation differences across DF paradigms. They argued 
that studies observing memory benefits and diminished DF effects for emotional material have 
used a minimal time to present words (e.g. 180ms), thereby offering little time for elaborative 
encoding of stimuli and creating an advantage for emotional over neutral items. However, 
findings from various DF studies suggest otherwise. The presentation time of the stimulus 
varies within studies with diminished DF effects for emotional material (ranging from 500-
5000ms) and in studies without these effects (ranging from 1000-3000ms). This set of outcomes 
suggests that variations in presentation time are not a good predictor of whether an effect of 
emotion on DF will be observed. Furthermore, Wessel and Merckelbach (2006) proposed that 
the method of instruction presentation may also affect the encoding processes of the item and 
therefore affect memory sensitivity between the valence categories. For example, presenting 





the remember/forget instruction simultaneously with the stimuli, as in Bailey and Chapman's 
(2012) study, may require different cognitive operations to those associated with DF when the 
cue is delayed. In the case of simultaneous presentation, participants may choose to simply 
ignore items they were instructed to forget instead of making an attempt to forget these items 
after they have been encoded. According to Brandt et al., (2013) a temporal separation between 
the study material and the remember/forget instruction is critical to investigate processes 
responsible for DF effects. However, the observation of a DF effect and diminished DF effect 
for emotional words in Bailey and Chapman's (2012) study suggests otherwise.  
Adding further complexity, there has not been consistency in terms of stimulus control 
throughout these studies, as well as reporting omissions in some cases (Liu et al., 2017; 
Marchewka et al., 2016; Nowicka et al., 2011; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006). In most studies 
there has been control over word length (Gallant & Yang, 2014; Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; 
Myers et al., 1998), word frequency (Brandt et al., 2013; Gallant & Yang, 2014; McNally et 
al., 1998; Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; Moulds & Bryant, 2002; Myers et al., 1998; Yang et 
al., 2016), and arousal between negative and positive material (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; 
Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; Otani et al., 2012; Payne & Corrigan, 2007). After controlling 
for all of these item properties, Minnema and Knowlton (2008) also measured the association 
norms within lists to reduce the likelihood of words within a list leading to the generation of 
words existing in the same list. However, most of these studies mentioned above did not control 
for these item properties altogether. This makes it challenging to detect an overall pattern which 
might explain the inconsistencies in the DF literature for emotional material.  
 The inconsistencies in the existing literature in terms of outcomes, properties that are 
controlled for, and how criterion is accounted for, have guided the set of experiments in this 
thesis. At issue are questions about the links between emotion and memory control, differential 
effects of positive and negative valence, and the links between changes in sensitivity (accuracy) 





and changes in criterion. The variability in published findings makes it challenging to make 
strong predictions, but based on the mechanisms and theories discussed in earlier sections some 
cautious predictions can be made. Although the work in this thesis is not designed to provide 
an answer to the question ‘What processes are responsible for memory control?’, it is expected 
that memory control will be more difficult for emotional compared to neutral material. This 
will be manifest in lower rates of forgetting for emotional as compared to neutral contents. 
Second, because recollection is considered to be a controlled process while familiarity is not, 
then in the experiments measuring recollection and familiarity, a directed forgetting effect will 
be observed only for recollection.  
 With respect to emotion and memory, when controlling for confounding factors, in this 
thesis it is expected to find no differences in memory sensitivity between emotional and neutral 
materials. These confounding factors relate to the control of stimulus properties, most notably 
semantic relatedness (Dougal & Rotello, 2007). This consistency of control is important, 
because a consistent set of findings across this series of studies would strongly argue that the 
variability in the literature is (at least partially) due to the different control over possible 
confounding factors in published work to date. 
Key outcomes in all experiments reported here are behavioural measures, as already 
indicated. Moreover, as already alluded to, in some experiments electrophysiological measures 
are also employed. For this reason, the following section describes fundamental aspects of the 
use of real time measures of brain activity to inform questions about human memory. 
 
 
1.6 Electroencephalography (EEG) Technology  
1.6.1 Fundamentals of EEG 
Berger (1924; as cited in Teplan, 2002) showed that electric currents generated in the 
brain can be recorded in real time via electrodes placed on the outside of the skull. This was the 





beginning of the use of electroencephalography (EEG) to study brain function. EEG now 
commonly involves the recording of electrical brain activity using electrodes that are placed on 
the scalp. 
Electrical activity that is recordable at the surface of the skull reflects large populations 
of active neurons firing simultaneously (Picton et al., 2000; Teplan, 2002). However, not all 
electrical brain activity is detectable with EEG. Failures to detect activity occur when neurons 
do not fire synchronously and/or are not properly arranged for the activity that is produced to 
propagate to the scalp. What this means is that non-significant findings when contrasting brain 
activity in two conditions do not allow the claim that the same processing occurred in those 
conditions (Coles & Rugg, 1995; Rugg, 1995b). 
One way to measure EEG is to assess activity in different frequency bands. For example, 
brain oscillations can be characterised into at least five bands: Gamma (>30 Hz), Beta (13-30 
Hz), Alpha (8-13 Hz), Theta (4-8 Hz) and Delta (0.5-4 Hz) (Jackson & Bolger, 2014; Luck, 
2014; Teplan, 2002). Activity in these bands varies according to detectable changes such as 
alertness, sleep status and the cognitive processes that are engaged while recording is taking 
place. Another way of measuring EEG is to assess activity in the time domain, plotting voltage 
changes over time. This is most commonly done by recording EEG time-locked to events of 
interest. Perhaps the most common form of time-locking is to stimuli that require a response 
from a participant. Other kinds of time-locking can, however, be employed, for example, 
response-locking (Luck, 2014). These event-locked elements of the EEG are referred to as 
event-related potentials (ERPs; Coles & Rugg, 1995; Rugg, 1995b).  
The ERPs typically subjected to analysis are most commonly averages of numerous 
trials of the same condition. This is because the signal:noise ratio on individual trials makes 
analysis of them difficult (Luck, 2014). Averaging over numerous trials should retain the signal 
(assuming it is consistent across trials) while reducing the noise (assuming it is random across 





trials) (Luck, 2014). There are, however, several caveats here. First, if there is variability in the 
timing of modulations of interest across trials this will influence the averaged ERP that is 
obtained: with greater variability (often referred to as latency jitter) the averaged ERP will be 
smoothed out and the maximum amplitude will be reduced (Coles & Rugg, 1995; Luck, 2014; 
Picton et al., 2000). So, in principle differences in amplitude across conditions might reflect 
only differences in jitter. Furthermore, in some cases the assumption of consistency of signal 
across trials is acknowledged as not being met. For example, in experiments where forced 
choice decisions are made it is reasonable to assume that in at least some cases the neural 
activity on some trials will differ from that on others. For example, the neural activity 
underpinning a guess, or a decision based on low quality information, will in all likelihood 
differ from that underpinning a highly confident response.  
 
1.6.2 Models of ERP Generation  
The classical ‘evoked’ model, holds that ERPs are transient, fixed latency and fixed 
polarity responses to a stimulus and/or event (Hanslmayr et al., 2007). However, Hanslmayr et 
al. (2007) argue that the evoked model does not fully account for the generation of ERPs. They 
report evidence for a different ‘phase-reset’ model. This model holds that mechanisms 
underlying ERP generation can be partially explained via the reorganization of oscillations 
(Sayers et al., 1974). The phase-reset model assumes that oscillations undergo a reset that 
generates evoked components in response to a stimulus and/or event. To clarify, each single 
trial as a response to a stimulus of a certain frequency is reset. These trials are averaged, with 
the result bringing an ERP after the phase reset (Sauseng & Klimesch, 2008).  
The accuracy of these competing accounts does not impact directly on the use of ERPs 
to make inferences about cognitive operations, in so far as the signal of interest is the averaged 
neural signature associated with different experiment conditions. In cognitive 





electrophysiology, the main purpose of employing ERPs is to use them to understand human 
information processing. The key to this approach is the assumption that using ERPs alongside 
behavioural measures can provide insights that are not available via behavioural measures 
alone, and/or can provide converging forms of evidence (Rugg, 1995b; Rugg, & Coles, 1995). 
ERPs can be used in this way to permit inferences about what processes were engaged, their 
time-courses and their properties.  
 
1.6.3 Interpreting ERP Data 
One way of characterising ERPs is by delineating the series of peaks and troughs, 
establishing the functional significance of each, and then observing how they vary according to 
conditions of interest (Donchin, 1966; Picton et al., 2000). For example, how does P3b vary 
with smoking status or arousal? Another approach is to identify ERP modulations via a contrast 
between experiment conditions of interest, for example, between items attracting old and new 
judgments on a recognition memory task. The underlying assumption here is that the contrast 
will allow a meaningful functional interpretation of any divergences between the associated 
ERPs, and via this approach the modulations that are identified might span one or more peaks 
and troughs as described above. For any given ERP signature of a cognitive process, the latency 
of the relevant ERP peak is used to infer when the cognitive process is maximally active. To 
infer how strongly a process is engaged, the amplitude is used (Luck, 2014; Kutas, & Dale, 
1997). 
 
1.6.4 Methods of ERP Acquisition 
In order to collect EEG data, most commonly an elasticised cap containing electrodes is 
placed on the scalp (see Figure 1.4A). The number of electrodes required depends on the 
experimental design and pre-existing knowledge of where effects might be largest (Luck, 





2014). Electrodes that are spaced sufficiently close together, increasing the number of 
electrodes, allows for precise measurement of the distribution of neural activity over the scalp. 
When electrodes are placed too far apart, one risk is that information is missed (Luck, 2014). A 
typical approach is to use an array that covers the scalp, and as one widely used visualisation 
tool is of scalp distribution, 64 or more electrodes should be used in order to ensure that these 
visualisations (often based on spherical spline interpolations) are accurate (Luck, 2014). When 
analyses, however, are targeted to specific modulations, or broadly distributed modulations, 
fewer than 64 electrodes could be sufficient.  
Capture of the signal propagating to the scalp is commonly facilitated by applying a gel 
that contains conducting electrolytes and which sits between the electrodes and the scalp. 
Electrodes are commonly placed according to the international 10/20 system (see Figure 1.4B; 
Klem, Luders, Jasper, & Elger, 1958). There are other systems (Luck, 2014), but the 10/20 
system is described here because it is used in the experiments described in this thesis. In this 
system, the electrodes are labelled by a letter and a number. The letter corresponds broadly to 
the cortex area underlying the electrode (e.g. F corresponds to the frontal cortex and T 
corresponds to the temporal cortex). Electrodes placed between two cortical regions are 
designated by two letters (e.g. FC refers to frontal-central). The number indicates on which side 
and how far from the midline the electrode is placed. Odd numbers correspond to the left side 
of the scalp and even numbers to the right side, low numbers being more medial locations than 
higher numbers. The letter z refers to the midline from the scalp which goes from the front to 
the back of the scalp (e.g. POz refers to the electrode in the parietal-occipital cortical region on 
the midline). 







Alongside the active electrodes (those from which a signal of interest will be acquired), 
EEG recordings also require a ground electrode and a reference electrode (Luck, 2014). The 
ground electrode assists in reducing electrical noise from power lines and other sources. EEG 
is a relative measure and signals at active electrodes represent the difference between activity 
there and at the reference electrode. For example, a nose tip or vertex reference might be used. 
Other common references include the average of the signal at the two mastoids (as is the case 
in the ERP experiments in this thesis) or an average reference (Luck, 2014). The preference for 
using the two mastoids as reference in this thesis is because this is a method that is widely used 
in the memory literature, which facilitates comparison of results between different studies.  
The perfect situation to record electrical brain activity would be when the recorded 
activity would only contain relevant brain activities that represent cognitive processes. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case and besides these cognitive processes, EEG recordings 
contain artefacts, generated by events such as muscle activities (including eye blinks) and 
Figure 1.4. (A) An elasticised cap that contains the electrodes. (B) Electrode locations of the 10-20 system, as 
standardized by the American Electroencephalographic Society (Klem et al., 1958). 





sweating. In addition to physically (participant) related artefacts, the EEG will also pick up 
technical electrical noise (Luck, 2014; Teplan, 2002). In order to identify relevant and 
meaningful components in EEG data it is necessary to remove artefacts. This can be done during 
online acquisition of the EEG data and/or offline after data has been acquired. For physical 
artefacts, placing extra electrodes that record these physical artefacts is helpful in order to clean 
the data. For example, electrodes that record eye blinking will help in identifying non-relevant 
activity and to subsequently remove this artefact from the data. Eye movements can be recorded 
by using an electro-oculogram (EOG) with electrodes placed on the supra- and suborbital ridges 
of the eyes (Luck, 2014; Teplan, 2002). In addition, providing participants with specific 
instructions also helps to reduce the number of artefacts in the EEG data. For example, asking 
participants to reduce eye blinking or to limit eye blinking to a specific cue on the screen, 
although this can also introduce a dual-task requirement that might be of concern when testing 
specific groups, for example older participants, in certain kinds of paradigms. 
 
1.6.5 ERPs in Recognition Memory 
The most studied ERP correlates in recognition memory are ‘old/new effects’, which 
are differences between the neural activities elicited by old and new test items attracting correct 
judgements (Warren, 1980). The rationale for this contrast is that it may reveal processes that 
support memory judgements (Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Sanquist et al., 1980). Separable 
old/new effects for recollection and familiarity have been identified (Friedman & Johnson, 
2000; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008). 
 
1.6.5.1 Recollection - The Left-Parietal Old/New Effect 
The ERP correlate that has been linked with recollection is the left-parietal old/new 
effect. It onsets around 400-500ms post-stimulus with a left-sided posterior maximum and lasts 





for 400-500ms in recognition memory tasks (Rugg & Curran, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002). In an 
early study by Sanquist et al. (1980) participants were instructed to judge whether two sets of 
words were similar or different based on three conditions: (i) orthographic (upper or lower 
case), (ii) phonemic (rhyming) and (iii) semantic (synonyms). For ERPs recorded in a 
subsequent recognition memory test they found increased positivity over parietal sites for 
judgements in the phonemic and semantic conditions. Furthermore, a greater positivity was 
found over parietal sites for words that were correctly recognized as old compared to words 
that were correctly recognized as new: a typical left-parietal old/new effect (Sanquist et al., 
1980). This outcome links the parietal effect to recollection because it was larger (more 
positive-going) in the conditions associated with deeper processing (phonemic and semantic) 
that are likely to give rise to greater recollection (e.g. Rugg et al., 1998). 
According to Rugg and Curran (2007), the strongest evidence that the left-parietal 
old/new effect indexes recollection is how the effect behaves in tasks requiring 
Remember/Know judgements or source judgements. The effect is larger (more positive-going) 
for Remember (reflecting recollection processes) than for Know judgements (Smith, 1993), and 
larger when source judgements are correct than when they are incorrect (Wilding et al., 1995; 
Wilding & Rugg, 1996). It is also larger when two rather than one source judgements are correct 
(Vilberg & Rugg, 2008; Wilding, 2000). For example, in a study by Wilding and Rugg (1996), 
participants were asked to judge whether words judged as old were previously presented in a 
male or female voice. The typical left-parietal old/new effect increased in magnitude for correct 
source (voice) judgements compared to incorrect source judgements.  
 
1.6.5.2 Familiarity - The Mid-Frontal Old/New Effect (FN400) 
The mid-frontal old/new effect, also referred to as the FN400, has been linked with the 
process of familiarity. While there are some early studies where, on inspection, a FN400 might 





be evident (e.g. Düzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, Heinze, & Tulving, 1997; Sanquist et al., 1980; 
Smith, 1993; Wilding & Rugg, 1996), the first strong proposal was made by Rugg and 
colleagues (1998). They gave participants instructions to encode items deeply (sentence 
generation) or shallowly (alphabetic judgement). This encoding task was followed by a 
recognition memory test. In addition to a left-parietal old/new effect, they observed a second 
effect that was of the same magnitude for deeply and shallowly studied items. The effect 
comprised a greater relative positivity for old items than new items from around 300-500ms 
with a frontal scalp distribution. It was evident only for old items judged correctly to be old. 
While this effect was not the focus of their paper, Rugg et al. (1998) suggested that this was a 
candidate for an index of familiarity because behavioural data indicate that depth of processing 
does not impact markedly on the process of familiarity (for reviews and discussions, see Curran, 
2000; Paller, Voss, & Boehm, 2007; Rugg et al., 1998).  
In a study by Curran (2000), participants were presented with studied words, words that 
were similar to the studied words and new words in a recognition memory test. Besides a typical 
left-parietal old/new effect, there was a greater mid-frontal old/new effect for similar words 
relative to new words and there was no difference in the old/new effect between studied and 
similar words study. Studied and similar words should be more familiar than new words, thus 
these findings are consistent with a view of the mid-frontal old/new effect as an index of 
familiarity. These findings have also been replicated using images instead of words (Curran & 
Cleary, 2003). In addition, another study that provides evidence for the case of the mid-frontal 
old/new effect as an index of familiarity used a Remember/Know paradigm combined with 
confidence judgements (Woodruff et al., 2006). If familiarity is a graded process, then neural 
activity should covary with differences in confidence for Know judgements. Woodruff et al. 
(2006) found the mid-frontal old/new effect to be largest for highly confident responses relative 





to less confident responses, linking the mid-frontal old/new effect to familiarity strength (also 
see Curran, 2004).  
Although these results are consistent with a familiarity account of the mid-frontal 
old/new effect (i.e. FN400), whether the FN400 is an index of familiarity is a matter of ongoing 
debate (Paller et al., 2007; Voss et al., 2012). It has been argued that the FN400 is not 
functionally distinct from the N400, which is apparent mostly over centro-parietal sites and is 
linked with conceptual priming (Bridger et al., 2012; Paller et al., 2007; Voss et al., 2012). 
Consequently, the FN400 has been interpreted as an index for conceptual priming, a form of 
implicit memory, rather than familiarity (Paller et al., 2007; Rugg & Curran, 2007; for a review 
of results see Voss et al., 2012). Bridger et al. (2012), however, demonstrated that the N400 and 
the FN400 differ functionally and topographically from each other. They achieved this by 
separating neural activity that could be elicited by conceptual priming (in a study phase) from 
activity that could be elicited by familiarity-based judgements (in a test phase). Participants 
were presented with primed and un-primed targets to which they were asked to make valence 
ratings. This allowed them to look into neural activity that was elicited by conceptual priming 
separately from any memory judgements. In a surprise recognition test, participants were 
presented only with un-primed targets and new words and instructed to make old/new 
judgements. Hence, by only presenting un-primed targets, if a FN400 was found this could be 
linked with familiarity and not with conceptual priming. They found a greater N400 for un-
primed targets compared to primed targets in the study phase, which was distributed over 
centro-parietal sites. For the recognition phase, they found a typical mid-frontal old/new effect 
that peaked around 300-500ms and was distributed over frontal sites. Bridger et al. (2012) 
interpreted these findings as evidence for functional differences between the N400, indexing 
conceptual priming, and the FN400, indexing familiarity-based recognition memory. In 
addition, Mecklinger, Frings and Rosburg (2012) argued that the arguments made against the 





FN400 as an index for familiarity, are inconsistent with both electrophysiology and behavioral 
data. For example, the FN400 varies where conceptual priming is held constant during a 
recognition test (e.g. Groh-Bordin, Zimmer, & Mecklinger, 2005). Furthermore, behavioural 
data indicating changes in conceptual priming have not always correlated with variations in the 
FN400 signal (Johansson et al., 2004).  
 
1.6.5.3 ERP Correlates of Emotional Material 
Neural activity has also been found to vary for emotional material. In general, an 
enhanced early posterior negativity (EPN) within the time region of 200-300ms after stimulus 
onset has been found for emotional material compared to neutral material (Herbert et al., 2008; 
Schupp et al., 2003). This enhanced EPN has been proposed to reflect selective sensory 
encoding (Kok, 1997). Later in the processing of emotional material, around 400-600ms over 
parietal sites, an enhanced late positive potential (LPP) has been observed (Cuthbert et al., 
2000). The same enhanced LPP is observed when participants are instructed to attend to and/or 
remember specific stimuli, however, with emotional material these processes may work 
automatically (Hauswald et al., 2011). In summary, both the EPN and LPP have been 
interpreted as indexing enhanced processing afforded emotional material, perhaps due to the 
importance of perceiving and evaluating information relevant to threat or well-being (Bailey & 
Chapman, 2012; Bradley et al., 1992; Ochsner, 2000).  
These modulations are a helpful tool for assessing how emotion influences cognitive 
processing, and some of these changes may be relevant for memory encoding or retrieval. In 
and of themselves, however, changes in these modulations cannot be linked directly to memory 
processes.  
In addition to the ways of exploring retrieval in the discussion of old/new effects, 
another means of assessing memory with ERPs is via subsequent memory effects (also called 





Dm: Difference due to Memory) (Paller et al., 1987). These are obtained by contrasting neural 
activity during encoding for items that receive correct or incorrect judgements on a subsequent 
memory task. They are assumed to reflect processes that support successful encoding. While 
there are examples of the use of Dm effects to study encoding of emotional materials (for 
example, Yick, Buratto and Schaefer (2015) reported larger Dm effects for high rather than low 
arousal images), it is arguable whether new insights into emotion and memory have been 
achieved by this approach to date. These effects are returned to in more detail in section 3.3. 
 
1.6.5.4 ERPs and the Directed-Forgetting Paradigm 
A common finding for ERPs in the Directed Forgetting paradigm is differences between 
neural activities for  TBR and TBF items (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Hauswald et al., 2011; Liu 
et al., 2017; Paller, 1990). In general, an enhanced positivity over parietal scalp regions during 
300-500ms after the cue onset for TBR compared to TBF items has been reported. This 
enhanced positivity strongly resembles the P300 effect, which is thought to reflect attentional 
processes and has been linked with memory encoding (Kok, 1997). Moreover, this ERP effect 
resembles the LPP effect, which is linked with processes engaged when people are instructed 
to remember stimuli (Hauswald et al., 2011). This enhanced positivity is thought to indicate the 
initiation of encoding processes for TBR items, and in this sense the data are consistent with 
the selective rehearsal account (Hauswald et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2017). In addition, Hauswald 
et al. (2011) observed an enhanced frontal positivity from 500-700ms after cue onset for TBF 
items compared to TBR items, which they have linked with active inhibition (also see Liu et 
al., 2017). They argued that both the effective encoding processes of TBR items and the active 
inhibition of TBF items are responsible for the directed forgetting effect. These ERP findings 
correspond with the two accounts, selective rehearsal and active inhibition, that are proposed 
as being responsible for the directed forgetting effect based on behavioural findings (for a 





review of such findings see Basden et al., 1993), as discussed in a previous section (see section 
1.3.3.1). The absence of direct evidence for the association of the latter modulation with 
inhibition, however, means that the basis for this inference is not well-established. 
Although the main focus in this thesis is on the ERPs measured during retrieval, to 
complement behavioural insights in how memory control and recognition memory are linked, 
ERPs during encoding will also been examined. This provides the opportunity to link memory 
control and encoding. Based on the findings described above, it is predicted that there will be 
differential neural activity elicited by cues to remember or to forget. In keeping with prior 
literature, this would comprise of an enhanced LPP for TBR items, and an enhanced frontal 
positivity for TBF items (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Hauswald et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2017; 
Paller, 1990).  
Other insights into the directed forgetting effect have been provided by studies 
measuring ERPs during recognition memory test phases. Nowicka et al. (2009) found a typical 
old/new effect over central and parietal regions for correctly recognised TBR items, which was 
absent for correctly recognized TBF items. These data support the prediction that control 
operates over recollection, because this old/new effect has been linked with this process. In 
addition, ERPs were more negative-going for forgotten TBF items compared to correctly 
judged new items over central and parietal sites. The researchers interpreted the first of these 
effects as greater recollection for TBR than TBF items. The second, negative-going effect is 
intriguing, as it suggests that there are active encoding (possibly inhibition) processes engaged 














2. EXAMINING EMOTION IN DIRECTED FORGETTING USING BEHAVIORAL 
MEASURES 
 
2.1 Experiment 1 – Emotion and Directed Forgetting: a Baseline Experiment 
As has been emphasised already, links between emotion and memory are well-
documented, although not thoroughly understood, and this is at least equally true for the links 
between emotion and control over memory. In some DF studies there is evidence for the 
emotion-enhanced memory effect (Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; Otani et al., 2012) and an 
effect of emotion on memory control (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; 
Nowicka et al., 2011; Otani et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2016), while in others there is no effect of 
emotion on memory control (Gallant & Yang, 2014; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006). Several 
factors may play a role in these inconsistencies, including the control exerted over stimulus sets, 
as well as a failure to consider response criterion adequately.   
Differences between semantic relatedness among emotional words compared to neutral 
words may partially account for the finding that memory is enhanced for emotional words 
(Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). The degree of relatedness has also been 
used to explain why emotional words are easier to remember even under directed forgetting 
instructions (Maratos et al., 2000). Only a small number of relevant studies, however, have 
controlled for relatedness between emotional and neutral words. In the directed forgetting 
literature, to the best of my knowledge, there is one study in which semantic relatedness was 
controlled between negative, positive and neutral words (Minnema & Knowlton, 2008). The 
researchers observed enhanced memory and a diminished DF effect for negative words relative 
to positive and neutral words, suggesting that differences among properties other than semantic 
relatedness contribute to memory for emotional materials. A consistent approach in this thesis 





is to control for semantic relatedness across emotional and neutral words. Semantic relatedness 
is measured using the online source tool ‘snaut’ (Mandera et al., 2017). This tool works on 
prediction models in which a word is predicted given the context (the associated words) it 
appears in. The level of relatedness is measured by calculating the semantic distance between 
word pairs, using a matrix function (Mandera et al., 2017). The matrix function allows 
comparison of the semantic distance for a large set of words simultaneously and provides 
semantic distance scores for each word pair. 
Besides semantic relatedness, considerations related to response criterion are also 
relevant to questions about how emotion, memory and memory control interact. The common 
finding in studies of recognition memory and emotion, as well as the linked DF literature, is a 
more liberal criterion for emotional material relative to neutral material (Bailey & Chapman, 
2012; Hauswald et al., 2011; Marchewka et al., 2016). Some researchers have questioned 
whether differences ascribed to emotion are in fact due to differences in response criterion and 
not due to changes in memorability itself (Kapucu et al., 2008; see section 1.4.3).  
Another factor that may play a role in memory control for emotional material is different 
coping styles (emotion regulation). Several frameworks, as discussed in the introduction (see 
section 1.3), attempt to explain memory control via different memory processes and 
mechanisms. However, another way to examine the links between emotion and memory control 
is by investigating the effect of emotional coping styles. It may be that the ability to regulate 
emotions influences the ability to forget or remember (Engen & Anderson, 2018; Hertel & 
McDaniel, 2010; Myers et al., 1998; Richards & Gross, 2000). For example, Richards and Gross 
(2000) conducted three experiments to investigate whether two emotion regulation strategies 
(expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal) influence memory performance. Instructing 
participants which regulation strategy to apply, they were initially divided in two groups: a 
watch condition, were participants had to watch a short film clip and listen carefully, and an 





expressive suppression condition, where participants were instructed to suppress their feelings 
so that nobody watching them could see what they were feeling. In a second experiment a third 
condition was added - the reappraisal condition - where participants were instructed to have a 
neutral and objective view when watching slides of injured people, varying from low to high 
emotionality. In both experiments, after watching the clip/slides, participants were given a 
recognition memory test and a cued-recall test. There was a decrease in memory performance 
on the cued-recall test and the recognition memory test in the expressive suppression condition. 
There were no differences in memory between the reappraisal condition and the watch 
condition. In addition, Richards and Gross (2000) replicated these findings in a field 
experiment. Based on these findings they concluded that the strategy used to regulate emotion 
does influence memory for emotional material, although whether the different conditions 
simply resulted in different levels of attention being paid to stimuli remains an open question. 
While Richards and Gross (2000) instructed participants which regulation strategy to 
apply, Myers et al. (1998) assessed which strategy participants adopted. Using the Manifest 
Anxiety Scale (MAS) to establish emotion regulation strategies, participants were divided into 
two groups: repressors and non-repressors. In a DF paradigm they observed poorer recall for 
negative TBF items in repressors relative to non-repressors, which they interpreted as repressors 
being better at limiting access to negative material that were instructed to forget (also see Xie 
et al., 2018). Motivated by these findings, measures of coping style were collected in the 
experiment described below. 
This first experiment can be considered to be a baseline experiment. The sections below 
detail the materials and methods used in order to examine the influence of semantic relatedness, 
response criterion and emotion regulation strategies on memory control in a DF recognition 
memory paradigm with three valence categories: negative, positive and neutral. Despite some 
inconsistencies, as already described, the literature to date suggest similar memory sensitivity 





for emotional and neutral material while controlling for semantic relatedness (Buchanan et al., 
2006; Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). The prediction in the first 
experiment therefore is that memory sensitivity will not change between emotional and neutral 
material. Because of the inconsistencies among published work, it is less clear whether emotion 
will influence the DF effect (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Brandt et al., 2013; Gallant et al., 2018; 
Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; Otani et al., 2012; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006). However, if 
sensitivity does not change, comparable levels of directed forgetting might well accompany 
that. The second prediction is that there will be a relatively more liberal criterion for emotional 
material, in keeping with the general finding in the literature (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Dougal 




There were 51 undergraduates (41 females, M = 20.66 years, SD = 2.97) from the 
University of Nottingham. After giving informed consent, participants completed the 
experiment and received either an inconvenience allowance of £2 or credits for their first-year 
courses. The experiment received ethical approval from the Ethics Committee in the School of 
Psychology at the University of Nottingham, as is the case for all experiments reported in this 
thesis. 
 
2.1.1.2 Design and Materials 
A 2 (instruction: remember vs forget) x 3 (valence: negative vs positive vs neutral) 
within-subjects design was employed.  
Three lists of 96 words (96 negative, 96 positive and 96 neutral) were selected from the 
Warriner, Kuperman and Brysbaert (2013) database. The three valence categories, negative, 





positive and neutral differed on the basis of valence (M = 2.92, SD = 0.63; M = 7.34, SD = 
0.49; M = 5.45, SD = 0.42 respectively). The negative, positive and neutral words were matched 
for semantic relatedness, arousal (negative and positive words only), word length and word 
frequency. Semantic relatedness was measured using the open source tool ‘snaut’. Word length 
and word frequency were measured using the open source tool SUBTLEX-UK (Van Heuven et 
al., 2014). A log transformation was used for the measures of word frequency in order to assess 
conformity to normality (but see Appendix D for differences in word frequency). At the level 
of the entire word sets independent sample t-tests were conducted to assess the equivalence of 
the semantic relatedness scores (range 0.80 – 0.98), arousal (range 2.25 – 6.90), word lengths 
(range 3 – 14 letters) and word frequencies (range 0.30 – 4.83) between the negative, positive 
and neutral words. The only significant differences were in arousal between emotional and 
neutral words (but see Appendix D for differences in word frequency). Full details of these 
outcomes can be seen in Appendix A (Table A1).   
These three lists were then split into study (48 words) and test (96 words) lists. Two 
study lists were then formed, each containing 24 words of each valence type (72 words in total). 
The corresponding test lists each contained 144 words (48 words for each valence category, 
half of which were also on the study lists). A further set of lists was created in which the words 
designated as either TBR or TBF were alternated. Again, independent sample t-tests were 
conducted separately on the study and test lists. The outcomes are consistent with those 
described above (see Appendix A, Table A2).  
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) was used in order to measure emotion 
regulation strategies (Gross & John, 2003). The ERQ is a 10-item measure that assesses 
individual differences in two emotion regulation strategies. There are two subgroups, cognitive 
reappraisal (‘I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I am in’) 
which has 6 items, and expressive suppression (‘I keep my emotions to myself’) which has 4 





items. The items were scored on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree), 
with a higher score indicating more use of that strategy. Internal consistency on this measure 
was assessed by Gross and John (2003), where it was higher for the cognitive reappraisal 
subgroup than the expressive suppression subgroup.  
 
2.1.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually, and the experiment lasted no more than 20 
minutes. The experiment consisted of two study-test blocks. In the study phase, words were 
presented individually for 2000ms in the centre of a computer screen. After each word a blank 
screen appeared for 250ms followed by a remember cue (VVVVV in the colour green) or a 
forget cue (XXXXX in the colour red). Participants were instructed to attempt to remember the 
preceding word following a remember cue, and to forget the word when a forget cue followed. 
The instructions remained on the screen for 500ms and the order of remember and forget words 
was determined randomly for each participant. Following the cue, a blank screen appeared for 
250ms before the next word was presented.  
Test trials commenced with a fixation cross for 500ms, followed by a word. Participants 
were asked to make an old/new recognition judgment on the word, regardless of the TBR or 
TBF instruction given in the study phase, by pressing designated keys with their left and right 
index fingers on a keyboard. The hands used for old and new responses were counterbalanced 
across participants. Each word remained on the screen until participants pressed a response key. 
Once a response was made, the fixation cross was presented again for 500ms, followed by the 
next word.  
After completing the recognition task on the computer, participants were asked to 
complete the ERQ questionnaire. 
 






Table 2.1 shows mean probabilities of correct judgements to old words (hits) and 
incorrect judgements to new words (false alarms) across instruction (remember, forget) and 
valence (negative, positive, neutral). Summary statistics across instruction and valence are 
presented in Table 2.2. As a guide, although the emphasis here is on differences in criterion 
across valence, a c-value of 0 indicates a neutral criterion, negative c-values indicate a liberal 




A 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVAs was conducted separately for sensitivity (d’) and 
criterion (c). In each case these analyses included the factors of instruction (remember and 
forget) and valence (negative, positive and neutral). Any violations of sphericity assumptions 
were adjusted by the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon correction (this was done in every experiment 
reported in this thesis) (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959). Identical ANOVA results for d’ and 
criterion for the factor instruction and the interaction (see Table 2.3) are due to shared false 
Table 2.1 
Probabilities of Correct Judgements (Hits) to Old Items and Incorrect Judgements (False Alarms) to New Items across 










Hits Remember 0.63 (0.15) 0.62 (0.16) 0.62 (0.16) 
Forget 0.44 (0.17) 0.48 (0.17) 0.43 (0.17) 
False alarms   0.18 (0.12) 0.15 (0.10) 0.21 (0.13) 
 
Table 2.2 
Summary Statistics for Each Valence Type across Instructions. d’ is the Estimate of Memory Sensitivity and c is the 
Estimate of Criterion. SD = standard deviation 
   Valence 







d'  Remember 1.39 (0.54) 1.48 (0.49) 1.24 (0.58) 
 Forget 0.86 (0.44) 1.08 (0.40) 0.70 (0.41) 
c Remember 0.33 (0.37) 0.41 (0.40) 0.29 (0.41) 
  Forget 0.60 (0.44) 0.61 (0.42) 0.56 (0.47) 
 





alarm rates for TBR and TBF items (this is the case in every experiment reported in this thesis). 
Only main effects are elaborated on below, as there were no reliable interactions between 
factors.  
 
2.1.2.1 Effects of Instruction 
There were main effects of instruction for both d’ and c. In the case of sensitivity this 
reflects a directed forgetting effect: d’ was superior for TBR than for TBF words. In the case of 
response criterion, there was a more liberal criterion for TBR words than for TBF words (see 
Table 2.3). 
2.1.2.2 Effects of Valence 
There were main effects of valence for both d’ and c (see Table 2.3), and these were 
followed up via paired sample t-tests. Sensitivity was superior for positive (M = 1.28, SD = 
0.38) and negative (M = 1.12, SD = 0.41) words relative to neutral (M = 0.97, SD = 0.42) words 
(positive vs neutral: t(50) = 5.89, p < .001, d = .83; negative vs neutral: t(50) = 2.70,  p = .009, 
d = .38). Sensitivity was also superior for positive words relative to negative words (t(50) = -
3.02, p = .004, d = .43).  
Table 2.3 
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence 
 Measure (DV)  df F p ηp² 
Instruction 
d' 1, 50 97.36 < .001*** .66 
c 1, 50 97.36 < .001*** .66 
     
Valence 
d' 2, 100 16.66 < .001*** .25 
c 2, 100 3.55 .032* .07 
     
Instruction  
x Valence  
Interactions 
d' 1.64, 82.09 1.32 .269 .03 
c 1.64, 82.09 1.32 .269 .03 
Notes. * p < .05, *** p < .001.   
df = degrees of freedom    
 





Furthermore, there was a more liberal response criterion for neutral (M = 0.42, SD = 
0.42) relative to positive (M = 0.51, SD = 0.39) words (t(60) = 2.43, p = .019, d = .37). Although 
not reliable, there is a trend in the same direction for negative words as well. 
 
2.1.2.3 Emotion Regulation 
Bivariate correlations were conducted for the ERQ scale separately for reappraisal and 
suppression scores. These were plotted against sensitivity for each valence type, separated by 
directed forgetting instruction. The scatterplots revealed a small but significant positive 
relationship between the neutral forget condition and the expressive suppression condition 
(r(49) = .29, p = .037), see Figure 2.1 below for the scatterplot (see Appendix B for other 



















2.1.2.4 Additional Study-Test Cycle Analyses 
To ensure that participants were adhering to the directed forgetting instructions in the 
second study-test cycle (block 2), a 2 (instruction: remember vs forget) x 2 (block: block 1 vs 



























Figure 2.1. Scatterplot of the expressive suppression mean scores against 
sensitivity in the forget condition for neutral items. This scatterplot is 
replotted in Figure B12 (see Appendix B) along with the scatterplots in 
the remaining conditions. 





judgements (hits) and sensitivity measures by collapsing the TBR and TBF items across 
valence, separated by block. Table 2.4 shows mean probabilities of hits and d’ measures across 
block (block 1, block 2) and instruction (remember, forget). The main effect of instruction was 
significant for both hits and d’, with higher hit rates and sensitivity for TBR compared to TBF 
items. There was also a main effect of block for hits, with superior hits in block 1 than block 2 
(see Table 2.5 for the ANOVA results). 
 
Table 2.4 
Averages of Hits and d’ Measures for Remember and Forget Items Averaged across Valence 
  M (SD) 
    Remember Forget 
Hits 
Block 1 0.65 (0.02) 0.49 (0.02) 
Block 2 0.60 (0.02) 0.41 (0.03) 
    
d'  
Block 1 1.30 (0.07) 0.91 (0.05) 

















The main objective in this baseline experiment was to investigate the links between 
emotion and memory control while controlling for semantic relatedness. The use of the ERQ 
also enabled an assessment of whether emotion regulation strategies affect memory 
performance. Sensitivity was superior for emotional words relative to neutral words, and 
participants were more conservative in their responding to positive words relative to neutral 
Table 2.5 
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Block 
  Hits   d' 
Measure (DV) df F p ηp²   df F p ηp² 
Instruction 1, 50 102.59 <.000*** .67 
 
1, 50 61.34 <.000*** .55 
Block 1, 50 10.57 .002** .17 
 
1, 50 2.88 .096 .05 
Instruction  
x Block Interactions 
1, 50 1.59 .210 .03 
  
1, 50 1.62 .209 .03 
Notes. ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
df = degrees of freedom 
 





words as well. Moreover, there was no evidence that the directed forgetting effects obtained for 
negative, positive and neutral words were different. 
The outcomes for measures of sensitivity are consistent with the view that memory for 
emotional material is superior to that for neutral material, as described in Chapter 1 (see section 
1.4.2) (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Ochsner, 2000; Talmi et al., 2008; for reviews see Levine 
& Edelstein, 2009), and is counter to the prediction. This consistency, however, does not extend 
to measures of criterion. In those studies where criterion has been reported, which is a subset 
of those in which emotion and memory control have been examined, the consistent finding has 
been that emotional material was associated with a more liberal criterion (Bailey & Chapman, 
2012; Hauswald et al., 2011; Marchewka et al., 2016). The findings in this experiment are 
exactly the opposite. This outcome will be considered in the context of findings in later 
experiments in this thesis. 
The outcomes for the links between emotion and DF measurements are consistent with 
some previous work, but not other work. Outcomes in previous studies were shown in Table 
1.1 above, and briefly, the outcomes in this experiment are consistent with those in the studies 
by Berger et al. (2018), Gallant et al. (2018), Gallant and Yang (2014), Marchewka et al. (2016), 
Taylor, Quinlan and Vullings (2018), Wessel and Merckelbach (2006) and Yang et al. (2012), 
who observed no differences in DF effects between emotional and neutral words. This outcome 
is in line with the prediction, although as already noted memory sensitivity differed, counter to 
predictions.  
An important component of this experiment was the attempt to balance for semantic 
relatedness. In studies where relatedness has been controlled for and where the focus was only 
on the question of whether this factor influences estimates of memorability, the key findings 
have been that memory sensitivity is not different between emotional and neutral words 
(Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008). In two particularly relevant experiments, 





Dougal and Rotello (2007) tested memory for emotional and neutral words. In the first 
experiment, enhanced memory for emotional words was observed. However, when controlling 
for semantic relatedness in the second experiment, memory sensitivity was not different 
between emotional and neutral words. The outcomes described here are inconsistent with those 
of Dougal and Rotello (2007), because sensitivity advantages were still present despite 
controlling for relatedness. 
It may be the case that these divergences are due in part to the different response 
requirements in the two experiments (R/K versus old/new discrimination), but it may also be 
the case that the variations are due to the fact that sensitivity measures may be inaccurate when 
criterion measures differ and only single point assessments are made available. Dougal and 
Rotello (2007) (among Kapucu et al., 2008; Windmann et al., 2002) have pointed out that 
measures of sensitivity and criterion are often confounded. What this means is that apparent 
differences in sensitivity might be misleading if they are accompanied by differences in 
criterion, and apparent similarities might be misleading for the same reason. This concern will 
also apply to measures of directed forgetting, since they are based on an assessment of 
sensitivity that cannot be separated from contributions due to criterion. One solution to these 
concerns is to acquire data points in a way that allows the two measures to be separated, and 
this will be described in more detail in the following section 2.2, following a brief consideration 
of emotion regulation and memory. 
The ERQ was an exploratory measure used here to investigate the relationship between 
emotional regulation and control over emotional material. There was a positive relationship 
between memory for neutral TBF words and the expressive suppression coping style. This 
stands in contrast with results from Myers et al. (1998), who found that using a repressive 
coping style resulted in worse memory for only negative TBF items. Furthermore, in contrast 
with studies of emotion regulation discussed earlier (Hertel & McDaniel, 2010; Richards & 





Gross, 2000), and with Myers et al. (1998), there was no effect of emotion regulation strategies 
on memory control for emotional material.  
One explanation for the variability in findings lies in differences in how emotion 
regulation is measured and/or manipulated. Myers et al. (1998) used self-report questionnaires 
that measure levels of anxiety and defensiveness in order to measure to what extent participants 
relied on a repressive coping style. In this experiment a questionnaire that directly measures 
emotion regulation coping styles was used. As already described above, Richard and Gross 
(2000) instructed participants which strategies to apply (suppression or reappraisal) and showed 
that strategy use was related to memory for emotional material. Adopting an expressive 
suppression strategy resulted in a decrease in memory performance, whereas a reappraisal 
strategy did not. It may be that the absence of data consistent with this outcome in this 
experiment is because what was measured was the tendency to regulate emotion in particular 
ways, rather than a direct manipulation of it. This account does not explain, however, findings 
in studies where memory for emotional material has varied according to assessments of traits. 
For example, Ho, Cheng and Dai (2017) investigated the links between anxiety and memory 
control using item-method directed forgetting, and observed that higher levels of anxiety were 
associated with a decreased DF effect for negative words.  
It should be noted, however, that the significant correlation should be interpreted with 
caution considering the context of the analyses. A total of 12 correlations (see Appendix B) 
were computed without multiple comparison correction. Given that the positive correlation has 
a p-value of .037, this would not survive any correction of this kind. 
The reasons for the disparities reported in this experiment are not entirely clear. They 
are not, however, independent of considerations of the accuracy of the memory measures (i.e. 
single point measures) that are used to assess links between emotion, memory and memory 





control. Methods that can overcome this confound between sensitivity and response criterion 
measures are considered in Experiments 2 and 3, described below.  
 
 
2.2 Experiment 2 – Emotion, Directed Forgetting and Confidence Judgements 
In Experiment 1, when controlling for semantic relatedness, sensitivity was higher for 
both classes of emotional material, and – somewhat surprisingly – there was a more 
conservative criterion for positive relative to neutral words. Emotionality did not have a 
significant effect on the ability to remember or forget, although there was evidence for a 
standard DF effect: participants made more accurate memory judgements to TBR than to TBF 
words. One possible reason for the inconsistency between the findings in Experiment 1 and the 
existing literature (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Brandt et al., 2013; Hauswald et al., 2011; Liu et 
al., 2017; Myers et al., 1998; Payne & Corrigan, 2007), and indeed between findings in other 
published studies, is the measures of memory that have been used.   
 In the most commonly employed Signal Detection Theory (SDT) measure, it is assumed 
that the strength distributions of old and new items after an encoding manipulation (study phase) 
are equal and that these two distributions overlap (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), whereas 
empirically this is not the case (see section 1.2 for a detailed description) (Wixted, 2007; 
Yonelinas, 2001a; Yonelinas et al., 1996; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007; for a review of such 
findings see Yonelinas, 1994). Under this assumption, d’ tends to overestimate sensitivity for a 
conservative criterion and underestimate sensitivity for a liberal criterion when distributions do 
not overlap (Dougal & Rotello, 2007).  
The most common finding regarding emotional material when assessed via recognition 
memory is a relatively more liberal response criterion relative to neutral material (Bailey & 
Chapman, 2012; Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008; Ochsner, 2000). Hence, 





differences in memory sensitivity may actually reflect changes in response criterion across 
conditions (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Phelps & Sharot, 2008). Despite a different set of criterion 
outcomes, the same argument applies to interpreting the data and analyses for Experiment 1.  
The same criticism can be directed at previous work (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Hauswald et 
al., 2011; Marchewka et al., 2016) and may be one factor contributing to the general variability 
across studies in the findings already described.  
This concern can be ameliorated by acquiring additional measures rather than simply 
old/new memory decisions from which an assessment of sensitivity and criterion can be 
derived. One way to do this is via the acquisition of confidence judgements and plotting receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curves.  
ROCs offer two important opportunities in the context of the outcomes of Experiment 
1. The first is that they provide a way of separately assessing changes in sensitivity and in 
criterion (see section 1.2.2 for a detailed description). The second is that they provide a means 
of estimating the contributions of recollection and familiarity to memory judgements, which is 
not possible using single-point measures. For current purposes, the specific questions of interest 
are: how does emotion influence response criterion and memory control, how do recollection 
and familiarity vary according to attempts to control forgetting, and how do they interact with 
the emotional status of stimuli? In line with previous findings, it is expected to find similar 
memory sensitivity for emotional and neutral material when controlling for semantic 
relatedness. While the extant literature would suggest a relatively more liberal criterion for 
emotional material, the outcomes of Experiment 1 would not support this prediction. However, 
considering that measures of sensitivity and criterion may have been confounded, the results 
observed in Experiment 1 may not be an appropriate guideline for the following experiments. 
Hence, controlling for the sensitivity/criterion confound would lead to the same prediction 
made previously: a more liberal response criterion for emotional material. The same reasoning 





applies here for memory sensitivity. In addition, following the observed effects of memory 
control in Experiment 1, it is expected to find similar effects in the following experiment. 
Earlier in this thesis a prediction was made concerning memory control and recognition 
memory processes. Previous DF studies, to the best of my knowledge, have not used 
behavioural measures to investigate memory control and recollection and familiarity. However, 
some investigation of old/new effects in a DF paradigm has been done (Nowicka et al., 2009; 
Van Hooff et al., 2009), and (partially) based on these findings it is predicted that memory 
control will not operate over familiarity: it is predicted that there will be a directed forgetting 
effect only for recollection. 
Experiment 2 includes three studies. Each has the same design other than the valence of 
the words employed, in that each experiment has only two valence categories; negative vs 
neutral, negative vs positive and positive vs neutral. The negative vs positive gives the 
opportunity to directly investigate whether negative and positive material have different effects 
on memory or whether these two classes can be considered as having similar effects. In 
addition, pairing the valence types across three studies allows for increasing the number of 
items per category in an experiment of a reasonable length, thereby increasing power. As for 
the first experiment in this thesis, the experiments described below employ the item-method DF 
paradigm. ROC data was collected by means of confidence judgements (Glanzer et al., 1999; 
Yonelinas et al., 1996). 
 
2.2.1 Methods 
Given the similarities between the designs of the three studies they are described jointly 
below. 
 






There were 44 undergraduates from the University of Nottingham for each study (study 
1: 38 females, M = 22.05 years, SD = 4.96; study 2: 37 females, M = 19.37 years, SD = 2.41; 
study 3: 37 females, M = 20.41 years, SD = 4.20). After giving informed consent, participants 
completed the experiment and received either an inconvenience allowance of £3 or credits 
towards their first-year credit requirement.  
 
2.2.1.2 Design and Materials 
Stimuli: Study 1 consisted of negative and neutral words, study 2 negative and positive 
words and study 3 positive and neutral words.  
A 2 (instruction: remember vs forget) x 2 (valence) within-subjects design was 
employed. Each valence category consisted of 180 words which were selected from the 
Warriner et al. (2013) database.  The valence categories in all studies differed on the basis of 
valence (negative: M = 2.56, SD = 0.63; positive: M = 7.33, SD = 0.57; neutral: M = 5.12, SD 
= 0.42). All words in each study were matched for semantic relatedness (distance), word length 
and word frequency using the methods described in Experiment 1. At the level of the entire 
word sets independent sample t-tests were conducted to assess the equivalence of the semantic 
relatedness scores (study 1: range 0.82 – 0.98; study 2: range 0.82 – 0.99; study 3: range 0.82 
– 0.99), arousal (study 1: range 2.25 – 7.27; study 2: range 2.25 – 7.27; study 3: range 2.50 – 
7.05), word lengths (all studies: range 3-14 letters) and word frequencies (study 1: range 0.30 
– 4.83; study 2: range 1.11 – 4.65; study 3: range 0.30 – 4.83) between the valence categories 
in each study. The only significant differences were in arousal in all studies (but see Appendix 
D for differences in word frequency). Full details of these outcomes can be seen in Appendix 
C (Table C1).   





The 180 words (each for the three valence categories) were then split into study (90 
words) and test (180 words) lists. Three study lists were then formed, each containing 30 words 
of each valence type (60 words in total). The corresponding test lists each contained 120 words 
(60 words for each valence category, half of which were also on the study lists). A further set 
of lists was created in which the words designated as either TBR or TBF were alternated. Again, 
independent sample t-tests were conducted separately on the study and test lists. There were 
significant differences for arousal between the emotional and neutral words, and arousal was 
matched between negative and positive words (see Appendix C, Table C2 and Table C3 and 
Appendix D). Another set of lists was then created for the counterbalancing of the designated 
instructions (TBR and TBF) and old/new status.  
 
2.2.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually, and the study lasted no more than 30 minutes. The 
experiment consisted of three study-test blocks. The procedure for the study phase on each trial 
was identical to that in Experiment 1 (see section 2.1.1.3). 
Test trials commenced with a fixation cross for 500ms, followed by a word. Participants 
were asked to make an old/new recognition judgment on the word based on confidence ratings, 
regardless of the TBR or TBF instruction given in the study phase. They responded according 
to a six-point rating scale (1 = sure new to 6 = sure old) by using the computer mouse to select 
a value on a rating scale. Each word, together with the rating scale, remained on the screen until 
participants made a response (see Appendix E for an example of the screen). Once a response 
was made, the fixation cross was presented again for 500ms, followed by the next word.  
 






Table 2.6 shows mean probabilities of hits and false alarms across instruction 
(remember, forget) and valence (negative, positive, neutral) for study 1, 2 and 3 (see Appendix 
F for proportions of responses for each confidence rating). Summary statistics across instruction 
and valence for each study are presented in Table 2.7. Recollection and Familiarity were 




For each study, 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the four measures 
shown in Table 2.7: sensitivity (d’), response criterion (c) and estimates of recollection (R) and 
familiarity (F). In each case these analyses initially included the factors of instruction 
Table 2.7 
Summary Statistics for Each Valence Type across Instructions for Studies 1, 2 and 3. R is the Estimate of Participants’ 
Judgements Driven by Recollection, F is the Estimate of Participants’ Judgements Driven by Familiarity, d’ is the Estimate of 
Memory Sensitivity and c is the Estimate of Criterion. SD = standard deviation 
    Study 1  Study 2  Study 3 













R Remember 0.27 (0.21) 0.30 (0.18)  0.24 (0.16) 0.22 (0.15)  0.28 (0.18) 0.27 (0.16) 
 Forget 0.21 (0.20) 0.26 (0.18)  0.18 (0.13) 0.16 (0.14)  0.20 (0.17) 0.19 (0.17) 
F Remember 1.08 (0.39) 1.09 (0.42)  0.93 (0.30) 0.84 (0.38)  0.88 (0.33) 0.94 (0.40) 
 Forget 0.92 (0.40) 0.91 (0.37)  0.81 (0.33) 0.73 (0.31)  0.76 (0.33) 0.76 (0.37) 
d'  Remember 1.47 (0.46) 1.53 (0.61)  1.44 (0.36) 1.35 (0.42)  1.29 (0.44) 1.44 (0.48) 
 Forget 1.27 (0.54) 1.32 (0.57)  1.23 (0.37) 1.12 (0.37)  1.12 (0.47) 1.15 (0.47) 
c Remember 0.04 (0.32) 0.28 (0.30)  0.06 (0.30) 0.11 (0.31)  0.24 (0.38) 0.35 (0.35) 
  Forget 0.14 (0.32) 0.41 (0.32)  0.17 (0.33) 0.23 (0.32)  0.32 (0.41) 0.50 (0.38) 
 
Table 2.6 
Probabilities of Correct Judgements (Hits) to Old Items and Incorrect Judgements (False Alarms) to New Items across 
Instruction (Remember/Forget) and Valence (Negative, Positive and Neutral) for Studies 1, 2 and 3. SD = standard deviation 
    Study 1  Study 2  Study 3 













Hits Remember 0.74 (0.12) 0.67 (0.14)  0.73 (0.11) 0.70 (0.13)  0.65 (0.15) 0.63 (0.19) 
 Forget 0.68 (0.15) 0.59 (0.15)  0.66 (0.14) 0.62 (0.15)  0.59 (0.15) 0.53 (0.17) 
False alarms  0.25 (0.12) 0.17 (0.10)  0.23 (0.08) 0.22 (0.09)  0.22 (0.11) 0.17 (0.09) 





(remember vs forget) and valence (two categories in each case). Only main effects are 
elaborated on below, as there were no reliable interactions between factors. 
 
2.2.2.1 Effects of Instruction 
There were main effects of instruction in all three studies for all measures. In the cases 
of sensitivity, recollection and familiarity this reflected a directed forgetting effect: d’, R and F 
were all superior for TBR than for TBF words (see Table 2.8). The main effect of instruction 
for response criterion reflects a more liberal criterion for TBR than for TBF words in each case. 
 
2.2.2.2 Effects of Valence 
There were main effects of valence across all studies for all measures. Sensitivity was 
superior for negative words relative to positive words in study 2, which is evident in the ROC 
curves (see Figure 2.2B). The ROC curves in study 2 (B) show that the curve for negative words 
falls more towards the upper left compared to the curve for positive words. This is the case in 
Table 2.8 
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence in Studies 1, 2 and 3 
    Study 1  Study 2  Study 3 
 Measure (DV)   df F p ηp²  df F p ηp²  df F p ηp² 
Instruction 
R 1, 43 6.71 .013* .14  1, 43 11.89 .001** .22  1, 43 10.13 .003** .19 
F 1, 43 14.31 < .001*** .25  1, 43 14.34 < .001*** .25  1, 43 13.38 .001** .24 
d' 1, 43 17.46 < .001*** .29  1, 43 23.11 < .001*** .35  1, 43 18.43 < .001*** .30 
c 1, 43 17.46 < .001*** .29  1, 43 23.11 < .001*** .35  1, 43 18.43 < .001*** .30 
                
Valence 
R 1, 43 4.16 .048* .09  1, 43 0.62 .437 .01  1, 43 0.33 .570 .01 
F 1, 43 0.00 .950 .00  1, 43 4.71 .036* .10  1, 43 0.35 .557 .01 
d' 1, 43 1.16 .287 .03  1, 43 6.80 .012* .14  1, 43 2.64 .112 .06 
c 1, 43 77.13 < .001*** .64  1, 43 8.40 .006* .16  1, 43 32.62 < .001*** .43 
                
Instruction  
x Valence  
Interactions 
R 1, 43 0.06 .803 .00  1, 43 0.00 .950 .00  1, 43 0.03 .858 .00 
F 1, 43 0.05 .829 .00  1, 43 0.02 .892 .00  1, 43 0.92 .344 .02 
d' 1, 43 0.39 .540 .01  1, 43 0.06 .803 .00  1, 43 3.25 .078 .07 
c 1, 43 0.39 .540 .01  1, 43 0.06 .803 .00  1, 43 3.25 .078 .07 
Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.           
df = degrees of freedom             





both the remember and forget condition. Moreover, the ROCs in study 1 and 3 (see Figure 2.2A 
and C, respectively) show that the curves for both the valence conditions overlap, indicating no 
differences in sensitivity between emotional and neutral words (see Table 2.8). Recollection, in 
study 1, was superior for neutral words relative to negative words. Familiarity was superior for 
negative relative to positive words in study 2.  
For response criterion, there was a more liberal criterion for emotional words compared 
to neutral words (study 1 and 3) and a more liberal criterion for negative words than for positive 
words in study 2 (see Table 2.8). The more liberal criterion for emotional words can be seen in 
the ROC curves (see Figure 2.2A and C). The cumulative hit/false alarm pairings by confidence 
fall consistently more towards the right for emotional words relative to neutral words. These 
data points indicate higher hit and false alarm rates at consecutive confidence levels: a more 
liberal response criterion. Moreover, the more liberal criterion for negative words in study 2 
(see Figure 2.2B), is visible in the first few cumulative hit/false pairings that fall more towards 
the right for negative words relative to positive words. Similar to study 1 and 3, this indicates a 
more liberal response criterion.  







Figure 2.2. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) data for study 1 (A), study 2 (B) and study 3 (C). 
The red curves denote the negative condition, the green curves denote the positive condition and the 
black curves denote the neutral condition. The curves indicate memory strength and the circles indicate 
the level of response confidence (response criterion) 
  





2.2.2.3 ROC Analyses – Area Under the Curve (AUC) 
Additional analyses of the ROC curves were conducted using Area Under the Curve 
(AUC) measures to examine effects of valence and instruction. The AUC was measured using 
the ROC Toolbox in Matlab (Koen et al., 2017). The results (see Table 2.9 for the ANOVA 
results) are similar to the results from the d’ analyses. That is, there are consistent DF effects 
across all three studies, which were not affected by valence. In study 2, there was also a 
significant main effect of valence. Memory was superior for negative (M = 0.76, SD = 0.01) 




One intention in this experiment was to develop an understanding of how control over 
remembering and forgetting of emotional material is exerted while using ROC measures. A 
second intention was to characterise how memory differences for emotional materials manifest 
themselves. Single point measures (e.g. old/new recognition judgements) can yield indicators 
of sensitivity as well as criterion. They may, however, be conflated as described earlier, which 
motivated the use of ROCs in this set of studies. They permit a more fine-grained assessment 
Table 2.9 
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence in Studies 1, 2 and 3 on the AUC 
measures 
  Study 1  Study 2  Study 3 
Measure 
(DV)   
df F p ηp²   
df F p ηp²   
df F p ηp² 
Instruction 
 
1, 43 26.61 <.000*** .38 
 
1, 43 33.98 <.000*** .44 
 
1, 43 19.60 <.000*** .31 
Valence 
 
1, 43 0.02 .880 .00 
 
1, 43 12.32 .001** .22 
 
1, 43 0.12 .734 .00 
Instruction  
x Valence 
Interactions   
1, 43 0.35 .555 .01 
  
1, 43 0.02 .879 .00 
  
1, 43 1.09 .303 .03 
Notes. ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
df = degrees of freedom  
 





of these two components of performance on memory tasks (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu 
et al., 2008). 
 
2.2.3.1 Memory Sensitivity and Directed Forgetting 
There were no interactions between the directed forgetting (Instruction) and emotion 
(Valence) manipulations, so these elements of the data are considered separately. A directed 
forgetting effect was found in all studies for the estimates of recollection and familiarity that 
were derived from the ROC data, and for memory sensitivity. In terms of sensitivity, this is 
consistent with common findings in the directed forgetting paradigm (MacLeod, 1999). For 
recollection and familiarity, this outcome is not in line with the prediction that control will 
operate only over recollection. The outcomes in this experiment suggest that memory control – 
at least as operationalised as directed forgetting – can influence both processes.  
The DF effect did not vary according to emotion, nor were there any differences in 
sensitivity between emotional and neutral words. The latter outcome is in line with findings 
from Dougal and Rotello (2007). This is also somewhat comparable with findings from other 
studies suggesting that emotion itself does not influence sensitivity (Kapucu et al., 2008; 
Windmann & Kutas, 2001). These data do not align with the outcomes in Experiment 1, 
however, with two possibilities for this being the use of single-point measures, as already 
discussed, and/or the use of three valence categories in the same experiment. In this experiment, 
differences in sensitivity were only observed in study 2, with superior sensitivity for negative 
relative to positive words. This is somewhat in line with other studies reporting superior 
sensitivity for negative material relative to positive material (Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; 
Otani et al., 2012). There are, however, also inconsistent findings compared to previous studies 
where sensitivity was enhanced for emotional material (both negative and positive) relative to 
neutral material (Brandt et al., 2013; Hauswald et al., 2011; Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; Otani 





et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2016), and in which DF effects were diminished for emotional relative 
to neutral material (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Hauswald et al., 2011; Otani et al., 2012; Payne 
& Corrigan, 2007; Yang et al., 2016). 
The ROC curves presented in Figure 2.2 demonstrate separately changes in d’ and 
criterion. However, the assumptions of the calculation of d’ – equal variance distributions for 
old and new items and a slope of 1.0 in zROCs (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988; Wixted, 2007) – 
are not commonly met in recognition memory tasks. As mentioned in the Introduction (see 
section 1.2.2), zROCs in recognition memory tasks commonly have slopes with values less than 
1.0 (Yonelinas, 1994), violating this assumption of d’ (Verde & Rotello, 2003). If this is the 
case in this experiment then other measures of sensitivity would be more appropriate for 
measuring possible effects of emotion and directed forgetting. 
An evaluation of the zROCs in Experiment 2 confirms previous observations of a slope 
less than 1.0 in recognition memory (Yonelinas, 1994) (see Appendix H, Figure H1 for the 
zROCs of Experiment 2 separated for studies 1, 2 and 3). As a consequence, this would suggest 
that another measure of sensitivity, such as da, would be more appropriate. The measure of da 
is an alternative to d’, that in contrast allows for possible variations in the old and new item 
distributions (Verde et al., 2006; Verde & Rotello, 2003). The repeated measures ANOVA 
conducted on d’ measures as described in section 2.2.2 were also conducted on da. These 
analyses revealed the same effects of emotion on directed forgetting as already described (see 
Appendix G, Table G1 for the ANOVA results based on da ); a directed forgetting effect in all 
studies, which did not vary according to emotion and enhanced memory sensitivity for negative 
words compared to positive words in study 2 (see Table 2.8 for the ANOVA results based on 
d’). Thus, using a different measure for sensitivity did not yield different effects.  
Despite the similarity between the findings when using d’ or da, based on the zROCs 
presented – which are consistently below 1 – it would be more appropriate to use da (Verde & 





Rotello, 2003). However, when there are minimal differences in slopes between conditions that 
are to be compared, using da will not lead to very different results as to using d’ (Simpson & 
Fitter, 1973). This is the likely reason for the outcomes in Experiment 2. The largest difference 
between slopes across conditions that were contrasted directly was 0.04 (this was in the contrast 
between the negative TBF and neutral TBF conditions). In other experiments the largest 
difference for any give contrast is 0.07 (this is in the contrast between negative TBF and neutral 
TBF in Experiment 3). The outcome of the analysis in this case for da mirrors that for d’. A full 
account of the zROCs for Experiment 3 (see Appendix H, Figure H2) provides reassurance that 
using da or d’ will not substantially change the findings and conclusions drawn in this thesis. 
On this basis, d’ as a measure of sensitivity is reported in the main text in subsequent 
experiments. 
 
2.2.3.2 Response Criterion 
Turning to response criterion, this was more liberal for both emotion categories relative 
to neutral words and more liberal for negative relative to positive words. While this outcome 
contrasts with what was found in Experiment 1, it replicates several studies where participants 
adopted a more liberal response criterion for emotional material, albeit based on assessments 
of single point measures (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Hauswald et al., 
2011; Kapucu et al., 2008; Marchewka et al., 2016; Windmann & Kutas, 2001). A possible 
explanation for the discrepancies between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 lies in the number 
of valence conditions used; three valences combined (Experiment 1) relative to contrasts of two 
valences in separate studies (Experiment 2). A combination of three or two valence conditions 
could result in different outcomes as it results in different proportions of emotional and neutral 
stimuli. In other DF studies, however, a more liberal criterion for emotional material has 
consistently been observed regardless of the number of valence conditions used (Bailey & 





Chapman, 2012; Berger et al., 2018; Gallant et al., 2018; Hauswald et al., 2011; Marchewka et 
al., 2016; Yang et al., 2012).  
Another difference which might explain the discrepancies between Experiment 1 and 2, 
is the use of ROC measures in Experiment 2. The findings in Experiment 2 are more comparable 
with the findings from Dougal and Rotello (2007). Using ROC measures, they also found a 
more liberal criterion for emotional material, whilst there were no differences in memory due 
to emotion. The separation of sensitivity and criterion measures using ROCs indicates that even 
though response criterion changes across valence conditions, memory does not. This reinforces 
the argument that when using single-point measures, as in Experiment 1, it becomes challenging 
to interpret changes in memory sensitivity when response criterion changes as well. The 
combination of tight control over stimulus properties and the removal of the sensitivity/criterion 
confound suggests greater confidence in the findings presented in Experiment 2 than in 
Experiment 1, and supports the prediction for subsequent studies that the relatively more liberal 
criterion for emotional material will remain. 
 
2.2.3.3 Recollection and Familiarity 
Recollection was superior for neutral compared to negative words in study 1, and 
familiarity was superior for negative compared to positive words in study 2. Linking this with 
previous studies that have applied ROC curves to extract measures of recollection and 
familiarity, in general, emotion has been found to increase recollection (in comparison with 
neutral material). For familiarity, however, little or no effects of emotion have been found in 
some studies (McCullough & Yonelinas, 2013; Ritchey et al., 2008; Yonelinas et al., 2011; 
Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). For example, Ritchey et al. (2008) examined subsequent memory 
effects for negative and neutral images in an fMRI study. Confidence judgements were 
collected in order to plot ROC curves, which also allowed the researchers to extract estimates 





of recollection and familiarity. They found recollection to be superior for negative images 
relative to neutral images, whereas there were no differences in familiarity between negative 
and neutral images. Similar effects have been reported in studies that investigated the effects of 
stress on memory for emotional and neutral images (McCullough & Yonelinas, 2013; 
Yonelinas et al., 2011). Using the R/K paradigm, Ochsner (2000) examined memory for 
emotional and neutral images. Enhanced memory for emotional images resulted only from 
increased ‘Remember’ judgements, which are assumed to reflect recollection (Rugg & Curran, 
2007; Voss et al., 2012; Yonelinas, 1994). In a combined ROC and R/K study already described, 
Dougal and Rotello (2007) observed increased Remember judgements for negative material 
relative to neutral material. However, they argued that the increased Remember judgements 
reflected a subjective experience of recollection due to increased ‘sense of familiarity’ of 
emotional words. In addition, in their studies, familiarity did not vary according to emotion. 
One explanation for the discrepancies in findings between the present experiment and 
existing literature is because different methods have been used across studies to measure 
recognition memory and the contributions of recollection and familiarity. In the present 
experiment, confidence judgements were used. ROC measures were then employed to calculate 
the contribution of recollection and familiarity. In contrast, Ochsner (2000) used the R/K 
paradigm, in which participants are explicitly instructed to base their judgements on whether or 
not they remember contextual information. However, Sharot et al. (2007) used a combination 
of ROC confidence judgements and the R/K procedure to estimate recollection and familiarity 
and the influence of emotion. Both methods resulted in similar outcomes: they observed 
enhanced memory for emotional material driven by recollection for healthy participants (also 
see Dougal & Rotello, 2007). Importantly, however, confidence judgments were given after a 
remember/know response was made. 





The behavioural findings indicating increased recollection for emotional material have 
been supported by the outcomes in ERP studies. For example, Zheng et al. (2018) used a 
standard old/new recognition test, and found a larger left-parietal old/new effect for emotional 
relative to neutral material. In so far as the parietal old/new effects indexes recollection, this is 
consistent with the majority of behavioural findings (but see Maratos et al., 2000; Windmann 
& Kutas, 2001). 
It has been observed, however, that memory judgements in recognition memory tasks 
likely rely heavily on familiarity (Johansson et al., 2004; Tulving, 1985b) by virtue of the task 
demands. This may not be the case, however, in the same way, when confidence judgements or 
R/K judgements are required. Under these circumstances, the task instructions might encourage 
a greater reliance on recollection (assuming it is a consciously controlled process) than when 
only old/new judgements are required. This consideration is important for the ERP experiments 
described in Chapter 3, but before that the outcomes in another set of behavioural experiments 
are reported. 
 
2.2.3.4 Employing the R/K Procedure 
In order to investigate the effect of emotion on memory control and processes of 
recollection and familiarity further, the Remember/Know procedure is used in Experiment 3. 
Based on a particular set of assumptions, as already described, ROCs can be used to estimate 
recollection and familiarity. Under the assumptions employed here (Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; 
Yonelinas, 1994; Yonelinas et al., 1996; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007) 
recollection is assumed to be a pure reflection of high confidence judgements, whereas the 
remaining (lower confidence judgements) are assumed to be based on familiarity. This is an 
important assumption, because it precludes the highest confidence judgements being based on 
familiarity, as well as encompassing the strong view that recollection is not graded in the way 





it is reflected in confidence judgements. In his extensive review of research into recollection 
and familiarity, Yonelinas (2002) argued that stronger conclusions about the likely roles played 
by recollection and familiarity in supporting memory judgements could be inferred when 
similar outcomes are obtained via different approaches designed to assess the processes of 
interest (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). In keeping with this logic, one way to investigate the 
generality of the findings in Experiment 2 is to maintain the same stimulus sets and employ a 
different measure for estimating recollection and familiarity. This was done by using the R/K 
procedure combined with confidence judgements in Experiment 3. 
 
 
2.3 Experiment 3 – Emotion, Directed Forgetting and the R/K Procedure 
The main objective of Experiment 2 was to estimate the contributions of sensitivity and 
criterion separately in tasks where valence and directed forgetting were manipulated. The 
experiments also provided an opportunity to assess the contributions of recollection and 
familiarity and how they interact with valence and DF instructions, because estimates of these 
processes can be derived from ROC data (Yonelinas, 1994). In Experiment 2 there were no 
differences in memory sensitivity due to emotion, nor did emotion influence the directed 
forgetting (DF) effect. There was also a relatively more liberal criterion for emotional words. 
This finding is important because it was obtained in a task where there was not the dependence 
on single-point measures. This had only been done, in a somewhat different design, in one 
previous study (Dougal & Rotello, 2007). Using negative, positive and neutral words, they also 
found a more liberal criterion while memory was equivalent for emotional and neutral words.  
Another means of extracting measures of these two memory processes is the 
Remember/Know (R/K) procedure (Tulving, 1985b). This procedure was employed here as an 
attempt to assess the generality of the findings from Experiment 2: to determine whether the 





ways in which recollection and familiarity vary with emotion and instructions is stable across 
different means of estimating recollection and familiarity.  
In the R/K procedure it is assumed that Remember judgements reflect recollection and 
Know judgements reflect familiarity (Tulving, 1985b; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). Common 
assumptions concerning the processes of recollection and familiarity are that they are 
independent and Know judgements reflect familiarity in absence of recollection (Yonelinas & 
Jacoby, 1995). This assumption means that some items are both familiar and recollected, and 
hence in order to measure recollection and familiarity in the R/K procedure a correction needs 
to be applied, otherwise the measure K (Know) alone will commonly underestimate the 
contribution of familiarity. To make estimates of familiarity under the independence 





In this equation F represents familiarity, K represents the probability of Know responses and R 
represents recollection (Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). 
In summary, the key objective in this experiment is to establish whether the results 
obtained using ROCs generalise when another measure of estimating recollection and 
familiarity (involving slightly different assumptions) is employed. Stimulus sets and all other 
aspects of the experimental design were held constant. Furthermore, as described earlier, single-
point measures may not be sufficient to make accurate interpretations on the influence of 
emotion on memory sensitivity. Therefore, as in Experiment 2, the experiments described 
below include a combination of the R/K procedure and confidence judgements. Based on 
findings of Experiment 2, it is expected to find similar memory sensitivity for emotional and 
neutral material and no effect of emotion on the directed forgetting effect. It is also expected to 
find a relatively more liberal criterion for emotional material. Furthermore, based on previous 
findings (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; McCullough & Yonelinas, 2013; Ritchey et al., 2008; 





Yonelinas et al., 2011) it would be expected only to find differences in recollection between 
emotional and neutral material. This, however, contrasts with the findings in Experiment 2. 
According to Yonelinas (2002) the ROC measures and the R/K procedure should lead to similar 
results, although they are based on somewhat different assumptions. If the two methods of 
estimating recollection and familiarity correspond (which depends primarily on the assumption 
that a R (Remember) response equates with a high confidence ‘old’ response), it is expected to 
observe superior recollection for neutral compared to negative material and superior familiarity 
for negative compared to positive material. Moreover, in line with the findings in Experiment 
2, a directed forgetting effect is expected to be observed for recollection and for familiarity. 
 
2.3.1 Methods 




There were 44 undergraduates from the University of Nottingham for each study (study 
1: 33 females, M = 21.33 years, SD = 3.23; study 2: 37 females, M = 19.93 years, SD = 2.45; 
study 3: 40 females, M = 19.07 years, SD = 1.80). After giving informed consent, participants 
completed the experiment and received either an inconvenience allowance of £3 or 0.5 credits 
towards their first-year credit requirement.  
 
2.3.1.2 Design and Materials 
The design and materials used in Experiment 3 were the same as in Experiment 2 (see 
section 2.2.1.2). 
 






Study and test procedures were very similar to Experiment 2. The only changes in 
Experiment 3 were the response possibilities that were set according to the R/K procedure 
combined with confidence judgements. Participants were asked to respond according to a 5-
point rating scale (Yonelinas et al., 2005) by using the keys 1 to 5 on a keyboard. They were 
instructed to judge whether each word was old or new, and to make one of the 5 responses. 
They were instructed to respond Remember (5) when they were able to remember specific 
details about the word at study, such as remembering the position of the word in the study list 
or what they thought at the time of presentation (see Appendix J for the specific instructions 
given to participants, based on the instructions used in Rajaram (1993)). For words they 
believed to be old, but for which they could not recover specific details, they were instructed to 
respond Know, and to indicate their confidence in their Know judgement (4 = sure old, 3 = 
maybe old). They were also asked to separate their new judgements by confidence (1 = sure 
new, 2 = maybe new).  
 
2.3.2 Results 
Table 2.10 displays mean probabilities of hits and false alarms separated by instruction 
(remember, forget) and valence (negative, positive, neutral) for studies 1, 2 and 3 in 
Experiment 3 (see Appendix I for proportions of responses for each confidence rating). Hits 
are the sum of Remember and Know judgements for old words. False alarms are the same 
sum of incorrect responses for new words. Measures of sensitivity and criterion for studies 1, 
2 and 3 are presented in Table 2.11. d’ (sensitivity) and c (criterion), were calculated as was 
done in Experiments 1 and 2. Familiarity was measured based on the independence 
assumption proposed by Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995). The estimates of recollection (R) were 
taken to be the probabilities of Remember judgements. The estimates of familiarity (F) were 





taken to be the probabilities of Know judgements collapsed across confidence using the 









For each study, 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the four measures 
shown in Table 2.11: sensitivity (d’), response criterion (c) and estimates of recollection (R) 
and familiarity (F). In each case these analyses initially included the factors of instruction 
Table 2.10 
Probabilities of Correct Judgements (Hits) to Old Items and Incorrect Judgements (False Alarms) to New Items across Instruction 
(Remember/Forget) and Valence (Negative, Positive and Neutral) for Studies 1, 2 and 3. SD = standard deviation 
    Study 1  Study 2  Study 3 
   Negative Neutral  Negative Positive  Positive Neutral 
    M (SD) M (SD)  M (SD) M (SD)  M (SD) M (SD) 
Hits Remember 0.73 (0.12) 0.67 (0.15) 
 
0.74 (0.12) 0.70 (0.11)  0.69 (0.15) 0.65 (0.16) 
 
Forget 0.63 (0.15) 0.55 (0.19) 
 
0.67 (0.14) 0.64 (0.16)  0.54 (0.16) 0.51 (0.16) 
False alarms 0.28 (0.14) 0.19 (0.12) 
 
0.23 (0.12) 0.22 (0.11)  0.25 (0.13) 0.20 (0.13) 
 
Table 2.11 
Summary Statistics for Each Valence across Instructions for Studies 1, 2 and 3. R is the Estimate of Recollection Driven by 
Remember Judgements, F is the Estimate of Familiarity Driven by Know Judgements (according to the Independence 
Assumption), d’ is the Estimate of Memory Sensitivity and c is the Estimate of Criterion. SD = standard deviation 
    Study 1  Study 2  Study 3 
  Negative Neutral  Negative Positive  Positive Neutral 
  M (SD) M (SD)  M (SD) M (SD)  M (SD) M (SD) 
R Remember 0.30 (0.20) 0.27 (0.18)  0.30 (0.17) 0.27 (0.16)  0.31 (0.18) 0.28 (0.15) 
 Forget 0.18 (0.17) 0.17 (0.15)  0.20 (0.16)  0.20 (0.17)  0.15 (0.10) 0.15 (0.11) 
F  Remember 0.59 (0.18) 0.54 (0.16)  0.63 (0.14) 0.59 (0.13)  0.55 (0.19) 0.51 (0.20) 
 Forget 0.54 (0.16) 0.46 (0.18)  0.60 (0.15) 0.56 (0.15)  0.47 (0.18) 0.42 (0.17) 
d'  Remember 1.24 (0.47) 1.34 (0.51)  1.52 (0.55) 1.43 (0.50)  1.30 (0.50) 1.42 (0.57) 
 Forget 0.94 (0.41) 1.00 (0.54)  1.30 (0.45) 1.24 (0.53)  0.87 (0.36) 0.99 (0.37) 
c Remember -0.02 (0.33) 0.22 (0.35) 
 
0.06 (0.32) 0.14 (0.32)  0.09 (0.39) 0.27 (0.41) 
 Forget 0.12 (0.38) 0.39 (0.41)  0.17 (0.38) 0.23 (0.36)  0.31 (0.39) 0.48 (0.46) 
 





(remember vs forget) and valence (two categories in each case). ROC curves for each study are 
attached in Appendix K. 
 
2.3.2.1 Effects of Instruction 
There were main effects of instruction in all three studies for all measures. In the cases 
of sensitivity, recollection and familiarity this reflects a directed forgetting effect: d’, R and F 
were all superior for TBR than for TBF words (although see the interaction term for R in study 
2 reported below; see Table 2.12). The main effect of instruction for response criterion reflects 
a relatively more liberal criterion for TBR than for TBF words.  
 
2.3.2.2 Effects of Valence 
There were main effects of valence across all studies for all four measures and an 
interaction between valence and instruction for recollection in study 2. Sensitivity was superior 
for negative words relative to positive words (study 2) and for neutral words relative to positive 
words (study 3; see Table 2.12). There was no effect of valence in study 1 – the negative/neutral 
Table 2.12 
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence in Studies 1, 2 and 3 
    Study 1  Study 2  Study 3 
Measure (DV)    df F p ηp²  df F p ηp²  df F p ηp²
Instruction 
R 1, 43 28.26 < .001*** .40  1, 43 19.62 < .001*** .31  1, 43 37.32 < .001*** .47
F 1, 43 13.22 .001** .24  1, 43 6.72 .013* .14  1, 43 20.05 < .001*** .32
d' 1, 43 35.40 < .001*** .45  1, 43 18.27 < .001*** .30  1, 43 37.50 < .001*** .47
c 1, 43 35.40 < .001*** .45  1, 43 18.27 < .001*** .30  1, 43 37.50 < .001*** .47
                
Valence 
R 1, 43 3.95 .053 .09  1, 43 4.45 .041* .09  1, 43 3.50 .068 .08
F 1, 43 15.94 < .001*** .27  1, 43 6.18 .017* .13  1, 43 10.75 .002** .20
d' 1, 43 2.49 .122 .06  1, 43 4.13 .048* .09  1, 43 7.38 .009** .15
c 1, 43 94.85 < .001*** .69  1, 43 4.45 .041* .09  1, 43 56.46 < .001*** .57
                
Instruction  
x Valence  
Interactions 
R 1, 43 1.07 .307 .02  1, 43 4.09 .049* .09  1, 43 2.39 .129 .05
F 1, 43 0.33 .567 .01  1, 43 0.00 .948 .00  1, 43 0.03 .867 .00
d' 1, 43 0.24 .625 .01  1, 43 0.46 .502 .01  1, 43 0.09 .768 .00
c 1, 43 0.24 .625 .01  1, 43 0.46 .502 .01  1, 43 0.09 .768 .00
Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.            
df = degrees of freedom              
 





contrast, although the absolute magnitude of the differences (neutral > negative) was similar to 
the differences in the other two studies. 
Turning to recollection, in study 2 recollection was superior for negative relative to 
positive words and there was also an interaction term. Recollection was superior for negative 
words in the remember condition and there was no effect of emotion in the forget condition. 
Furthermore, there was an effect of emotion for familiarity across all studies. Familiarity was 
superior for emotional relative to neutral words and for negative relative to positive words (see 
Table 2.12). 
For response criterion, there was a more liberal response criterion for emotional words 
relative to neutral words and a more liberal criterion for negative words relative to positive 
words (see Table 2.12). 
 
2.3.2.3 ROC Analyses – Area Under the Curve (AUC) 
Additional analyses of the ROC curves were conducted for the Area Under the Curve 
(AUC) measures to examine possible effects of valence and instruction. The AUC was 
measured using the ROC Toolbox in Matlab (Koen et al., 2017). The results (see Table 2.13 for 
the ANOVA results) are similar to the results from the d’ analyses. That is, there are consistent 
DF effects across all three studies, which are not affected by valence. In study 2, there was also 
a significant main effect of valence. Memory was higher for negative (M = 0.79, SD = 0.01) 
than for positive (M = 0.78, SD = 0.01) items. Although the d’ analyses resulted in a main effect 































One intention in this experiment was to investigate the generality of the findings in 
Experiment 2, where ROC measures were used to extract estimates of recollection and 
familiarity. This was done in Experiment 3 by introducing the Remember/Know procedure in 
combination with confidence judgements. The confidence judgements were applied in order to 
have an experimental design close to Experiment 2 that allows a direct comparison of both 
methods. The experiment also allowed for assessment of criterion and the important separation 
between sensitivity and criterion.  
 
2.3.3.1 Memory Sensitivity and Directed Forgetting 
Consistent with the findings in Experiment 2, there was a reliable DF effect for all 
measures, the DF effect did not vary according to emotion, nor did emotion enhance memory 
sensitivity. Moreover, memory sensitivity was superior for negative relative to positive words. 
Recollection as well as familiarity were superior for TBR words relative to TBF words in all 
three studies. This is partially in line with previous findings in an ERP study investigating the 
neural correlates of recollection and familiarity in directed forgetting. Nowicka et al. (2009) 
Table 2.13
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence in Studies 1, 2 and 3 on the AUC 
measures 
  Study 1  Study 2  Study 3 
Measure 
(DV)   
df F p ηp²   
df F p ηp²   
df F p ηp² 
Instruction 
 
1, 43 41.11 <.000*** .49 
 
1, 43 24.21 <.000*** .36 
 
1, 43 43.23 <.000*** .50 
Valence 
 
1, 43 0.10 .750 .00 
 
1, 43 7.98 .007** .16 
 
1, 43 3.05 .088 .07 
Instruction  
x Valence 
Interactions   
1, 43 0.20 .660 .01 
  
1, 43 1.08 .306 .02 
  
1, 43 1.53 .224 .03 
Notes. ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
df = degrees of freedom  
 





reported a left-parietal old/new effect for TBR items, suggesting that remembering TBR items 
was based on recollection processes. There was no left-parietal old/new effect for correctly 
recognized TBF words, and the outcomes of this ERP study did not speak to putative 
contributions via familiarity.  
For memory sensitivity, the DF effect observed here is consistent with common findings 
in the directed forgetting paradigm (MacLeod, 1999). The absence of changes in the DF effect 
with emotion is consistent with some previous studies (Berger et al., 2018; Gallant et al., 2018; 
Taylor et al., 2018). This consistency, however, does not extend to other studies that have found 
a smaller DF effect for emotional material (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Brandt et al., 2013; 
Hauswald et al., 2011; Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; Otani et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2016), or a 
smaller DF effect for neutral material (Brandt et al., 2013). Moreover, the observation that 
emotion did not enhance memory sensitivity is in contrast with the assumption that emotion 
enhances memory (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Levine & Edelstein, 2009; Talmi et al., 2008), 
as well as findings in some DF studies (Brandt et al., 2013; Gallant & Yang, 2014; Payne & 
Corrigan, 2007; Taylor et al., 2018).  In contrast with Experiment 2, memory sensitivity was 
superior for neutral words relative to positive words, which is consistent with some previous 
findings of studies investigating directed forgetting for emotional and neutral material (Bailey 
& Chapman, 2012; Berger et al., 2018), and other studies (Maratos et al., 2000). This effect of 
emotion between neutral and positive words was not, however, evident in the AUC analyses. 
In summary, and perhaps inevitably given the heterogeneity in the existing literature, the data 
in Experiment 3 are aligned with some prior data but not others. 
The superior sensitivity for negative relative to positive material in study 2 suggests that 
negative and positive material have different effects on memory. Based on this finding, the 
effect of emotion on memory here cannot be linked to properties of arousal, rather this may be 
linked with properties of valence (Dolcos et al., 2004; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003, 2004; 





Kensinger & Kark, 2018). The consistency in this case with the findings in Experiment 2 
reinforces this argument. Another consistency between the present experiment and Experiment 
2, both using multiple points measures, is that emotion did not enhance memory overall, 
emphasizing that response criterion can create illusory indications of changes in memory when 
single-point measures are used (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008).  
In summary, the findings observed here are in line with some of the predictions made 
in this experiment but not others. Briefly, emotion did not enhance sensitivity, the DF effect 
was not influenced by emotion and a DF effect was observed for recollection and familiarity. 
In contrast, however, sensitivity was superior for neutral words relative to positive words. The 
consistent DF effect across the three behavioural experiments described above is further 
evidence of a robust pattern. Moreover, the finding that the DF effect did not differ according 
to valence is also a consistent outcome. So far, these outcomes suggest that factors not 
controlled for in prior DF studies have resulted in the published inconsistencies.  
 
2.3.3.2 Response Criterion 
Response criterion was more liberal for emotional words relative to neutral and for 
negative words relative to positive words. This is in line with findings from Experiment 2. 
These findings are inconsistent, however, with the findings in Experiment 1 where there was a 
more conservative response criterion for emotional words. As discussed in Experiment 2, the 
number of valence conditions used and the use of single-point vs multiple-point measures may 
provide an explanation for these discrepancies. The consistency of the findings across 
Experiments 2 and 3, in designs arguably better suited to assess the measures of interest than 
those used in Experiment 1, increases the degree of confidence that criterion change with 
emotion is a robust outcome. 





The findings discussed here are consistent with previous DF and other studies, where 
participants adopted a more liberal criterion for emotional material (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; 
Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Hauswald et al., 2011; Kapucu et al., 2008; Marchewka et al., 2016; 
Windmann & Kutas, 2001). In these studies, however, there were no direct paired contrasts 
between negative and positive material. The criterion changes here and in Experiment 2 for this 
paired contrast are thus a relatively novel outcome, and these outcomes cannot be attributed to 
differences in arousal, either, given that this was matched for these two valence categories.  
 
2.3.3.3 Recollection and Familiarity 
In study 2, recollection was superior for negative relative to positive TBR words, 
whereas emotion did not influence recollection for TBF words. This interaction illustrates that 
forgetting negative and positive words was equally challenging whereas remembering negative 
words was easier than remembering positive words. Previous studies of emotional directed 
forgetting reporting an interaction between directed forgetting and emotion involved only 
negative and neutral material, or three valence categories, so in no previous cases was the 
negative/positive contrast isolated (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Hauswald et al., 2011; Nowicka 
et al., 2011; Payne & Corrigan, 2007). These studies suggest that emotional information may 
be particularly resistant to forgetting compared to neutral items, whereas the findings in the 
present experiment reveal important differences within the emotional category (negative vs 
positive). Zheng et al. (2018) found a larger left-parietal old/new effect for negative relative to 
positive and neutral images, which may indicate that memory judgements were to a greater 
extent based on recollection for negative images relative to positive images, but this was not 
mirrored in the behavioural outcomes in their study. 
In this experiment there were no differences in recollection estimates between emotional 
and neutral words, which contrasts with the findings from Experiment 2 and some previous 





findings (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Ochsner, 2000; Ritchey et al., 2008). In Experiment 2 
recollection was superior for neutral relative to negative words. Linking the present findings 
with the existing literature, behavioural R/K studies have reported enhanced recollection for 
emotional material based on increases in Remember judgements (Ochsner, 2000; Sharot et al., 
2007).  
Familiarity estimates in Experiment 3 were increased for emotional relative to neutral 
words. This is also inconsistent with the findings from Experiment 2, but consistent with 
Ochsner (2000) who found, at least for negative images, increased Know judgements relative 
to neutral images. They also found increased Know judgements for negative relative to positive 
images, which is consistent with Experiment 2 as well as the present findings. Perhaps the 
strongest conclusion that this pattern of outcomes permits is that it adds further weight to the 
view that the effects of emotion on memory cannot be reduced to the influence of arousal.  
The DF effect again observed for recollection as well as familiarity confirms the revised 
prediction that was made based on the findings in Experiment 2 (prior to that experiment, DF 
was expected to influence recollection only). One explanation for this observation is that 
directed forgetting is a consequence of enhanced processing of TBR items that influences both 
recollection and familiarity. This account is in line with findings that there are some 
experimental manipulations that increase both recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas & 
Jacoby, 1995). 
With respect to the effects of emotion on recollection and familiarity, there are some 
inconsistencies as described above. Also, the findings here are in contrast to what has been 
predicted based on Experiment 2. To repeat, the key differences are: (i) superior recollection 
for neutral compared to negative words in Experiment 2 and superior recollection only for 
negative compared to positive words in Experiment3 and (ii) familiarity was superior for 
emotional words compared to neutral words in Experiment 3, whereas this effect was not 





evident in Experiment 2. One explanation for these inconsistencies is that different measures 
were used in both experiments. This did not, however, result in different observations for 
response criterion and directed forgetting. In addition, both experiments used a different set of 
participants, so individual differences cannot be ruled out. While recognising that a definitive 
explanation is unlikely, a closer inspection of the recollection and familiarity outcomes using 
two different methods (i.e. the ROC measure and R/K method of measuring recollection and 
familiarity) was undertaken. 
 
2.3.3.4 Comparing ROC and R/K Analyses 
As mentioned earlier, one intention in Experiment 3 was to investigate the generality of 
the findings in Experiment 2 (ROCs) using a slightly different method, the R/K procedure. This 
was also done by directly comparing the outcomes using the R/K method in Experiment 2 and 
the ROC measure in Experiment 3. If high confidence old judgements are based on recollection 
only, and this is also true for Remember judgements, then ROCs in the two cases should 
overlap. If, however, the highest level of confidence judgements can also be made on the basis 
of familiarity, then the intercept of the ROC will be lower in the R/K procedure. In this 
experiment, a combination of the R/K procedure and confidence judgements was applied, and 
the question to be considered is how ROCs plotted in this design should relate to ROCs plotted 
on the basis of confidence judgements, as in Experiment 2. Previously, studies have investigated 
precisely this question and have found that estimates of recollection and familiarity derived 
from the R/K procedure correspond with the ones derived from ROC measures (Yonelinas et 
al., 1996; for a review of findings see Yonelinas, 2001a). In addition, R/K measures of 
recollection and familiarity generally fit with the predicted ROCs according to the DPSD model 
(Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; Yonelinas et al., 1996). A comparison of the ROC figures between 
Experiment 2 and 3 suggests that the ROC curves result in similar patterns (see Appendix K for 





the ROC curves in Experiment 3). In the negative/neutral contrast there is an overlap of the 
curves indicating no differences in sensitivity, whereas in the negative/positive contrast the two 
curves do not overlap indicating differences in sensitivity. These observations are identical to 
the observations in Experiment 2 (see Figure 2.2). Similarly, the ROC curves in Experiment 3 
indicate a more liberal criterion for emotional words compared to neutral words and for negative 
words compared to positive words. This is very similar indeed to the observations in 
Experiment 2.  
 For a direct comparison of the ROC and R/K method within each experiment, the R/K 
method in Experiment 2 was applied by taking the highest confidence old judgements to old 
items as the proportion of Remember responses, as the estimate of recollection. The other two 
confidence judgements for old items (probably old and maybe old) were considered as Know 
responses and used to calculate familiarity using the independence R/K method. In Experiment 
3, the 5-point confidence scale was used to derive 5-point ROC curves (instead of 6-point ROC 
curves in Experiment 2) and estimates of recollection and familiarity were based on the DPSD 
model. Remember responses were used as the highest confidence old judgement that reflected 
recollection (i.e. the left most point on the ROC curve). The remainder of the confidence scale 
(4 points) were used for the remainder of the ROC curve. The estimates of recollection and 
familiarity measured based on the ROC measures and the R/K procedure in Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 3 for all three studies can be found in Table 2.14 (Experiment 2) and Table 2.15 
(Experiment 3). 
 






Inspection of these data points suggests that the measures correspond and indicate 
similar effects of emotion on the processes of recollection only in study 2 (negative vs positive) 
in both experiments. For example, in Experiment 3 recollection and familiarity are increased 
for negative relative to positive words using both methods. Moreover, broadly equivalent 
recollection in Experiment 3 for negative and positive words in the forget condition is also 
visible in both methods (see Table 2.15). This is, however, not the case in study 1 and 3, where 
both measures estimate different effects of emotion on recollection and familiarity. In study 1 
Table 2.15 
Measures of Recollection (R) and Familiarity (F) Calculated using the R/K Approach and the ROC Analyses across Instructions 
(Remember/Forget) and Valence (Negative, Positive and Neutral) in Studies 1, 2 and 3 in Experiment 3. SD = standard deviation 
      Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 
  Negative Neutral Negative Positive Positive Neutral 
   M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
ROC 
R 
Remember 0.17 (0.21) 0.22 (0.18) 0.20 (0.15) 0.18 (0.14) 0.18 (0.18) 0.21 (0.17) 
Forget 0.08 (0.13) 0.12 (0.14) 0.12 (0.13) 0.12 (0.15) 0.09 (0.09) 0.09 (0.09) 
F 
Remember 0.87 (0.90) 1.05 (0.43) 1.27 (0.52) 1.18 (0.52) 1.02 (0.51) 0.92 (1.11) 
Forget 0.79 (0.42) 0.79 (0.46) 1.11 (0.42) 1.06 (0.44) 0.46 (1.46) 0.78 (0.36) 
R/K 
R 
Remember 0.29 (0.20) 0.26 (0.19) 0.30 (0.17) 0.27 (0.16) 0.30 (0.19) 0.27 (0.16) 
Forget 0.17 (0.18) 0.16 (0.15) 0.20 (0.16) 0.20 (0.17) 0.14 (0.10) 0.14 (0.11) 
F 
Remember 0.58 (0.19) 0.53 (0.17) 0.63 (0.14) 0.59 (0.13) 0.55 (0.19) 0.51 (0.20) 
Forget 0.53 (0.17) 0.45 (0.18) 0.60 (0.15) 0.56 (0.15) 0.47 (0.18) 0.42 (0.17) 
 
Table 2.14 
Measures of Recollection (R) and Familiarity (F) Calculated using the R/K Approach and the ROC Analyses across Instructions 
(Remember/Forget) and Valence (Negative, Positive and Neutral) in Studies 1, 2 and 3 in Experiment 2. SD = standard deviation 
      Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 
  Negative Neutral Negative Positive Positive Neutral 
   M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
ROC 
R 
Remember 0.26 (0.22) 0.29 (0.19) 0.23 (0.16) 0.21 (0.15) 0.27 (0.18) 0.26 (0.16) 
Forget 0.20 (0.21) 0.25 (0.19) 0.17 (0.13) 0.15 (0.14) 0.19 (0.17) 0.18 (0.17) 
F 
Remember 1.08 (0.39) 1.09 (0.52) 0.93 (0.30) 0.84 (0.38) 0.86 (0.34) 0.92 (0.41) 
Forget 0.92 (0.40) 0.91 (0.37) 0.81 (0.33) 0.73 (0.31) 0.74 (0.34) 0.74 (0.38) 
R/K 
R 
Remember 0.46 (0.18) 0.41 (0.18) 0.46 (0.16) 0.43 (0.16) 0.38 (0.20) 0.37 (0.17) 
Forget 0.37 (0.21) 0.33 (0.19) 0.38 (0.17) 0.34 (0.18) 0.30 (0.20) 0.26 (0.18) 
F 
Remember 0.51 (0.20) 0.45 (0.16) 0.57 (0.17) 0.53 (0.19) 0.43 (0.14) 0.43 (0.16) 
Forget 0.48 (0.17) 0.39 (0.15) 0.51 (0.17) 0.48 (0.16) 0.42 (0.17) 0.37 (0.16) 
 





of Experiment 2, for example, recollection was superior for neutral TBR words relative to 
negative TBR words under the ROC method, whereas the opposite is the case under the R/K 
method. These outcomes are at least suggestive of the conclusion that one or more of the 
assumptions underlying these methods does not hold.  
The results of these comparisons bear some similarities with those in other studies 
reporting discrepancies when using both methods (e.g. Rotello, Macmillan, Reeder, & Wong, 
2005). For example, Rotello et al. (2005) employed a combination of confidence judgements 
and R/K judgements and found participants’ Remember judgements were accompanied with 
various levels of confidence. Thus, Remember judgements were not a pure measure of 
recollection (also see Rotello et al., 2006). Wixted (2007) has argued that the processes of 
recollection and familiarity are not independent and that Remember responses or high 
confidence judgements may not reflect only recollection. By this view, while the two processes 
are considered to exist, each response on a memory test is a reflection of a combined 
contribution from the two processes, albeit to differing extents (for a detailed review, see 
Wixted, 2007). The data in Experiments 2 and 3 cannot adjudicate between different models of 
the relationships between recollection and familiarity. They do, none the less, align themselves 
with findings suggesting that there is a less than 1:1 correspondence between their accuracy in 














3. EXAMINING EMOTION IN DIRECTED FORGETTING USING 
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES (ERPs) 
 
3.1 Experiment 4 – Emotion and Directed Forgetting using ERPs 
Introducing confidence judgements in Experiment 2 allowed for a separation between 
estimates of memory sensitivity and response criterion that was not possible in Experiment 1, 
where only old/new judgements were required at test. One of the reasons for conducting 
Experiments 2 and 3 was to understand the data that is obtained when single-point measures 
have been employed. As described in section 2.2, an issue with using single-point measures is 
that memory sensitivity and response criterion are not necessarily independent. Because of this, 
conclusions about whether emotion affects memory sensitivity, response criterion or both can 
be made only tentatively when differences in criterion occur across critical conditions.   
This potential confound motivated the use of confidence judgements in Experiment 2 
and 3, because they are one way of providing separate estimates of the contributions of 
sensitivity and criterion. The outcomes of these experiments shed light on the ways in which 
sensitivity and criterion interact with emotion (see section 2.2). Additionally, the use of 
confidence judgements in Experiment 2 permitted an investigation of how the processes of 
recollection and familiarity contribute to memory for emotional and neutral material, and how 
they are influenced by instructions to remember and forget. This was also accomplished via the 
use of the Remember/Know procedure (combined with confidence judgments) in Experiment 
3. Across these three experiments the main findings were: (i) a consistent liberal criterion for 
emotional compared to neutral material in Experiment 2 and 3, and (ii) no differences between 
the directed forgetting effect for emotional and neutral material. In Experiment 1 there was a 
more liberal criterion for neutral material, which is inconsistent with others finding the opposite 





using a variety of methods (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Hauswald et 
al., 2011; Marchewka et al., 2016), as was found in Experiment 2 and 3.  
 If, however, changes to the memory response requirements at test change markedly how 
participants approach tasks – for example, by relying to a greater extent on recollection when 
confidence or R/K judgements are made – then the findings in Experiment 2 and 3 might not 
be reasonably compared to those in Experiment 1, where only old/new recognition memory 
judgements were required. For this reason, in this chapter the experiment that is reported 
requires old/new judgements only at test, and the contributions of recollection and familiarity 
to memory for emotionally valenced material as well as the influence of directions to remember 
and forget are assessed via a neural measure (event-related potentials: ERPs). The rationale for 
using ERPs is to provide a means of assessing the extent to which recollection and familiarity 
are engaged in a directed forgetting task requiring only old/new decisions. 
 Previous studies using event-related potentials (ERPs) have identified dissociable neural 
correlates that are linked with recollection and familiarity (Rugg & Curran, 2007; Rugg et al., 
1998; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008; for a review see Friedman & Johnson, 2000). The left-parietal 
old/new effect, which onsets around 400-500ms post-stimulus has a left-sided posterior 
maximum and lasts for 400-500ms, has been linked with recollection (Rugg & Curran, 2007; 
Sanquist et al., 1980). This effect is larger for Remember than for Know judgements in the R/K 
procedure (Duarte, Ranganath, Winward, Hayward, & Knight, 2004; Friedman & Johnson, 
2000; Smith, 1993), and when source judgements are correct rather than when they are incorrect 
(Leynes & Phillips, 2008; Senkfor & Van Petten, 1998; Wilding, 2000; Wilding et al., 1995; 
Wilding & Rugg, 1996). The process of familiarity has been linked with the mid-frontal old/new 
effect (which is also referred to as the FN400; Curran, 1999; Rugg et al., 1998). This effect, is 
observed in a time window of 300-500ms with a fronto-central maximum (Rugg et al., 1998; 
and for reviews and discussions see Curran, 2000; Paller et al., 2007). 





ERPs have also been used to examine how recollection and familiarity are influenced 
by emotion. Maratos et al. (2000) investigated memory for negative and neutral words. 
Participants were instructed to study a set of words while rating the words on emotionality. 
During a subsequent recognition memory test, Maratos et al. (2000) observed reduced memory 
sensitivity for negative words. Electrophysiologically, there were no differences in the 
magnitude of the mid-frontal old/new effects according to emotion. The left-parietal ERP 
old/new effect, however, was smaller for negative words. Based on these findings, they 
suggested that emotion influences memory based on recollection and not familiarity (Maratos 
et al., 2000). The opposite ERP outcome was, however, obtained in a study by Zheng et al. 
(2018). Behaviourally, using negative, positive and neutral images, they found no differences 
in memory sensitivity. They did, however, observe a larger left-parietal old/new effect for 
negative images relative to positive and neutral images. They concluded that, for negative 
images, increased recollection-based memory judgements were made, although it remains 
problematic that this was not reflected in the behavioural data. In another study that investigated 
memory for negative and neutral words, there were no differences in memory sensitivity 
(Windmann & Kutas, 2001). Moreover, in contrast to the ERP findings described above, 
Windmann and Kutas (2001) found no effect of emotion on the magnitude of the old/new 
effects in mid-frontal and left-parietal regions. Therefore, they concluded that emotion did not 
influence recollection or familiarity, but again the absence of a behavioural effect makes 
interpretation of the ERP old/new effects somewhat difficult. 
 Researchers have also investigated how old/new effects vary for TBR and TBF items. 
Nowicka et al. (2009) found a reliable old/new effect for correctly recognized TBR items over 
central and parietal sites, whereas this old/new effect was absent for correctly recognized TBF 
items. According to Nowicka et al. (2009), these findings suggest that recollective processes 
support TBR items more than TBF items. Van Hooff, Whitaker and Ford (2009), also examined 





ERPs for TBR and TBF test words and found a similar pattern. They also found a larger left-
parietal old/new effect for TBR items relative to TBF items.  
 To re-iterate, the rationale for using ERP old/new effects is to provide a means of 
investigating memory and emotion that complements the ROC and R/K measures. In this 
experiment the focus is on conducting targeted analyses at mid-frontal and left-parietal sites 
over the 300-500ms and 500-800ms time windows, in order to isolate activity which is assumed 
to reflect the processes of recollection and familiarity (Rugg & Curran, 2007; Rugg et al., 1998; 
Sanquist et al., 1980; Wilding & Rugg, 1996). Two studies were conducted in which memory 
effects were investigated between negative and neutral words (study 1) and between positive 
and neutral words (study 2). The reason for separating negative and positive material relative 
to neutral material in different studies was to increase power and maintain sufficient trials in 
key conditions for the ERP data analyses. If the ways in which recollection and familiarity are 
influenced by emotion and directed forgetting are not dependent upon response demands at test, 
then the ERP modulations will behave in a way that is comparable to how the estimates for 
recollection and familiarity varied with emotion and directed forgetting instructions in 
Experiments 2 and 3. That is, both the left-parietal and mid-frontal old/new effects will be larger 




Participants in both studies were undergraduates from the University of Nottingham. 
Participants with sensitivity (d’) scores < 0.24 for recognition memory and/or <16 trials in the 
critical response categories (see below for definitions) in the ERP data were excluded. In 
addition, participants for whom more than 25% of trials were rejected due to noise were also 
excluded. In study 1 there were 20 participants of which 4 participants were excluded for having 





fewer than 16 trials in at least one critical response category. In study 2 there were 21 
participants of which 5 participants were excluded; one participant did not meet the inclusion 
criterion for sensitivity, one was excluded because of extensive noise in the EEG data and three 
were excluded for having fewer than 16 trials in one or more of the critical response categories. 
In both studies data from 16 remaining participants were used for behavioural and EEG analyses 
(study 1: 13 females, M = 23 years, SD = 3.73; study 2: 11 females, M = 19.81 years, SD = 
1.87). After giving informed consent, participants completed the experiment and received either 
an inconvenience allowance of £10 or 2 credits towards their first-year credit requirement.  
 
3.1.1.2 Design and Materials 
The two studies had very similar designs and procedures and differed only in the 
categories of valence used. Study 1 consisted of negative and neutral words, study 2 positive 
and neutral words.  
A 2 (instruction: remember vs forget) x 2 (valence) within-subjects design was 
employed. Each valence category consisted of 240 words which were selected from the 
Warriner et al. (2013) database.  The valence categories in both studies differed on the basis of 
valence (negative: M = 2.70, SD = 0.67; positive: M = 7.28, SD = 0.48; neutral: M = 5.12, SD 
= 0.38). All words were matched for semantic relatedness, word length and word frequency. At 
the level of the entire word sets independent sample t-tests were conducted to assess the 
equivalence of the semantic relatedness scores (study 1: range 0.79 – 0.95; study 2: range 0.79 
– 0.98), arousal (study 1: range 2.25 – 7.27; study 2: range 2.50 – 7.05), word length (both 
studies: range 3 – 14) and word frequencies (both studies: range 0.30 – 5.40). The only 
significant differences were in arousal. Full details of these outcomes can be seen in Appendix 
L (Table L1).   





The 240 words were then split into study (120 words) and test (240 words) lists. Six 
study lists were formed, each containing 20 words for each valence type (40 words in total). 
The corresponding test lists each contained 80 words in total (40 words for each valence 
category, half of which were also on the study lists). A further set of lists was created in which 
the words designated as either TBR or TBF were alternated. DF instructions (TBR and TBF) 
and the old/new status of words were counterbalanced. Again, independent sample t-tests were 
conducted separately on the study and test lists for the list of properties described above. The 
outcomes are consistent with those already described (see Appendix L, Table L2 (study lists) 
and Table L3 (test lists)).  
 
3.1.1.3 EEG Acquisition 
EEG was recorded at a sample rate of 1024 Hz using a Biosemi ActiveTwo system 
(Amsterdam, Netherlands) with 64 active electrodes placed according to the 10-20 system 
(Jasper, 1958, see Figure 1.4B). Two additional electrodes located at mid-parietal sites, the 
Common Mode Sense (CMS) and the Driven Right Leg (DRL), were used for online 
referencing (see Figure 1.4B). Additional electrodes were placed on the left and right mastoids 
for offline re-referencing. Electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded using two electrodes above 
and below the right eye (VEOG) and from the outer canthi (HEOG) of both eyes for monitoring 
eye blinks and lateral eye movements.  
Offline pre-processing of the EEG data was done via the Brain Products Analyzer 
software. The data were filtered using a high-pass filter of 0.1 Hz and a low-pass filter of 30 
Hz. Trials containing large EOG artefacts (eye blinks and movements) were rejected using the 
Ocular Correction ICA function in Analyzer, followed by a visual inspection. The data were 
then re-referenced using the average of the signal at the two mastoids and segmented into 
epochs of 1200ms time locked to stimulus presentation (including a 200ms pre-stimulus 





baseline). A semi-automated procedure was used for the rejection of large artefacts exceeding 
±100 µV, which were identified initially via an algorithm and followed by visual inspection. 
The critical response categories were: correct old judgements (hits) to remember and forget 
words for negative, positive and neutral words and correct new responses (correct rejections to 
new negative, positive and neutral words). See Table 3.1 for mean numbers of trials 
contributing to each of the response categories in studies 1 and 2. An average of 87.6% of trials 





Participants were tested individually, and the study lasted no more than 50 minutes. The 
entire time spent with participants was up to 2 hours. The remaining 70 minutes was occupied 
by the application of the cap and electrodes, and removal and debrief after the end of the study. 
 The experiment consisted of six study-test blocks. In the study phase, a fixation cross 
appeared on the screen for 1000ms followed by a 200ms blank screen. Words were then 
presented individually for 1500ms in the centre of the screen. After each word a blank screen 
appeared for 500ms followed by a remember cue (VVVVV in the colour green) or a forget cue 
(XXXXX in the colour red). Participants were instructed to attempt to remember the preceding 
Table 3.1 
Mean Numbers of Trials used for Averaging separated by Response Category (Correct Rejections and Hits 
separated by Instruction (Remember/Forget)) and Valence (Negative, Positive and Neutral). SD = standard 
deviation 
  Study 1  Study 2 
 Negative Neutral  Positive Neutral 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
Hit (Remember) 40 (6.92) 37 (7.75)  36 (9.04) 32 (8.29) 
Hit (Forget) 32 (9.53) 27 (9.42)  31 (8.99) 28 (9.57) 
Correct Rejection 85 (19.95) 89 (22.22)  80 (11.47) 84 (15.78) 
 





word following a remember cue, and to forget the word when a forget cue followed. The 
instructions remained on the screen for 500ms and the order of remember and forget words was 
determined randomly for each participant. Following the offset of the cue, a blank screen 
appeared for a varying duration of between 700 and 1300ms, before the next trial started. 
 Test trials commenced with a blank screen for 1000ms, followed by a fixation cross for 
another 1000ms. After the fixation cross another blank screen appeared for 200ms before a 
word was presented for 300ms. Participants were asked to make an old/new recognition 
judgment on the word, regardless of the TBR or TBF instruction given in the study phase, by 
pressing designated keys with their left and right index fingers on a keyboard. The hands used 
for old and new responses were counterbalanced across participants. Once a response was 
made, the next trial commenced. 
 Participants were instructed to minimise unnecessary movement during the study and 
test blocks and limit eye blinking to the periods when the fixation cross appeared on the screen. 
They were allowed to take short breaks between study and test blocks. Within these breaks they 
were allowed to move carefully and blink as they wished. 
 
3.1.2 Results 
3.1.2.1 Behavioural Data 
Table 3.2 shows mean probabilities of hits and false alarms across instruction 
(remember, forget) and valence (negative vs neutral and positive vs neutral). Estimates for 
sensitivity and criterion separated for instruction and valence are presented in Table 3.3.  
 







For each study, 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the two measures 
shown in Table 3.3: sensitivity (d’) and response criterion (c). In each case these analyses 
initially included the factors of instruction (remember vs forget) and valence (two categories in 
each case). Only main effects are elaborated on below, as there were no reliable interactions 
between factors. 
 
3.1.2.1.1 Effects of Instruction 
There were main effects of instruction in both studies for sensitivity and response 
criterion. In the case of sensitivity this reflects a directed forgetting effect: d’ was superior for  
TBR compared to TBF words (see Table 3.4). The main effect of instruction for response 
criterion reflects a more liberal criterion for TBR than for TBF words. 
Table 3.2  
Probabilities of Correct Judgements (Hits) to Old Items and Incorrect Judgements (False Alarms) to New Items 
across Instruction (Remember/Forget) and Valence (Negative, Positive and Neutral) for Studies 1 and 2. SD = 
standard deviation 
    Study 1  Study 2 









Hits Remember 0.74 (0.11) 0.70 (0.13)  0.69 (0.12) 0.61 (0.14) 
 Forget 0.59 (0.21) 0.50 (0.19)  0.58 (0.16) 0.52 (0.15) 
False alarms  0.18 (0.13) 0.15 (0.13)  0.22 (0.13) 0.18 (0.13) 
 
Table 3.3  
Summary Statistics for Each Valence Type across Instructions for Studies 1 and 2. d’ is the Estimate of Memory 
Sensitivity and c is the Estimate of Criterion. SD = standard deviation 
    Study 1  Study 2 
  Negative Neutral  Positive Neutral 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
d'  Remember 1.72 (0.53) 1.77 (0.74)  1.35 (0.56) 1.31 (0.52) 
 Forget 1.32 (0.50) 1.25 (0.48)  1.05 (0.44) 1.08 (0.32) 
c Remember 0.12 (0.40) 0.29 (0.42)  0.15 (0.30) 0.38 (0.35) 
  Forget 0.32 (0.46) 0.55 (0.53)  0.30 (0.38) 0.49 (0.42) 
 






3.1.2.1.2 Effects of Valence 
There were main effects of valence only for response criterion (see Table 3.4). A more 
liberal response criterion was observed for emotional words relative to neutral words in both 
studies. 
 
3.1.2.2 EEG Data 
Analyses of the neural data were targeted at mid-frontal sites from 300-500ms to assess 
changes in the putative index of familiarity according to valence and response categories (i.e. 
remember hit, forget hit and correct rejections). Furthermore, analyses were targeted at left-
parietal sites from 500-800ms to assess changes in the index of recollection according to the 
same factors.  
Figure 3.1 (negative vs neutral) and Figure 3.2 (positive vs neutral) show the grand 
average ERPs for the three critical response categories over mid-frontal (F3, Fz, F4) and left-
parietal (P3, P5, P7) regions. The translucent grey areas indicate the critical time windows for 
the analyses of the mid-frontal (300-500ms) and left-parietal (500-800ms) old/new effects. The 
Table 3.4 
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence in Studies 1 and 2 
    Study 1  Study 2 
 Measure (DV)   df F p ηp²  df F p ηp² 
Instruction 
d' 1, 15 15.34 .001** .51  1, 15 8.69 .010** .37 
c 1, 15 15.34 .001** .51  1, 15 8.69 .010** .37 
          
           
Valence 
d' 1, 15 0.02 .891 .00  1, 15 0.01 .920 .00 
c 1, 15 20.52 < .001*** .58  1, 15 20.37 < .001*** .58 
          
           
Instruction  
x Valence  
Interactions 
d' 1, 15 1.96 .182 .12  1, 15 0.52 .481 .03 
c 1, 15 1.96 .182 .12  1, 15 0.52 .481 .03 
Notes. ** p < .01, *** p < .001.       
df = degrees of freedom         
 





scalp maps at the foot of each figure are computed on the basis of difference scores obtained 
by subtracting the mean amplitude measures for correct rejections from those for the TBR and 
TBF hit categories. The method used is a spherical spline interpolation (Perrin et al., 1989).  
For study 1 (see Figure 3.1) the old/new effects are small with no marked changes 
according to valence. Moreover, in contrast to what is often observed, some of the old/new 
effects are negative-going, most notably for TBF items. For study 2 (see Figure 3.2), there are 
only small differences between old/new effects at frontal sites between 300 and 500ms. Over 
parietal scalp between 500 and 800ms the old/new effects for positive words are larger than 
those for neutral words. There are no marked differences according to instruction (TBR/TBF). 
The key outcomes are shown in Figure 3.3, which depicts the mean amplitudes of the key 
old/new effects and comprise a summary of the data that were submitted to the analyses 
described below. 








Figure 3.1. (A) Grand average ERPs for frontal sites (channel F3, Fz, F4) in a time window of 300-500ms and for parietal 
sites (channels P3, P5, P7) in a time window of 500-800ms for negative (left column) and neutral (right column) material, 
separated for remember hits (RH), forget hits (FH) and correct rejections (CR). (B) Scalp maps showing the scalp 
distributions of the differences between the neural activities elicited by correct old/new judgements to old and new items 
for the time windows 300-500ms and 500-800ms for negative and neutral material.  
 
Study 1 








Figure 3.2. (A) Grand average ERPs for frontal sites (channel F3, Fz, F4) in a time window of 300-500ms and for parietal 
sites (channels P3, P5, P7) in a time window of 500-800ms for positive (left column) and neutral (right column) material, 
separated for remember hits (RH), forget hits (FH) and correct rejections (CR). (B) Scalp maps showing the scalp 
distributions of the differences between the neural activities elicited by correct old/new judgements to old and new items 
for the time windows 300-500ms and 500-800ms for positive and neutral material.  
 
Study 2 
























For each study, 3 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on mean 
amplitudes for the 300-500ms (mid-frontal old/new effect; F3, Fz, F4) and the 500-800ms (left-
parietal old/new effect; P3, P5, P7) data shown in Figure 3.3. In each case these analyses 
initially included the factors of response category (remember hits, forget hits and correct 
rejections), valence (two categories in each case) and site as described above. 
 
Study 2 
 Figure 3.3. Mean amplitudes of the TBR and TBF old/new effects in studies 1 and 2 separated by valence and 
instruction. The old/new effects were calculated by subtracting the mean amplitudes for correct rejections from 
those for TBR and TBF hits. The mean amplitudes are averages taken across channels F3, Fz, F4) for the 300-
500ms window and channels P3, P5, P7 for the 500-800ms window. Error bars represent standard error. 
Study 1 





3.1.2.2.1 Mid-Frontal Old/New Effect 
There were no main effects of valence or response category and no interactions for the 
analyses of the mid-frontal old/new effects in either of the studies (see Table 3.5).  
 
 
3.1.2.2.2 Left-Parietal Old/New Effect 
There was a significant interaction for valence and response category in study 1 (see 
Table 3.6). However, simple main effects were not significant and there were no reliable 
differences in mean amplitudes in old/new judgements (forget, remember and new words) for 
negative words (F(2,14) = 2.29, p = .138) and neutral words (F(2,14) = 0.78, p = .477). The 
interaction term likely reflects the presence of a small positive-going old/new effect for negative 
TBR items, and either no or small negative-going old/new effects in the other three instances. 
 
Table 3.5 
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Response Category and Valence for the 
Mid-Frontal Old/New Effects in Studies 1 and 2 
  Study 1  Study 2 
Measure (DV) df F p ηp²  df F p 
ηp² 
Response Category 2, 30 1.11 .344 .07  2, 30 0.67 .517 .04 
Valence 1, 15 0.03 .861 .00  1, 15 0.11 .745 .01 
Response Category*Valence 2, 30 2.84 .074 .16  2, 30 0.10 .904 .01 
Note. df = degrees of freedom   
 
    
 
 
Table 3.6  
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Response Category and Valence for the 
Left-Parietal Old/New Effects in Studies 1 and 2 
  Study 1  Study 2 
Measure (DV) df F p ηp²  df F p 
ηp² 
Response Category 2, 30 0.75 .482 .05  2, 30 1.80 .183 .11 
Valence 1, 15 0.00 .988 .00  1, 15 0.00 .988 .00 
Response Category*Valence 2, 30 3.66 .038* .20  2, 30 0.85 .439 .05 
Note. * p < .05.   
 
    
 
df = degrees of freedom          






The overall objective in this experiment was to contribute to our understanding of how 
control over remembering and forgetting of emotional material and the processes of recollection 
and familiarity are linked. A key element of this experiment was the use of ERPs to index the 
engagement of recollection and familiarity. The motivation for using a neural measure was to 
provide a measure of recollection and familiarity when using only old/new judgements in a 
recognition test, recognising that, as described earlier, when confidence judgements or different 
response options other than old/new judgements are required at test participants may rely 
differently on recollection and familiarity.  
 Behaviourally, and consistent with previous experiments in this thesis and the wider 
literature, there was a directed forgetting effect in both studies: better memory for TBR words 
compared to TBF words (MacLeod, 1999). Furthermore, consistent with the findings in 
Experiments 2 and 3, emotion did not influence the ability to remember and forget nor did 
emotion enhance memory sensitivity. Also, in line with earlier findings, there was a more liberal 
criterion for emotional words (negative and positive) compared to neutral words.  
 Electrophysiologically, there were no reliable old/new effects in the mid-frontal and 
left-parietal sites, with the exception of a small and difficult to interpret interaction at parietal 
sites in study 1. Consequently, the data have little say about how directed forgetting and 
emotion influence memory processes. Although not reliable, in study 2 there was a typical 
old/new effect pattern in which ERPs for hits (remember and forget) were more positive-going 
than for correct rejections for both positive and neutral words. The absence of reliable effects 
is surprising, and further comment is deferred pending the report of a replication attempt for 
study 1, given the unexpected pattern of outcomes. 
 
 





3.2 A Full Replication of Study 1 (Negative and Neutral Words) 
The absence of reliable positive-going mid-frontal and left-parietal old/new effects in 
the first ERP experiment in this thesis is inconsistent with the vast majority of published 
findings. For both effects there is an extensive literature documenting their scalp distributions, 
polarity and sensitivity to experiment manipulations (Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & 
Curran, 2007; Sanquist et al., 1980). These effects have also been revealed in DF studies 
(Nowicka et al., 2009), suggesting that this specific manipulation of instructions during 
encoding is unlikely to be a reason for the observed data patterns in study 1. Indeed, the 
published literature contains numerous reports of the consistency in the polarity of old/new 
effects across many encoding manipulations. The outcomes in study 2 are qualitatively similar 
to what is commonly observed. 
Inspection of the data for individual participants in study 1 did not reveal any outliers, 
and the proportion of trials rejected due to noise is not excessive, and is comparable to that for 
study 2 (~12% in both cases). The levels of response accuracy in this study, while not very 
high, are similar to those in studies where positive-going ERP old/new effects have been 
revealed (see, for example Tsivilis et al., 2015). These considerations do not provide a clear 
explanation for the findings in study 1, but they do argue for another study designed to assess 
how robust the outcomes are. If it is the case that old/new effects comparable to those in study 
1 are replicated, then it would suggest that there are specific elements of the design employed 
here that are responsible for effects that differ strikingly from those that are typically reported. 
The most salient of these would be the stimuli employed. The outcomes and a discussion of the 
findings are provided below. 
 







These were undergraduates and postgraduates from the University of Nottingham. The 
same inclusion criteria were applied as in study 1 and 2 (see section 3.1.1.1). There were a total 
of 22 participants of which 6 participants were excluded. 3 participants were excluded because 
they did not meet the inclusion criteria for sensitivity, 1 was excluded because of extensive 
noise in the EEG data resulting in rejection of more than 25% of trials and 2 participants were 
excluded because of extensive alpha activity that was specific to some critical response 
categories. Data from the remaining 16 participants were used for behavioural and EEG 
analyses (8 females, M = 23.25, SD = 3.32). After giving informed consent, participants 
completed the experiment and received an inconvenience allowance of £10. 
 
3.2.1.2 Design, Materials and Procedure 
The design, materials and procedure of the task, as well as the EEG recording protocols 
were kept the same as in the EEG studies described above (see sections 3.1.1.2 to 3.1.1.4). See 
Table 3.7 for mean numbers of trials contributing to each of the response categories in the EEG 
data compared to study 1. An average of 93.8% of trials per participant was retained for analyses 
after pre-processing the EEG data (in study 1 there was an average of 87.6% of trials per 
participant retained). 
Table 3.7 
Mean Numbers of Trials used for Averaging separated by Response Category (Correct Rejections and Hits separated by 
Instruction (Remember/Forget) and Valence (Negative, Positive and Neutral) for Study 1 and the Replication of Study 1. SD 
= standard deviation 
  Study 1  Replication Study 1 
 Negative Neutral  Negative Neutral 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
Hit (Remember) 40 (6.92) 37 (7.75)  40 (7.84) 36 (9.99) 
Hit (Forget) 32 (9.53) 27 (9.42)  32 (6.74) 27 (4.97) 
Correct Rejection 85 (19.95) 89 (22.22)  93 (15.16) 98 (13.34) 
 






3.2.2.1 Behavioural Data 
Table 3.8 shows mean probabilities of hits and false alarms across instruction 
(remember, forget) and valence (negative vs neutral) for study 1 and the replication of study 1. 
Estimates for sensitivity and criterion separated for instruction and valence are presented in 
Table 3.9.  
 
While the outcomes of study 1 have already been reported, they are repeated here for 
ease of the direct comparison with the replication outcomes. For the replication of study 1, 2 x 
2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the two measures shown in Table 3.9: 
sensitivity (d’) and response criterion (c). In each case these analyses initially included the 
factors of instruction (remember vs forget) and valence (negative vs neutral). 
 
Table 3.8 
Probabilities of Correct Judgements (Hits) to Old Items and Incorrect Judgements (False Alarms) to New Items across 
Instruction (Remember/Forget) and Valence for Study 1 and the Replication of Study 1. SD = standard deviation 
    Study 1   Replication Study 1 









Hit Remember 0.74 (0.11) 0.70 (0.13)  0.72 (0.16) 0.64 (0.17) 
 Forget 0.59 (0.21) 0.50 (0.19)  0.56 (0.11) 0.47 (0.10) 




Summary Statistics for Each Valence Type across Instructions for Study 1 and the Replication of Study 1. d’ is the 
Estimate of Memory Sensitivity and c is the Estimate of Criterion. SD = standard deviation 
    Study 1  Replication Study 1 
  Negative Neutral  Negative Neutral 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
d'  Remember 1.72 (0.53) 1.77 (0.74)  1.69 (0.61) 1.63 (0.63) 
 Forget 1.32 (0.50) 1.25 (0.48)  1.23 (0.42) 1.17 (0.43) 
c Remember 0.12 (0.40) 0.29 (0.42)  0.22 (0.41) 0.43 (0.36) 
  Forget 0.32 (0.46) 0.55 (0.53)  0.45 (0.38) 0.66 (0.31) 
 





3.2.2.1.1 Effects of Instruction 
Similar to the results in study 1, there were main effects of instruction for sensitivity 
and response criterion. In the case of sensitivity this reflects a directed forgetting effect: d’ was 
superior for TBR in comparison to TBF words (see Table 3.10). In what is a fairly typical 
pattern in the work reported in this thesis, the main effect of instruction for response criterion 
reflects a more liberal criterion for TBR than for TBF words. 
 
3.2.2.1.2 Effects of Valence 
There were main effects of valance only for response criterion (see Table 3.10). A more 
liberal response criterion was observed for negative words relative to neutral words in both 
cases. 
 
3.2.2.2 EEG Data 
As for the two initial studies, analyses of the neural data were targeted at mid-frontal 
sites from 300-500ms and at left-parietal sites from 500-800ms. 
Table 3.10 
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence in Study 1 and the 
Replication of Study 1 
    Study 1  Replication Study 1 
Measure (DV)    df F p ηp²  df F p ηp² 
Instruction 
d' 1, 15 15.34 .001** .51  1, 15 26,49 < .001*** .64 
c 1, 15 15.34 .001** .51  1, 15 26,49 < .001*** .64 
          
           
Valence 
d' 1, 15 0.02 .891 .00  1, 15 1.28 .276 .08 
c 1, 15 20.52 < .001*** .58  1, 15 25.94 < .001*** .63 
          
           
Instruction  
x Valence  
Interactions 
d' 1, 15 1.96 .182 .12  1, 15 0.00 .951 .00 
c 1, 15 1.96 .182 .12  1, 15 0.00 .951 .00 
Notes. ** p < .01, *** p < .001.       
df = degrees of freedom         
 





 Figure 3.4 shows the grand average ERPs for the three critical response categories 
(remember hits, forget hits and correct rejections) at frontal (F3, Fz, F4) and left-parietal (P3, 
P5, P7) sites. The translucent grey areas indicate the critical time windows for the analyses of 
the mid-frontal (300-500ms) and left-parietal (500-800ms) old/new effects. The scalp maps at 
the foot of the figure are computed in the same way as for studies 1 and 2. 
 There appear to be, for the most part, small positive-going old/new effects at frontal and 
parietal sites. The exception to this general pattern is what appears to be an early negative-going 
mid-frontal ERP old/new effect for TBR words in the negative condition. The key outcomes 
are shown in Figure 3.5, which depicts the mean amplitudes of the key old/new effects and 
comprise a summary of the data that were submitted to the analyses described below compared 
to the mean amplitudes observed in study 1. 
 








Figure 3.4. (A) Grand average ERPs for frontal sites (channel F3, Fz, F4) in a time window of 300-500ms and for parietal sites 
(channels P3, P5, P7) in a time window of 500-800ms for negative (left column) and neutral (right column) material, separated for 
remember hits (RH), forget hits (FH) and correct rejections (CR). (B) Scalp maps showing the scalp distributions of the differences 
between the neural activities elicited by correct old/new judgements to old and new items for the time windows 300-500ms and 500-
800ms for negative and neutral material.  
 
Study 1 (Replication) 






For the replication of study 1, 3 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted 
on mean amplitudes for the 300-500ms (mid-frontal old/new effect; F3, Fz, F4) and the 500-
800ms (left-parietal old/new effect; P3, P5, P7) data shown in Figure 3.5. In each case these 
analyses initially included the factors of response category (remember hits, forget hits and 





Figure 3.5. Mean amplitudes of the TBR and TBF old/new effects in studies 1 and the replication of 
study 1 separated by valence and instruction (remember and forget). The old/new effect magnitudes were 
calculated by subtracting the mean amplitudes for correct rejections from those for TBR and TBF hits. 
The mean amplitudes are averages taken across channels F3, Fz, F4) for the 300-500ms window and 
channels P3, P5, P7 for the 500-800ms window. Error bars represent standard error. 





3.1.2.2.1 Mid-Frontal Old/New Effect 
There was a significant interaction for valence and response category (see Table 3.11) 
in the replication study, which was followed up via simple main effects tests. Simple main 
effects showed a significant effect for TBR words (F(1,15) = 3.60, p = .037, ηp² = .19), whereas 
no reliable differences for TBF words were apparent. The outcomes likely reflect the small 
positive-going old/new effects for neutral words, and the absence of an effect (TBF) or a 
negative-going effect (TBR) for negative words. 
 
3.1.2.2.2 Left-Parietal Old/New Effect 
There were no main effects of valence or response category and no interactions between 
these factors (see Table 3.12).  
 
Table 3.11 
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Response Category and Valence for the 
Mid-Frontal Old/New Effects in Study 1 and the Replication of Study 1 
  Study 1   Replication Study 1 
Measure (DV) df F p ηp²   df F p ηp² 
Response Category 2, 30 1.11 .344 .07  2, 30 1.32 .283 .08 
Valence 1, 15 0.03 .861 .00  1, 15 0.69 .420 .04 
Response Category*Valence 2, 30 2.84 .074 .16  2, 30 3.60 .040* .19 
Note. * p < .05          
df = degrees of freedom         
 
Table 3.12  
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Response Category and Valence for the 
Left-Parietal Old/New Effects in Study 1 and the Replication of Study 1 
  Study 1  Replication Study 1 
Measure (DV) df F p ηp²  df F p ηp² 
Valence 1,15 0.00 .988 .00  1, 15 0.53 .477 .03 
Response Category 2, 30 0.75 .482 .05  2, 30 1.69 .202 .10 
Valence*Response Category 2, 30 3.66 .038* .20  2, 30 2.87 .072 .16 
Note. * p < .05.   
 
    
 
df = degrees of freedom          
 






For the replication study, sensitivity was higher for TBR items than TBF items, 
indicating a directed forgetting (DF) effect. There was no effect of emotion on memory 
sensitivity nor did the DF effect vary according to emotion. These findings are consistent with 
those in study 1. Also consistent with study 1 is the finding of a more liberal response criterion 
for negative items than for neutral items. These behavioural findings are also consistent with 
the findings from study 2, as well as Experiments 2 and 3. 
 The EEG data analyses in the replication study indicated that the left-parietal old/new 
effect did not differ according to DF instructions or emotion. There was, however, some 
indication of divergences at mid-frontal electrode locations. While there were small positive-
going old/new effects of similar magnitude for neutral words, the old/new effect for negative 
words was negative-going for remember instructions and negligible for the forget instruction. 
These findings are contrary to what was found in study 1, where there were no effects of DF 
instructions and emotion on both the mid-frontal and left-parietal old/new effect.  
Overall, the outcomes in the replication – primarily positive-going old/new effects- are 
more consistent with what has often been observed (Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & 
Curran, 2007; Sanquist et al., 1980; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008). In study 1, the majority of old/new 
effects were negative-going, and while there have been a few reports of negative-going effects 
(e.g. Woodruff et al., 2006), they are few and difficult to interpret.  
How should the different data patterns in the initial study and the replication be 
interpreted? The behavioural data in the two studies are broadly similar, making it unlikely that 
performance changes contribute markedly to the different EEG outcomes. One difference 
across the studies is the percentage of trials rejected (~6% difference), although the mean trials 
numbers submitted for averaging and then analysis are reasonable in both cases (see Table 3.7). 
Moreover, inspection of the means for old/new effects on a by participant basis did not reveal 





any marked outliers contributing to the overall averaged pattern. These considerations do not 
offer an immediate explanation for the disparate findings. 
One reason for employing ERPs in this experiment was to provide a means of assessing 
how recollection and familiarity contribute to directed forgetting and vary with emotion when 
only recognition memory judgements are made. It may be, however, that the old/new 
instructions make it unlikely to assess changes in recollection, if memory judgements in an 
old/new recognition memory test rely heavily on familiarity based judgements (Johansson et 
al., 2004; Tulving, 1985b). However, this explanation does not tend to extend easily to the 
absence of reliable mid-frontal old/new effects. Nor is it consistent with previous ERP studies 
in which an old/new recognition memory task was applied (Maratos et al., 2000; Zheng et al., 
2018). In short, for recollection, some have found a smaller left-parietal old/new effect for 
negative material (e.g. Maratos et al., 2000), whereas the opposite has also been observed: a 
larger left-parietal old/new effect for negative relative to positive and neutral material (e.g. 
Zheng et al., 2018). Perhaps one way to explain these null results and discrepancies with 
previous studies showing positive results is to consider experiment design and response 
accuracy. Using words, Maratos et al. (2000) matched the negative and neutral words only for 
word length and the degree of semantic relatedness and not on word frequency. Previously, it 
has been shown that word frequency does influence the magnitude of the old/new effects (Rugg 
& Doyle, 1992). Frequency was controlled for in the studies reported in this thesis. Perhaps 
more important are the levels of memory sensitivity, as quite understandably old/new effects 
increase in magnitude as response accuracy increases. Maratos et al. (2000) and Zheng et al. 
(2018) had higher levels of response accuracy compared to what was observed in the present 
experiments. In present studies, memory sensitivity was on average between 1.20 and 1.52 (d’ 
collapsed across remember and forget instructions). Memory performance in Maratos et al.’s 
(2000) study was between 1.64 (negative) and 2.03 (neutral) and in Zheng et al.’s (2018) study 





between ±2.4 (neutral) and ±2.6 (negative + positive). Hence, the lower levels of sensitivity in 
the studies reported here are a candidate explanation for the non-signifcant old/new effects. 
Whatever the real explanation is, the somewhat disapointing functional consequence is 
that the ERP data recorded at test have little to say about the links between emotion, control, 
recollection and familiarity. There are, however, other opportunities for functional insights that 
the ERP data offer. A particularly interesting question to ask is whether and/or how emotion 
and DF instructions influence processes that are active during the encoding of emotional and 
neutral words. Analyses designed to contribute to an understanding of how these elements are 
linked are described below. 
 
 
3.3 Encoding, Emotion and Directed Forgetting 
3.3.1 Neural Measures of Encoding and Responses to Directed Forgetting Instructions 
Neural activity recorded at the time items are studied can be employed to investigate 
encoding processes. The most common way that this is done is by separating and contrasting 
neural activity for items that received either correct or incorrect memory judgements on a 
subsequent test. Differences between activities of this kind have been termed subsequent 
memory or Dm (Difference according to memory) effects (Paller et al., 1987), and may well 
reflect processes important for successful memory encoding. 
 The subsequent memory approach has been employed extensively and successfully in 
fMRI studies (for a review of findings see Henson, 2005; Paller & Wagner, 2002), identifying 
the brain systems that can support successful encoding (e.g. Henson, Rugg, Shallice, Josephs, 
& Dolan, 1999; Wagner et al., 1998). The same approach with ERPs has a longer history (Paller 
et al., 1987, 1988), and the results from several studies have provided insights into the time-





course and nature of memory encoding processes (e.g. Otten, Henson, & Rugg, 2001; Otten & 
Rugg, 2001; Otten, Quayle, & Puvaneswaran, 2010). 
 Often ERP subsequent memory effects when the accompanying test is recognition 
memory yield small or non-significant differences between neural activities for items attracting 
correct or incorrect recognition memory judgements. Larger effects are often observed when 
the test requirements might be considered to rely on recollection (Otten et al., 2001; Otten & 
Rugg, 2001; Otten et al., 2010; for a review of findings see Friedman & Johnson, 2000). In light 
of this, Otten and Rugg (2001) argued that when using a recognition memory task to examine 
subsequent memory effect, it is beneficial to employ confidence judgements. This is an 
effective means of removing low confidence responses, and/or correct guesses, from the 
subsequent memoy contrast. 
That said, Yick et al. (2015) investigated processes supporting encoding of emotional 
materials using negative and neutral images and an old/new recognition memory task combined 
with confidence judgements. To ensure larger effects, ‘guess’ responses were excluded from 
the ERP analyses. They observed a broadly distributed positive-going effect for negative 
relative to neutral images that onset around 400ms and lasted for at least 600ms. These 
outcomes are consistent with the view that different processes operate at encoding according to 
valence, although the use of only these two valence categories means that ascribing effects to 
valence or arousal is not straightforward. 
 The findings of Yick et al. (2015) give some indication that there is merit in analyzing 
ERP subsequent memory effects in the ERP experiments in this thesis, despite the fact that their 
results are surprising in the context of the broader research literature, where subsequent memory 
effects in old/new recognition memory tasks are often small. To anticipate, however, and in 
keeping with the observations made in the preceding paragraph, and probably also related to 
the relatively modest levels of response accuracy in these experiments, there were no significant 





subsequent memory effects in the first ERP study and the replication. There was a reliable 
subsequent memory effect in the second study, but it did not vary according to valence. For this 
reason, these subsequent memory effects are summarized, along with the reports of their 
analysis, in Appendix M. 
 The designs of the ERP experiments in this thesis, however, also permit an analysis of 
the neural activities elicited by the cues to remember/forget. These ERPs offer access to a 
related set of questions regarding how memory encoding can be investigated. A first step is to 
establish whether ERPs vary according to remember/forget instructions. If they do, then a 
second question is whether subsequent memory effects for remember/forget items are 
equivalent. If both remembering and forgetting are active (and different) processes, then the 
subsequent memory effects would be different in the two cases. While the presence of 
subsequent memory effects for remember cues only would not rule out the same interpretation 
(ERPs might just not be sensitive to active forgetting processes), this outcome would also be 
consistent with the view that active processing of items is engaged only following a remember 
cue. 
 The designs of the ERP experiments in this thesis also permit assessment of how 
instructions to remember/forget vary with emotion. In each experiment it is possible to separate 
remember and forget cues according to the valence of the preceding item. If the differences are 
comparable in the two cases the most straightforward interpretation is that the effects simply 
reflect the valence of the preceding items. Of greater interest, however, would be different 
effects according to valence in the two cases. To consider one outcome: differences according 
to valence only for remember cues would be consistent with the interpretation offered in the 
previous paragraph whereby active processing in pursuit of encoding is engaged when a 
remember but not when a forget cue is encountered. 





For DF instructions, differences in brain activity have been reported in a handful of 
studies. The most common finding is a temporally extended greater relative positivity for TBR 
items relative to TBF items over posterior sites (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Gallant et al., 2018; 
Hauswald et al., 2011). This difference typically onsets around 300ms post-stimulus and 
continues for at least 300ms. While this finding has been interpreted as an indication of more 
enhanced processing of items given a TBR instruction, in none of these studies has it been 
possible to provide a strong basis for this claim: because it was simply a paired contrast in each 
case the polarity of the difference and claims about greater processing receive only weak 
support. Hauswald et al. (2011) linked frontal activity (more positive-going for TBF than TBR) 
to suppression for TBF items (also see Gallant et al., 2018), but again the empirical basis for 
this claim is weak. 
 Bailey and Chapman (2012) investigated the effect of valence on the activities elicited 
by TBR and TBF cues. Besides differential processing of directed forgetting instructions, they 
found an enhanced late posterior positivity (⁓450 to 600ms post-stimulus) for emotional 
material relative to neutral material (also see Gallant & Dyson, 2016), which they have 
interpreted as an indication of enhanced attention allocation for emotional material (Kok, 1997). 
They did not, however, observe that emotion influenced the activity associated with TBR and 
TBF cues differently. Likewise, other researchers have failed to observe any evidence of 
differential processing following either a remember or forget cue according to emotion (Gallant 
et al., 2018; Hauswald et al., 2011). These findings are consistent across the different materials 
used, such as words (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Gallant et al., 2018) or images (Hauswald et 
al., 2011), as well as the number of the valence categories that were contrasted. 
There are, however, some contrasting data points. Brandt et al. (2013) found a more 
positive-going posterior modulation following a TBR cue for negative words relative to neutral 
words. Neural activity did not vary according to emotion following a TBF cue. Likewise, 





Gallant and Dyson (2016) reported more positive-going posterior activity for a TBR cue 
following negative words relative to neutral words and an absence of an emotional effect on the 
TBF cue. The effect was not found when comparing positive with neutral words. These findings 
have been interpreted as enhanced processing for emotional material that participants were 
instructed to remember and are consistent with the view that: (a) ERPs elicited by 
remember/forget cues are not uniformly sensitive to the valence of the preceding memoranda, 
and (b) forget cues are not subject to active forgetting processes that vary by valence. 
In another study, Yang et al. (2012), however, observed enhanced positivity over 
posterior sites following a TBR cue for neutral images relative to negative images. They linked 
this effect to the observation that neutral material is more difficult to remember relative to 
emotional material (Hamann, 2001). In addition, they did observe differences according to 
valence for forget cues. This comprised more positive-going frontal activity for TBF cues for 
negative images compared to neutral images. They interpreted these findings as an indication 
of inhibition processes acting over TBF cues for negative images. At a minimum, their findings 
do suggest differential and active processing of TBF items in comparison to TBR items, but the 
inference linking to inhibition derives support only from data in other studies. The frontal 
activity observed by Yang et al. (2012) and not by Brandt et al. (2013) and Gallant and Dyson 
(2016), may not necessarily be linked to the different materials used, as images were used by 
Hauswald et al. (2011) who also did not find any effect of valence on TBF cues. 
Using a combination of words and images, Liu et al. (2017) manipulated the encoding 
context by using negative or neutral images and neutral words that were embedded in these 
images. Consistent with Brandt et al. (2013) and Gallant and Dyson (2016), they observed a 
larger positive-going posterior effect for TBR cues that were preceded by a negative image 
relative to a neutral image. In addition, relatively more positive-going frontal activity was 
observed for TBF cues relative to TBR cues, which did not vary according to valence. 





Taken together, the existing literature does not provide a consistent basis for predicting 
whether ERPs elicited by TBF cues will vary with emotion. For TBR cues, however, the prior 
literature suggests a greater relative positivity for emotional material. In order to test this 
prediction, and to capture effects with possible maxima and posterior and/or anterior locations, 
a broad analysis of the distribution of any ERP divergences by cue type and emotion was 
conducted, as described in greater detail below.  
 
3.3.2 Analyses 
As already stated, there were no reliable subsequent memory effects that varied 
according to valence (see Appendix M). For this reason, the remainder of the section below is 
focused on the neural activity that is elicited by remember and forget instructions and 
assessments of whether valence interacts with these. An overview of these analyses (they are 
the same for each study) and then the results are reported below. 
Based on previous literature investigating the effects of emotion on remembering and 
forgetting (Hauswald et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2017), analyses were targeted at two distinct time 
windows: 300-500ms and 500-700ms. Mean amplitudes were extracted for the following 
electrodes: at posterior regions CP1, CPz, CP2, P1, Pz, P2 and at anterior regions FP1, FPz, 
FP2, F1, Fz, F2. For each time window 6 x 2 x 2 repeated-measure ANOVAs were computed 
for both electrode groups including the following factors: Channel, Valence (negative vs neutral 
or positive vs neutral) and DF instructions (remember vs forget).  
 
3.3.3 Results 
Figure 3.6 (negative vs neutral), Figure 3.7 (negative vs neutral; replication study) and 
Figure 3.8 (positive vs neutral) show the grand average ERPs elicited by remember and forget 
cues separated by valence. They are shown for representative posterior (CPz, Pz) and anterior 





(FPz, Fz) electrode locations. The scalp maps at the foot of each figure illustrate the amplitude 
distributions of the relevant paired contrasts in each of the targeted conditions.  
In study 1 (Figure 3.6) the only marked differences are over mid-posterior sites for TBR 
cues. The figure shows a greater relative positivity for cues preceded by negative rather than 
neutral words which onsets around 300ms post-stimulus and continues for the duration of the 
recording epoch. In the replication of study 1 (Figure 3.7), there are similar selective patterns, 
although the greater relative positivity extends a little more anteriorly. For TBR words in study 
2 (Figure 3.8), a similar pattern can be seen, in this case comprising in a greater relative 
positivity for positive relative to neutral. Moreover, in this study there is some evidence for a 
relatively greater negativity for positive relative to neutral in response to TBF cues, which is 
largest over centro-parietal regions. 






Remember Forget  
Study 1 
Figure 3.6. (A) Grand average ERPs for posterior regions (channels CPz, Pz) and for anterior regions (channels FPz, Fz) for remember 
(left column) and forget (right column) items, separated for negative and neutral words. (B) Scalp maps showing the differences 
between neural activities elicited by negative and neutral words in each targeted condition: TBR and TBF for the time windows 300-
500ms and 500-700ms. 
B 
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 Study 1 (Replication) 
A 
B 
Figure 3.7. (A) Grand average ERPs for posterior regions (channels CPz, Pz) and for anterior regions (channels FPz, Fz) for remember 
(left column) and forget (right column) items, separated for negative and neutral words. (B) Scalp maps showing the differences 
between neural activities elicited by negative and neutral words in each targeted condition: TBR and TBF for the time windows 300-
500ms and 500-700ms.  
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 Study 2 
A 
B 
       Figure 3.8. (A) Grand average ERPs for posterior regions (channels CPz, Pz) and for anterior regions (channels FPz, Fz) for remember 
(left column) and forget (right column) items, separated for positive and neutral words. (B) Scalp maps showing the differences 
between neural activities elicited by negative and neutral words in each targeted condition: TBR and TBF for the time windows 300-
500ms and 500-700ms. 
Remember Forget  





For each study, 6 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on mean 
amplitudes for the 300-500ms time window (posterior regions; CP1, CPz, CP2, P1, Pz, P2) and 
the 500-700ms time window (anterior regions; FP1, FPz, FP2, F1, Fz, F2). In each case these 
analyses initially included the factors of channel, instructions (remember and forget) and 
valence (two categories in each case). 
 
3.3.3.1 300-500ms Time Window 
3.3.3.1.1 Anterior Sites 
There were no significant effects in study 1. There was, however, a reliable interaction 
between valence and instruction in the replication of study 1 and in study 2 (see Table 3.13). 
However, analysis of simple main effects in the replication of study 1 revealed no significant 
effects according to valence in the remember condition (F(1, 15) = 2.96, p = .106) or in the 
forget condition (F(1, 15) = 0.44, p = .516). The most likely reason for the significant interaction 
term is the relatively larger differences according to valence for TBR than for TBF cues. 
 In a comparable outcome, the interaction term in study 2 arises for similar reasons: 
simple main effect analyses in study 2 revealed a reliable greater negativity for remember cues 
following neutral (M = -1.24, SD = 0.70) words relative to those following positive (M = -0.25, 
SD = 0.79) words (F(1, 15) = 10.98, p = .005, ηp² = .42) . There were no reliable differences in 
the forget condition. 
Table 3.13  
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence in the 300-500ms time window over 
Anterior Regions for Study 1, Replication Study 1 and Study 2 
 Study 1  Study 1 (Replication)  Study 2 
Measure (DV) df F p ηp²  df F p ηp²  df F p 
Instruction 1, 15 0.81 .382 .05  1, 15 1.36 .261 .08  1, 15 3.63 .076 
Valence 1, 15 0.56 .465 .04  1, 15 0.46 .509 .03  1, 15 1.17 .296 
Instruction*Valence 1, 15 0.67 .425 .04  1, 15 5.49 .033* .27  1, 15 8.59 .010* 
Note. * p < .05.                           
df = degrees of freedom    
 
         
 





3.3.3.1.2 Posterior Sites 
There were no significant effects in study 1, despite the greater relative positivity that is 
evident in Figure 3.6. There were reliable effects in the replication of study 1 and in study 2. In 
the replication study main effects of instructions reflect greater relative positivity for TBR (M 
= 4.06, SD = 0.88) cues relative to TBF (M = 2.91, SD = 0.57) cues over posterior scalp (see 
Table 3.14). Of greater importance, there were significant interactions between valence and 
instruction in both the replication of study 1 and in study 2. Simple main effects in the 
replication of study 1 revealed a greater relative positivity over posterior regions for remember 
cues following negative (M = 4.37, SD = 0.86) words compared to those following neutral (M 
= 3.76, SD = 0.92) words (F(1, 15) = 15.00, p = .044, ηp² = .24). There were no reliable effects 
in the forget condition. Simple main effects in study 2 reflect an increased positivity over 
posterior regions for remember cues following positive (M = 3.51, SD = 1.02) words compared 
to those following neutral (M = 2.25, SD = 0.88) words (F(1, 15) = 11.75, p = .004, ηp² = .44) 
only, despite the apparent reversal in the forget condition (see Figure 3.8). 
 
 
3.3.3.2 500-700ms Time Window 
3.3.3.2.1 Anterior Sites 
Reliable effects were observed only in study 2, where there was an interaction between 
valence and instruction (see Table 3.15). Simple main effects revealed a greater relative 
Table 3.14  
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence in the 300-500ms time window over 
Posterior Regions for Study 1, Replication Study 1 and Study 2 
 Study 1  Study 1 (Replication)  Study 2 
Measure (DV) df F p ηp²  df F p ηp²  df F p 
Instruction 1, 15 1.73 .208 .10  1, 15 7.20 .017* .32  1, 15 0.63 .441 
Valence 1, 15 3.49 .081 .19  1, 15 0.01 .920 .00  1, 15 5.75 .118 
Instruction*Valence 1, 15 0.60 .450 .04  1, 15 5.71 .031* .28  1, 15 9.97 .006** 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01.     
 
         
df = degrees of freedom    
 
         
 





positivity over anterior regions for remember cues following positive (M = 0.70, SD = 0.69) 
words compared to those following neutral (M = -0.43, SD = 0.54) words (F(1, 15) = 7.72, p = 
.014, ηp² = .34). In the forget condition, by contrast, there was an increased positivity for neutral 
(M = 0.04, SD = 0.45) words relative to positive (M = 1.04, SD = 0.42) words (F(1, 15) = 5.46, 
p = .034, ηp² = .27). 
 
 
3.3.3.2.2 Posterior Sites 
There were no reliable effects in study 1. There was a main effect of instruction in the 
replication of study 1 (see Table 3.16), which reflected a greater relative positivity for TBR (M 
= 2.76, SD = 0.68) words relative to TBF (M = 1.79, SD = 0.48) words over posterior scalp. In 
study 2 there was an interaction between valence and instruction. Simple main effects reflect a 
greater relative positivity for forget cues following neutral (M = 2.42, SD = 0.71) words relative 
to those following positive (M = 1.15, SD = 0.75) words (F(1, 15) = 9.51, p = .008, ηp² = .39) 
only, despite the apparent reversal in the remember condition (see Figure 3.8). 
Table 3.15  
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence in the 500-700ms time window 
over Anterior Regions for Study 1, Replication Study 1 and Study 2 
 Study 1  Study 1 (Replication)  Study 2 
Measure (DV) df F p ηp²   df F p ηp²   df F p ηp² 
Instruction 1, 15 0.17 .689 .01  1, 15 1.98 .180 .12  1, 15 0.57 .463 .04 
Valence 1, 15 0.08 .778 .01  1, 15 2.25 .154 .13  1, 15 0.04 .836 .00 




Note. * p < .05, *** p < .001.       
 
      
df = degrees of freedom            
 








The objective of these analyses was to use the ERP data to understand memory encoding 
in the context of emotion and directed forgetting. The absence of subsequent memory effects is 
arguably unsurprising given the previous literature (although see Yick et al., 2015). The 
outcomes for the analyses of the activities elicited by TBR and TBF cues are, however, of 
particular interest.  
 For the replication of study 1 and for study 2, there was a common greater relative 
positivity for TBR cues that were preceded by emotional rather than neutral words over 
posterior scalp. This is consistent with previous findings (Brandt et al., 2013; Gallant & Dyson, 
2016; Liu et al., 2017). One proposal is that these differences are linked to enhanced attention 
allocation for emotional material during encoding (Hauswald et al., 2011; Kok, 1997). The 
presence of this modulation only for TBR is also important because this outcome is consistent 
with the view that following TBF cues items are subject to relatively little effortful processing, 
at least in study 1 (replication). Over anterior scalp, in study 2, the same effect was found for 
positive words followed by a TBR cue relative to neutral words. The greater relative positivity, 
however, for TBF cues preceded by neutral words over anterior scalp in study 2 suggests a 
different conclusion. That is, that TBR and TBF cues engage different processes that are 
Table 3.16  
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence in the 500-700ms time window over 
Posterior Regions for Study 1, Replication Study 1 and Study 2 
 Study 1  Study 1 (Replication)  Study 2 
Measure (DV) df F p ηp²   df F p ηp²   df F p ηp² 
Instruction 1, 15 1.44 .249 .09  1, 15 6.17 .025* .29  1, 15 0.57 .463 .04 
Valence 1, 15 1.12 .306 .07  1, 15 1.61 .225 .10  1, 15 1.21 .288 .08 
Instruction*Valence 1, 15 0.17 .690 .01   1, 15 3.26 .091 .18   1, 15 8.07 .012* .35 
Note. * p < .05.       
 
      
df = degrees of freedom            
 





differentially influenced by valence. In addition, this anterior effect for neutral TBF cues is also 
visible over posterior scalp in a later time window (500-700ms). These outcomes for TBR cues 
are in line with the predictions. No confident prediction was made for TBF cues, and these data 
points are broadly consistent with those of Yang et al. (2012), but not with those of Brandt et 
al. (2013) and Gallant and Dyson (2016). 
These outcomes – notwithstanding the inconsistencies with some other reports – suggest 
that people do not apply the same forgetting operations for positive and negative material. A 
stronger demonstration of this would stem from a within-participant assessment, but the data 
across assessments are at least suggestive of a common set of processes engaged in response to 
TBR cues that are agnostic about the positive/negative dimension, and a second set that are 
specific to positive (relative to neutral) material. Support for accounts that posit active 
suppression/inhibition as a mechanism for forgetting (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Basden 
et al., 1993; Hauswald et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2012) is therefore evident in 
study 2. The null result for TBF in study 1 (replication) needs to be treated cautiously, none the 
less it is worth noting the qualitative similarity with the outcomes in study 2. Moreover, the 
findings for TBF in study 2 are consistent with the view that active processing of TBF items 
differed by valence, but whether this neural activity is an index of inhibition or suppression is 
more challenging on the basis of the current data alone. The N2 component has often been 
linked with processes of suppression or inhibition (Eimer, 1993; Kok, 1986), which is most 
commonly examined in a go/no-go task in which participants have to respond to certain stimuli 
and refrain from responding to other stimuli (Eimer, 1993; Levy & Anderson, 2002). The N2 
is observed over frontal scalp in a time window commonly spanning 200-300ms (Eimer, 1993). 
Linking this to observations in DF studies, enhanced frontal activities for TBF relative to TBR 
cues have therefore been interpreted as the engagement of inhibitory processes. Yang et al. 
(2012) observed a similar frontal activity comparable to that seen in go/no-go task for TBF 





cues. The majority of DF studies, however, have observed frontally distributed activity in a 
later time window, commonly from 500-600ms onwards (Hauswald et al., 2011; Hsieh et al., 





























4. THE INFLUENCE OF ENCODING CONTEXT IN DIRECTED FORGETTING 
 
4.1 Experiment 5 – Encoding Context, Emotion and Directed Forgetting 
Across all experiments in this thesis a reliable directed forgetting effect has been 
observed. When only two classes of valence were compared (Experiments 2–4), emotion did 
not have an effect on the amount of directed forgetting, nor did it affect memory sensitivity. 
Furthermore, with the exception of Experiment 1, there was a relatively more liberal criterion 
for emotional words compared to neutral words. The consistency of these behavioural results, 
which were observed in the behavioural data for the ERP experiments as well, attests to the 
robust nature of these findings. The variable findings for recollection and familiarity across 
some experiments provide somewhat lower confidence in overarching claims that can be made, 
and as already acknowledged the use of different measures at retrieval across experiments is 
also a potential factor. 
The focus in this experiment is on the ways in which effects due to emotion – most 
notably criterion change – might be due to processes that operate at encoding and/or retrieval. 
This builds on prior work where it has been noted that attributing outcomes to either stage is 
difficult when emotion is manipulated during encoding and retrieval (Maratos & Rugg, 2001; 
Smith et al., 2004).  
As discussed in the Introduction (see sections 1.4.3-1.4.5), how emotion is manipulated 
and how it affects memory needs to be considered carefully. Emotional materials have increased 
arousal levels relative to what can be described as neutral materials, and of course differ in 
valence (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). For words, other properties including semantic 
relatedness, word frequency and word length may be important. Another factor to consider 
when using emotional material, and of primary importance in this chapter, is that when using 





emotional material during study as well as test, there is an additional potential confound (Liu 
et al., 2017; Maratos & Rugg, 2001; Smith, Dolan, & Rugg, 2004). This occurs because the 
emotional attributes of a retrieval cue are confounded with the emotional attributes of the 
information that needs to be retrieved. Thus, whether emotion influences encoding and/or 
retrieval processes is hard to distinguish. A generally accepted principle of memory is that 
attributes of a retrieval cue can influence what information is retrieved, and how the memory 
trace is experienced (Keele, 1972; Moscovitch, 1992; Schacter et al., 1998). It is therefore 
possible that differences between the emotional properties of items at test and/or at encoding 
are responsible for different outcomes on memory assessments (Liu et al., 2017; Maratos & 
Rugg, 2001; Smith et al., 2004).  
One way to avoid this potential confound, if the intention is to understand the influence 
of emotion at the time of encoding, is to use neutral materials during study and test and 
manipulate the emotional encoding context in which the material is studied. During a 
subsequent memory test, the neutral items are then presented. As a result, the emotional 
attributes of a retrieval cue are (arguably) eliminated during test and there is no potential 
confound between the retrieval cues and the information to be retrieved. In keeping with this 
rationale, Liu et al. (2017) used emotional images and neutral words in an item-method directed 
forgetting task. During the study phase, neutral words were shown against a background of 
emotionally negative or neutral images. To ensure that participants paid attention to the words 
and the background images, they were instructed to click on the part of the image that they 
believed was related to the embedded word. Participants were instructed to either remember or 
forget the words. Recognition memory was superior for words studied in the neutral context. In 
addition, the directed forgetting effect was larger for words shown against a neutral background, 
and this was due to the fact that memory for TBR words experienced in a negative context was 
decreased compared to TBR words in a neutral context.  





The authors suggested that if the negative images attracted relatively more attention than 
neutral images (Talmi et al., 2008), thereby limiting attention directed towards the neutrally 
embedded words, this outcome would come about. If attention towards the neutral words is 
limited, then presumably so is the extent to which these words are encoded, making it less 
challenging to forget than to remember these words. This argument can be seen as an example 
of ‘attentional narrowing’; memory is worse for peripheral details when there is a central 
arousing/emotional item in a scene (Bradley et al., 1992; Mather & Knight, 2008), although in 
the manipulation used by Liu et al., (2017) the arousing/emotional item was peripheral and the 
central item was neutral. In another study, albeit without a directed forgetting manipulation, 
Maratos and Rugg (2001) used emotional and neutral sentences as the encoding context for 
neutral words. Memory was assessed via a recognition memory task. The encoding context did 
not influence the memorability of the neutral words, and they argued that this is perhaps because 
a recognition test is not sufficient to detect an effect of contextual manipulations, because 
recognition judgements can be based on familiarity as well as on recollection (Yonelinas & 
Jacoby, 1995). However, this does not explain the differences in memory according to the 
emotional encoding context observed in Liu et al.'s (2017), who used a recognition memory 
test. In a second experiment, Maratos and Rugg (2001) used an additional source memory test 
by instructing participants to make judgements on whether a word was presented in a negative 
or neutral context. Contrary to the outcomes in their first experiment, they observed enhanced 
memory for words from a negative context relative to a neutral context. In addition, they 
observed increased correct judgements for neutral contexts relative to negative contexts. They 
proposed that these discrepancies arise because participants prepared differently: they were 
expecting to make source judgements as well in the second experiment. 
 More broadly, the effects of emotion on source memory have been studied extensively 
and the findings are inconsistent (for a review of findings see: Mather, 2007; Yonelinas & 





Ritchey, 2015). Negative valence has been shown to impair associative memory (Madan et al., 
2012; Madan, Fujiwara, et al., 2017; Maratos & Rugg, 2001), whereas positive valence has 
been found to enhance it (Madan et al., 2019). Using a cued-recall task, Madan et al., (2012) 
examined the effect of negative arousal on associative memories of moderately arousing 
negative and neutral word-pairs. Participants were instructed to remember the word pairs and 
memory was tested in a cued-recall task. They observed an impairment of associative memory 
between word pairs due to negative arousal. On the contrary, in a free recall test, memory for 
negative arousing words was enhanced compared to neutral words. These findings were later 
replicated using images (Madan et al., 2017). Based on these findings they suggested that 
negative arousal impairs the encoding of associations, whereas it enhances the memory of an 
item itself (Madan et al., 2012; Madan et al., 2017). 
In contrast to these findings, there are also reports of enhanced associative memory for 
negative material. Smith et al. (2004) used positive, negative and neutral images as background 
context and neutral images of objects that were superimposed on the background images. 
Participants were instructed to imagine an association between the objects and the images and 
were tested (via yes/no recognition) on their memory for the object images. In addition, after 
the recognition judgement participants were required to make a source judgement by indicating 
whether the background image was negative, positive or neutral or whether they didn’t 
remember the valence of the image. They found superior memory for objects encoded in a 
positive context relative to a negative and neutral context. Moreover, the number of correct 
source judgements was higher for objects that were encoded in both the negative and positive 
context compared to the neutral context. In contrast to what was observed by Madan et al. 
(2012, 2017), therefore, under these circumstances associative memory is not impaired for 
negative material. These findings also diverge somewhat from those of Liu et al. (2017) who 
found that memory for neutral material associated with a negative context was impaired relative 





to material associated with a neutral context. One explanation for this disparity is that different 
valence contrasts were used (negative vs neutral in one case, and positive vs negative vs neutral 
in the other) and therefore the effect of encoding context differs. In a valence contrast in which 
negative, positive and neutral material is applied, the ratio between emotionally valenced and 
neutral material is unequal. Whereas, when, for example, negative and neutral material is 
contrasted the ratio is equal. In addition, the valence dimension is increased when using both 
negative and positive material intermixed with neutral material. These two differences in 
combination might explain why differences in the effects of emotion occur when using a 
different combination of valence categories.  
 Turning to considerations for the current experiment, manipulating the encoding context 
to potentially avoid the confound between the influence of emotional attributes across study 
and test also merits some additional considerations. One could argue that because the neutral 
words are embedded in different emotional encoding contexts, the emotional attributes of the 
image become associated with the words thereby influencing their perceived valence. If this 
was the case, then this experiment would be prone to the same confound it is designed to avoid. 
Mather and Knight (2008) suggested that items previously associated with emotional material 
attract more attention than items not previously associated with emotional material, which they 
referred to as the emotional harbinger effect. They conducted a series of experiments to 
investigate this and in each they created an emotional harbinger effect by presenting a neutral 
item simultaneously with an emotional item (either auditory or visual material in separate 
experiments) 16 times in total and found that memory for contextual details was impaired for 
neutral material that was previously associated with an emotional item. They proposed that the 
impaired memory was a result of changes in emotionality of the neutral items due to being 
associated with emotional material previously. Thus, according to this account, even though the 
item is neutral, when it is associated with emotional material, this changes the perceived 





emotionality. It is important to note, however, that there might be a differential effect when a 
neutral item is associated with emotional material only once (Liu et al., 2017; Smith et al., 2004) 
or 16 times (Mather & Knight, 2008). None-the-less, given this consideration, the experiment 
described below provides a means of assessing the emotional harbinger effect. 
 The objective for this experiment was to remain as close as possible to the experimental 
design in Liu et al.’s (2017) study and therefore a similar manipulation was implemented. In 
short, the item-method directed forgetting procedure was implemented using neutral words 
embedded in emotional and neutral images presented during encoding. Neutral words were 
presented during retrieval in an old/new recognition memory test. It might seem surprising that 
no measure of recollection and familiarity was included given the broad focus on these 
measures in this thesis. However, this was done to create broadly similar circumstances and 
task demands for the participants in this experiment and in Liu et al.’s (2017) study.  
Additionally, in response to the issues discussed above, an association memory test and a 
valence rating task were included. The intention behind the association memory test is based 
on arguments from Maratos and Rugg (2001) that recognition memory alone may not always 
be sufficient to detect an effect of contextual manipulations, in this case emotion. Moreover, in 
order to evaluate whether there is a case of the emotional harbinger effect – a change in 
perceived valence of words – a valence rating task is included. In line with previous findings, 
it was expected to find: (i) a directed forgetting effect, (ii) enhanced memory for words encoded 
in a neutral context due to attentional narrowing for words encoded in an emotional context, 
(iii) a diminished directed forgetting effect for words encoded in an emotional context, and (iv) 
enhanced associative memory for positive and neutral encoding contexts. Moreover, and 
perhaps most pertinently, if the consistent criterion change reported in this series is a 
consequence of effects of emotion operating over the valence of words at retrieval, then they 
will be absent in this experiment.  








These were 44 undergraduates and postgraduates (28 females, M = 24.30 years, SD = 
3.68) from the University of Nottingham. After giving informed consent, participants 
completed the experiment and received an inconvenience allowance of £8.  
 
4.1.1.2 Design and Materials 
A 2 (instruction: remember vs forget) x 3 (context valence: negative vs positive vs 
neutral) within-subjects design was employed. There were 360 neutral words and 180 images. 
The words were selected from the Warriner et al. (2013) database and were presented along 
with one of the three categories of valenced images. 
Images were selected from the EmoMadrid affective picture database 
(http://www.uam.es/CEACO/EmoMadrid.htm; Carretié, Tapia, López-Martín, & Albert, 
2019). Valence and arousal were measured via a rating scale from -2 (very negative/very 
calming) to 2 (very positive/very arousing). The images differed on the basis of valence 
(negative: M = -1.27, SD = 0.36; positive: M = 1.22, SD = 0.26; neutral: M = 0.18, SD = 0.20), 
and on the basis of arousal (negative: M = 1.08, SD = 0.31; positive: M = 1.03, SD = 0.40; 
neutral: M = -0.03, SD = 0.36) between emotional (negative and positive) and neutral images 
(see Appendix N). The images were matched for visual complexity, using measures of edge 
density and feature congestion (Madan et al., 2018) across all valence categories. At the level 
of the entire image sets independent sample t-tests were conducted to assess the equivalence of 
edge density (range 0.00 – 0.20) and feature congestion (range 1.57 – 10.38). Full details of 
these matching criteria and the outcomes of the analyses can be found in Appendix N. 





The 360 words were split into 180 old words shown during the study phase and 180 new 
words shown at test phase together with the old words. Half of the words presented during the 
study phase were followed by an instruction to remember and half of them by an instruction to 
forget. This created six critical (background – instruction) conditions of interest; Negative-
Remember, Negative-Forget, Positive-Remember, Positive-Forget, Neutral-Remember and 
Neutral-Forget. The pairing of words with the images and the assignment of remember and 
forget instructions were randomized. 
 
4.1.1.3 Procedure 
4.1.1.3.1 Study Phase 
Participants were tested individually, and the study lasted no more than 1 hour. The 
experiment consisted of one study-test block. In the study phase, 180 images were presented 
individually for 4500ms in the centre of a computer screen. After 1000ms of the 4500ms a 
fixation cross appeared in the middle of the image for 500ms, followed by a word that was 
presented for 500ms. After the word disappeared, the image remained on the screen for 2500ms 
during which time participants were instructed to imagine an association between the word and 
the image. The image was then replaced by a fixation cross for 500ms followed by a remember 
cue (VVVVV in the colour green) or a forget cue (XXXXX in the colour red). Participants were 
instructed to attempt to remember the preceding word following a remember cue, and to forget 
the word following a forget cue. The instructions remained on the screen for 1500ms and the 
order of remember and forget words was determined randomly for each participant. Following 
the offset of the cue, there was a blank screen for 500ms after which the next image appeared 
on the screen. See Figure 4.1 for an example of one trial. 
 






Figure 4.1. Experimental procedure for the study phase with and example trial of a word embedded in a neutral 
image and followed by a forget cue.  
 
4.1.1.3.2 Old/New Recognition Memory 
Test trials commenced with a fixation cross for 500ms, followed by a word for 500ms. 
Participants were asked to make an old/new recognition judgment to each word, regardless of 
the TBR or TBF instruction given in the study phase, by pressing designated keys with their 
left and right index fingers on a keyboard. Once a response was made, a blank screen appeared 
for 500ms, after which the next trial commenced with a fixation cross that was visible for 
500ms.  
 
4.1.1.3.3 Association Memory 
After the old/new recognition test, a surprise associative memory test commenced with 
a fixation cross for 500ms at the centre of the screen. The fixation cross was then replaced with 
a word at the centre of the screen and 6 images – 3 images above the word and 3 below the 
word (see Figure 4.2 for an example). One of the images had been paired with the word at study. 
The other 5 (‘lure’ images) had not, but had been presented at study. Each image was presented 
6 times during the associative memory test; once as the image paired with the word and the 
other 5 times as a lure image. Participants were instructed to select the image that was paired 
with the word on the screen in the previous study phase by using a computer mouse and clicking 
on the image. The images and the word remained on the screen until a response was made, 





which was then followed by a blank screen for 100ms. After the blank screen, a new trial 
commenced with a fixation cross. There were two test conditions. In the valence consistent 
condition, the valence of the lure images was consistent with the valence of the target image. 
In the valence mixed condition, there were 2 images of each valence category (negative, 
positive and neutral). An equal number of trials (90) were in the valence consistent and 




4.1.1.3.4 Valence Rating Task 
After the association memory test, participants were asked to rate how happy or unhappy 
the 360 words presented during the old/new recognition test made them feel. Each word was 
presented on the screen individually and participants were asked to respond via keyboard 
according to a 9-point Likert scale (1 = extremely unhappy to 9 = extremely happy). They were 
instructed to respond 1 when a word made them feel extremely unhappy, 9 when a word made 
them feel extremely happy and to use numbers in between to describe intermediate feelings. 
word 
 
Figure 4.2. One trial of the association memory test presenting a word in the middle 
with 6 images (3 above and 3 under the word). 
 





When a word made them feel completely neutral, they were instructed to respond 5. This rating 
scale is similar to the rating scale used to collect valence ratings in the database that was used 
to select the words that were employed in this experiment (Warriner et al., 2013). Each word 
remained on the screen until a response was made. 
 
4.1.2 Results 
Table 4.1 shows mean probabilities of hits and false alarms as well as sensitivity and 
criterion across instruction (remember, forget) and background image valence (negative, 
positive, neutral). The proportions of correct source judgements in the association memory test 




Probabilities of Correct Judgements (Hits) to Old Items, Incorrect Judgements (False Alarms) to New Items and Estimates of 
Memory Sensitivity (d’) and Criterion (c) for each Background Image Valence, across Instruction (Remember/Forget). SD = 
standard deviation 






 Remember  Forget    Remember  Forget 
 
Remember  Forget 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Negative 0.61 (0.15)  0.55 (0.19)    1.35 (0.60)  1.17 (0.60)  0.35 (0.34) 
 0.44 (0.41) 
Positive 0.59 (0.17) 
 
0.54 (0.16) 





0.39 (0.38)  0.46 (0.35) 










0.41 (0.36)  0.47 (0.38) 
 
Table 4.2 
Probabilities of Correct Source Judgements across Instruction (Remember/Forget) and Source Condition (Consistent 
and Mixed) for Each Valence (Negative, Positive and Neutral) Category of the Background Images 
  Remember   Forget 
 Consistent Mixed  Consistent Mixed 
 M (SD) M (SD)  M (SD) M (SD) 
Negative 0.60 (0.22) 0.60 (0.24)   0.54 (0.24) 0.55 (0.21) 
Positive 0.58 (0.20) 0.54 (0.24)  0.50 (0.23) 0.50 (0.23) 
Neutral 0.57 (0.25) 0.62 (0.23)   0.56 (0.21) 0.58 (0.21) 
 





4.1.2.1 Old/New Recognition Test 
2 (instruction: remember vs forget) x 3 (valence: negative vs positive vs neutral) 
repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted separately on the measures of sensitivity (d’) and 
response criterion (c). Only effects of DF instruction were reliable (see Table 4.3). d’ was 
superior for TBR than for TBF items, and there was a more liberal criterion for TBR items. 
 
4.1.2.2 Association Memory Test 
A 2 (instruction: forget vs. remember) x 3 (valence: negative vs. positive vs. neutral) x 
2 (association condition: consistent vs. mixed) repeated measures ANOVA revealed only main 
effects (see Table 4.3). Association memory was superior for images that were paired at study 
with words that participants were instructed to remember (M = 0.59, SD = 0.03) relative to 
instructions to forget (M = 0.54, SD = 0.03). The main effect for valence was followed up via 
t-tests. Memory was superior for negative (M = 0.57, SD = 0.19) and neutral (M = 0.58, SD = 
Table 4.3  
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence for Memory Sensitivity and 
Criterion in the Old/New Recognition Memory Test and Comparisons between Instruction, Valence and Association (Consistent and 
Mixed Valence) for Memory Accuracy in the Association Memory Test 
  
Old/new recognition memory   Association memory 




df F p ηp²  df F p ηp² 
 
df F p ηp² 
Instruction 
1, 43 10.88 .002** .20   1, 43 10.88 .002** .20   1, 43 11.09 .002** .21 
Valence  
2, 86 2.31 .106 .05  2, 86 2.31 .106 .05  2, 86 6.46 .002** .13 
Association           
1, 43 0.52 .475 .01 
Instruction*Valence 
2, 86 0.27 .761 .01  2, 86 0.27 .761 .01  2, 86 0.54 .583 .01 
Instruction*Association           
1, 43 0.09 .771 .00 
Valence*Association           
2, 86 2.09 .130 .05 
Instruction*Valence* 
Association 
                    2, 86 1.43 .244 .03 
Notes. ** p < .01.              
df = degrees of freedom              
 





0.20) images relative to positive (M = 0.53, SD = 0.19) images (negative vs positive: t(43) = 
2.74, p = .009, d = .41 and neutral vs positive: t(43) = -3.37,  p = .002, d = .50). There were no 
differences in association memory between negative and neutral images. 
 
4.1.2.3 Valence Rating Task 
A one-way ANOVA with four levels (negative, positive, neutral context and new words) 
was conducted. A significant effect (F(2.68, 960,18) = 13.67, p < .001, ηp² = .04) was followed 
up for all possible paired comparisons via t-tests using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .008 
(.05/6). When words were presented in a positive (M = 5.36, SD = 0.65) context they were rated 
more positively relative to when presented in a negative context (M = 5.15, SD = 0.64; t(359) 
= -4.68, p < .001, d = .25) or as new words (M = 5.16, SD = 0.40; t(359) = 5.63, p < .001, d = 
.31). Words presented in a neutral context (M = 5.31, SD = 0.67) were also rated more positively 
relative to when presented in a negative context (t(359) = -3.63, p < .001, d = .20) or as new 
words (t(359) = 4.30, p < .001, d = .23). There were no other reliable differences. There was, 
however, a positive correlation between the ratings for the new words (M = 5.16, SD = 0.40) 
and the ratings from the database (M = 5.12, SD = 0.31), r (358) = .33, p <.001. 
In order to evaluate whether the valence of the images accompanying words at study 
influenced perceived valence of the words subsequently, t-tests were conducted on the means 
of the valence ratings for each participant using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .008 
(.05/6). While not differing from each other, words in a positive (M = 5.34, SD = 0.46) and 
neutral context (M = 5.29, SD = 0.44) were rated as being more positive than words in a negative 
context (M = 5.17, SD = 0.44; positive vs negative: t(43) = -2.87, p = .006, d = .42; neutral vs 
negative t(43) = -2.32, p = .025, d = .34). In comparison to new words, those studied in a positive 
or neutral context were rated more highly (new words: M = 5.17, SD = 0.41; positive vs new 
words: t(43) = 4.27, p < .001, d = .62; neutral vs new words: t(43) = 3.33, p = .002, d = .50).  







Memory was enhanced for TBR compared to TBF words. This directed forgetting (DF) 
effect was not influenced by the valence of the encoding context nor was the memorability of 
the words. This is in contrast with the findings reported by Liu et al. (2017): memory for words 
in a neutral context was enhanced compared to words in a negative context and the directed 
forgetting effect was diminished for words in a negative context, due to better memory for TBR 
words in a neutral context than in a negative one.   
 Methodological factors might explain the discrepancies between these findings. One 
difference between the experiments is the method used for creating an association between the 
words and the images. Liu et al. (2017) instructed their participants to click somewhere on the 
image that was related to the meaning of the word. This may have been an easier way for 
participants to create an association than the method used in the present experiment, where 
participants were merely instructed to imagine an association between the word and image and 
no action was needed. The degree to which the encoding context influences the encoding of a 
word may be linked with the strength of an association between the word and the encoding 
context. When a strong association has been made between an emotional image and neutral 
word, this may enhance memory for the neutral words. However, as argued by Liu et al. (2017), 
an emotional encoding context may attract enhanced attention leading to poorer encoding, 
which then results in lower memory for words encoded in an emotional encoding context. Thus, 
perhaps the degree to which an image is distracting may also be different between Liu et al.'s 
(2017) study and those in this experiment.  
Perhaps more important is the degree of visual complexity of the images used in the two 
experiments. Images that are high in arousal (negative and positive images) are commonly also 
higher in visual complexity (Madan et al., 2018). Matching for complexity was achieved in this 





experiment, but this was not included in Liu et al.'s (2017) design. In their study, it might be 
that their outcomes arise because of increased visual complexity of the negative images they 
employed. Because visual complexity was matched across negative, positive and neutral images 
in this experiment any outcomes obtained are not subject to this possible confound. This is a 
good argument for weighting heavily the findings in this experiment relative to those reported 
by Liu et al. (2017). 
 As described earlier, Maratos and Rugg (2001), as well as many others (Yonelinas, 
2002), suggested that recognition memory is not the most sensitive means of detecting effects 
of encoding manipulations that primarily influence recollection. Using negative and neutral 
sentences, they examined the effect of the encoding context on neutral words using a 
recognition memory task (i.e. Experiment 1) and a combination of a recognition/source memory 
task (i.e. Experiment 2). In their second experiment they observed enhanced memory for words 
encoded in a negative context relative to words encoded in a neutral context. This effect was 
absent in their first experiment and they ascribed these discrepancies to differences in task 
demands: because participants anticipated making source judgements in the second experiment, 
this may have resulted in the encoding context having a larger effect on the encoding processes 
of the neutral words embedded in these sentences. Linking these observations to the findings in 
the present experiment, this would explain why there was no effect of encoding context on 
memory because the association memory test was incidental. If participants had been aware of 
a subsequent source memory test, the encoding context might have affected the memorability 
of the neutral words. However, Smith et al. (2004) observed superior memory for objects 
encoded in a positive context relative to a negative and neutral context regardless of whether 
the source memory task was intentional or incidental. Perhaps other factors such as 
methodological elements (e.g. control of stimulus properties) or the manipulation of the 
encoding context (e.g. sentences or images) are at the root of these discrepancies. Furthermore, 





the findings reported here don’t seem to be in line with the attentional narrowing effect (Mather 
& Knight, 2008), since the encoding context did not affect the memorability of the words.  
 Even though emotion did not affect the memorability of words, it did influence the 
word-context associations. Identification of the images associated with words was superior for 
negative and neutral images relative to positive images. The direction of the effect of emotion 
is the opposite to what has been reported in some previous studies. In some other studies 
negative emotion has tended to impair associative memory (Madan et al., 2012; Madan et al., 
2017; Maratos & Rugg, 2001; but see Smith et al., 2004), while positive emotion has enhanced 
it (Madan et al., 2019; Pierce & Kensinger, 2011; Smith et al., 2004). For negative emotion it 
has been proposed that it is more challenging to integrate a neutral item with negative items, 
because people tend to focus their attention more towards the negative item (Otani et al., 2012; 
Pierce & Kensinger, 2011). Positive emotion has been proposed to broaden attention and 
cognitive processing, making it easier to integrate positive and neutral material, also referred to 
as attention broadening (Madan et al., 2019; Pierce & Kensinger, 2011). Taken together, these 
accounts predict an impairment of word-context associations for negative images and an 
enhancement for positive images. Linking these to the present findings, there seems to be a case 
of attentional narrowing (Mather & Knight, 2008) for positive images – the positive images 
attract enhanced attention leading to a decreased attention to the neutral word. This may have 
caused an impairment in creating word-context associations, leading to decreased memory for 
positive images. However, this is not consistent with the attention broadening argument and 
with previous findings (Madan et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2004). The findings reported here are 
also inconsistent with other studies using a similar encoding context manipulation (Maratos & 
Rugg, 2001; Smith et al., 2004). For example, in Smith et al.'s (2004) study, memory for 
contextual details was enhanced for negative and positive contexts relative to a neutral context. 
There are, however, differences in task demands between these studies and the present 





experiment. Smith et al. (2004) required participants to make a judgement on the valence of the 
encoding context, whereas participants in this experiment were required to indicate the specific 
image associated with a word. Thus, besides making a judgement on the valence of the context, 
participants were required to make an attempt to retrieve the specific image.  
Another explanation for poorer memory for word-context associations for positive 
images stems from considerations regarding limitations in creating associations between 
stimuli. According to Mather (2007) emotion could impair the creation of associations between 
an emotional and neutral stimulus due to an emotional stimulus attracting more attention. As a 
result, this impairment decreases the likelihood of associating an emotional stimuli with a 
neutral one. Mather (2007) further suggested that an enhanced effect of emotion on the creation 
of associations is only seen when it is targeted at features of an emotional item itself. This 
account does not explain, however, the differences between negative and positive contexts 
reported in this experiment. These differences (the effects of negative and positive emotion on 
memory for word-context associations) suggest that arousal is not the factor responsible for 
these effects. Rather, valence is more likely to be implicated. A more direct comparison 
between negative and positive word-context associations, as was done in Experiment 2 and 3, 
would provide a more comprehensive answer to the question of whether arousal and/or valence 
influence word-context associations. 
There was also a directed forgetting effect for the images in this experiment. 
Comparable DF effects have been reported previously (Bancroft et al., 2013; Hockley et al., 
2016; Wang et al., 2016), although in these studies the DF instructions were direct. For example, 
in the study by Bancroft et al. (2013), in an item-method DF design, participants were directly 
instructed to apply the DF instructions (i.e. remember or forget) to word pairs that were 
presented. Participants were to create associations between word pairs when instructed to 
remember while not doing so when instructed to forget. Bancroft et al. (2013) observed a DF 





effect for the word pairs. In the present study the DF effect, by contrast, occurred despite the 
fact that the instructions to remember/forget were directed only at the words and participants 
were not instructed to either remember or forget the word-image associations. In addition, the 
DF instructions were not an indicator of whether to create an association or not. In another study 
(Burgess, Hockley & Hourihan, 2017) an encoding context structure similar to the present 
experiment (albeit without manipulating emotion) was used. Words were presented against 
neutral images and participants were instructed to only remember or forget the words. Although 
they found a DF effect for the words, they did not observe a DF effect for the images. In contrast 
to the design of present experiment, they did not instruct participants to create an association 
between the words and the images, which could explain the different outcomes.  
The absence of an effect of emotion on the memorability of the words and the directed 
forgetting effect for words is consistent with findings in the previous experiments in this thesis. 
The motivation for this experiment was to disentangle what happens during encoding and 
retrieval and to investigate in what way emotion might influence memory control. This was 
done by removing – or at least attempting to minimise – the emotional attributes affiliated with 
retrieval cues. In light of this manipulation, the fact that response criterion was not different for 
words that were encoded in an emotional or neutral context is important: an effect of emotion 
on criterion has been observed consistently in previous experiments in this thesis. This raises 
the possibility that it is the emotional attributes of retrieval cues that results in participants 
adopting a more liberal criterion for emotional material. One explanation for a more liberal 
response criterion for emotional contents is that it results from an increased sense of familiarity 
for emotional relative to neutral material that is generated simply by a test item (Kensinger & 
Corkin, 2003; Kensinger & Kark, 2018). This would then result in an increased likelihood of 
responding old to emotional material (for a similar explanation in other contexts, see 
discussions of the revelation effect (Azimian-Faridani & Wilding, 2004; Lecompte, 1995; 





Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990)). The fact that the changes in criterion in earlier studies were 
based on an increase in the likelihood of new as well as old test items is consistent with this 
account. By this view, removing the emotional attributes from the retrieval cue resulted in the 
absence of the changes in criterion with emotion that have been reported consistently 
throughout this thesis up to this point.  
Turning to the outcomes in the valence rating task, there were reliable, although small, 
differences between ratings. When words were encoded in a positive and neutral context they 
were rated as more positive than when they were encoded in a negative context or when they 
had not been shown at study. This suggests that, at least in the positive and neutral context, 
words changed in perceived emotionality. Given this outcome, is it surprising that no changes 
in criterion were observed? It might be argued that this outcome stands in opposition to the 
view that the reason for the null result for criterion change with emotion is because only neutral 
words were presented at test. If the study encounter in any way changed the emotional attributes 
of the words when presented at test it might be seen in the criterion data. These effects on the 
valence task are small, however, and were revealed in a direct assessment. These considerations 
likely form part of an explanation for any disconnect between these two sets of outcomes in this 
experiment. 
 To summarise, by employing a manipulation of emotion at study only, this experiment 
design offered a means of assessing the influence of emotion on memory and memory control 
at different stages (encoding and retrieval). The encoding manipulation did not influence 
memory for the words, nor did it influence the ability to remember and forget the words. This 
contrasts with what was been predicted based on prior studies. However, as per the explanations 
outlined in this discussion other factors (such as the control of visual complexity) and other 
experimental differences, most notably the method used to create associations between words 
and images, may have led to these inconsistent outcomes. The outcomes do at least suggest that 





again when controlling for critical potential confounds, an emotional manipulation during 
encoding does not influence directed forgetting. Moreover, in contrast, emotion did influence 
memory for background images, and there was also a DF effect for the images (even though 
the R/F instructions were directed to the words only).  
Perhaps the most significant finding in this experiment is that response criterion was not 
affected by the emotionality of the encoding context. The pre-experiment considerations 
anticipated that a null outcome here – no change in criterion with emotion – would argue for 
processes at retrieval (rather than those at encoding) being important. This outcome in this 
experiment is important, because of the consistent finding of a criterion change in prior studies. 
The outcomes in this experiment suggest that the emotional properties of retrieval cues are the 
primary driver for changes in response criterion with emotion. There are caveats, however: the 
reliance on a null result and the absence of a direct contrast at the time of retrieval and within 
the same experiment between conditions when emotion does/does not vary. These issues are 

























5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Objectives and Experimental Design 
The overall objective of the experiments described in this thesis was to develop an 
understanding of when control over remembering and forgetting of emotional material can be 
exerted and how emotion influences memory judgements. The links between cognitive control 
and memory have been investigated extensively (Anderson & Green, 2001; Levy & Anderson, 
2002; Rizio & Dennis, 2013), however there is little consensus about the linkage between 
emotion and control (Chen et al., 2012; Dehli & Brennen, 2008; Depue et al., 2006; Gallant et 
al., 2017, 2018; Hauer & Wessel, 2006). Of particular importance for the work here, it is unclear 
whether emotion influences the ability to exert control over remembering and forgetting 
emotional material (Barnier et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2018; Dehli & Brennen, 2008; Otani et 
al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2016).  
As described in the Introduction (see section 1.4.6.1) and in several discussions 
throughout this thesis, published findings of directed forgetting and emotion are inconsistent 
(Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Brandt et al., 2013; Gallant & Yang, 2014; Hauswald et al., 2011; 
McNally et al., 1998; Myers et al., 1998; Payne & Corrigan, 2007; Wessel & Merckelbach, 
2006). 
In the DF item-method, which was used consistently in this thesis, participants receive 
a list of study items and are instructed after each item to either remember or forget it (MacLeod, 
1975, 1999; Muther, 1965). In a subsequent test, their memory for all items is tested. The 
commonly observed DF effect is superior memory for items that participants were instructed to 
remember relative to those that they were instructed to forget. A combination of processes is 
proposed to be responsible for the DF effect in the item-method, which are encapsulated in two 





primary accounts; the selective rehearsal account (Bjork, 1972; MacLeod, 1975) and the active 
inhibition account (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Basden et al., 1993). According to the 
selective rehearsal account TBR items are rehearsed and encoded more extensively than TBF 
items. According to the active inhibition account, inhibition processes are activated when 
instructed to forget, which leads to relatively better memory for TBR items. The accuracy of 
either account is difficult to establish because of the marked heterogeneity in published 
findings, and the experiments in this thesis were not designed to distinguish between these 
accounts (although see the discussions of the ERP encoding analyses described below and in 
section 3.3.4). The experiments were designed, however, to contribute to an understanding of 
how emotion, memory and memory control interact, by exerting a consistent set of controls 
over stimulus properties. These are described below, following a brief recapitulation of other 
matters addressed in these experiments: the separation between criterion and sensitivity, the 
links between emotion, control, recollection and familiarity, and the similarities and differences 
between interactions between positive and negative valence and memory.  
 
5.1.1 Word and Word Set Properties 
One important factor is stimulus properties, which are a potential confound if they differ 
with valence (Kensinger & Kark, 2018). One critical property is semantic relatedness, which 
tends to be greater for sets of emotional words compared to sets of neutral words (Buchanan et 
al., 2006). Semantic relatedness refers to the strength of semantic relationships between words, 
and can be assessed in several ways (Landauer et al., 1998; Mandera et al., 2017; Nelson et al., 
2004). It has been shown that when a list of words has a high degree of semantic relatedness 
this can facilitate memory, because relatedness may improve accessibility of memory (Tulving 
& Pearlstone, 1966). This general point has also been made specifically for emotional words 
(Buchanan, 2007; Maratos et al., 2000; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). These considerations 





suggest that it could be easier to remember, and (perhaps) harder to forget, emotional words, 
unless semantic relatedness is equated between word sets. Dougal and Rotello (2007) examined 
memory for emotional and neutral words using a Remember/Know (R/K) task. They matched 
the words for semantic relatedness and found no differences in memory sensitivity between 
emotional and neutral words. In addition, although no differences were observed for Know 
responses, Remember responses were increased for negative relative to positive and neutral 
words. These findings suggest that relatedness is an important consideration when interpreting 
findings in studies where memory for emotional material is examined, but different 
observations of the effect of emotion on memory have been reported elsewhere. For example, 
Minnema and Knowlton (2008) found enhanced memory for negative relative to positive and 
neutral words despite controlling for semantic relatedness. 
In addition to controlling for relatedness, several other factors were equalised across 
valence categories in the experiments in this thesis. These were: word length and frequency 
across all three valence categories, and arousal between negative and positive words in 
Experiments 1-4 and visual complexity and arousal between negative and positive images in 
Experiment 5. Because of these attempts to exert the same degree of control over stimulus 
properties in word sets (and images) across all of the experiments in this thesis, it is possible to 
have a level of confidence in similarities and differences across the experiments that is not 
possible when contrasting other work where different levels and kinds of control have been 
exercised. 
 
5.1.2 Measurement and Design 
Differences in sensitivity as measured by d-prime (d’) might not be accurate when 
response criterion varies and single-point measures are used: there is a potential confound 
between measures of d’ and response criterion, when response criterion varies across 





conditions. In this case, d’ can be meaningfully compared only when the variances of the old 
and new items distributions are equal (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 
1992; Yonelinas, 1994). However, empirically it is not typically the case that the distributions 
are comparable (Egan 1958, 1975; Ratcliff et al., 1992; Wixted, 2007; for a review of findings 
see Yonelinas, 1994), which makes it challenging to interpret changes in memory sensitivity 
across conditions. This issue has been addressed and discussed at length by Dougal and Rotello 
(2007), and addressed in this thesis by introducing confidence judgements at test to plot receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curves. ROCs provide an opportunity to separate estimates of 
sensitivity and criterion (Yonelinas, 1994; Yonelinas et al., 1996; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007), 
thereby offering a more accurate account of sensitivity measures when criterion changes across 
conditions. This is especially crucial when examining the effects of emotion on memory and 
memory control, because criterion tends to be more liberal for emotional material relative to 
neutral material (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008; 
Ochsner, 2000; Windmann & Kutas, 2001). 
Only a subset of directed forgetting (DF) studies have reported response criterion and/or 
focused on the importance of the role it may play in memory for emotional material (Bailey & 
Chapman, 2012; Berger et al., 2018; Gallant et al., 2018; Hauswald et al., 2011; Marchewka et 
al., 2016; Yang et al., 2012). In general, these studies have reported a relatively more liberal 
response criterion for emotional material relative to neutral material. However, with respect to 
the effects of emotion on memory sensitivity, the findings are inconsistent. Where some have 
reported equivalent levels of memory sensitivity for emotional and neutral material (Gallant et 
al., 2018; Hauswald et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2012), others have reported superior memory for 
neutral relative to emotional material (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Berger et al., 2018) or superior 
memory for emotional relative to neutral material (Marchewka et al., 2016). 





Besides disentangling measures of sensitivity and criterion, ROCs also allow extraction 
of estimates of the contributions of recollection (R) and familiarity (F) to recognition 
judgements (Koen et al., 2017; Yonelinas et al., 1996). Estimates of recollection and familiarity 
were derived from ROCs in Experiment 2. There are different means of acquiring estimates of 
recollection and familiarity and overlapping but not identical assumptions are employed in 
different cases. In order to assess the generality of the findings in Experiment 2, different ways 
of achieving this were employed in subsequent experiments. In Experiment 3 the R/K procedure 
was used, which offers a subjective means of estimating recollection and familiarity. In 
Experiment 4 event-related potentials (ERPs) were employed. The reason for doing this was to 
examine the contributions of recollection and familiarity in a task requiring only old/new 
recognition memory judgements (Rugg et al., 1998; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Sanquist et al., 
1980). Changing task demands may influence in what manner participants approach a task and 
rely on recollection and familiarity. For example, old/new recognition judgements are assumed 
to rely heavily on familiarity (Johansson et al., 2004; Tulving, 1985b).   
 
5.1.3 Valence Manipulations 
The experiments described here involved three valence categories: negative, positive 
and neutral. The rationale for using both negative and positive material is partly because of 
some evidence that negative and positive valence have different effects on memory (Kensinger 
& Kark, 2018), and memory control (e.g. Li et al., 2017; Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; Otani 
et al., 2012). Superior memory for negative material relative to positive and neutral material 
has been reported (Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; Otani et al., 2012), although other data show 
superior memory for both negative and positive material relative to neutral material (Gallant & 
Yang, 2014; Li et al., 2017; Payne & Corrigan, 2007). With respect to memory control, some 
researchers have reported smaller DF effects for negative relative to positive material (e.g. 





Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; Otani et al., 2012), whereas others have reported equivalent DF 
effects for these two valence categories (e.g. Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Payne & Corrigan, 
2007). The experiments in this thesis offer a way to provide additional data that are germane to 
this question. If changes in memory are equivalent for positive and negative material relevant 
to neutral material, then a parsimonious explanation is that arousal is a substantive contributor 
to the observed effects (Buchanan et al., 2006; Cahill & McGaugh, 1995; Ochsner, 2000; Phelps 
& Sharot, 2008; Sharot et al., 2004). Different effects for positive and negative materials cannot 
be accommodated in this way.  
Despite the evidence that is suggestive of differential effects of negative and positive 
material on memory (Kensinger & Kark, 2018; Li et al., 2017; Minnema & Knowlton, 2008; 
Otani et al., 2012), the majority of studies have focused on memory differences between 
negative and neutral material (e.g. Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Xie et al., 2018; Yonelinas & 
Ritchey, 2015). One reason for this focus arises via a clinical perspective, as understanding the 
mechanisms of memory and how negative memories interrupt people’s daily functioning is of 
practical importance (Harvey et al., 1998; Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995; Williams & Broadbent, 
1986). Disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are linked with failures to 
regulate memory for emotionally challenging events (Elzinga & Bremner, 2002). In short, the 
general finding is a diminished DF effect for negative material relative to neutral material for 
participants with depressive tendencies (Xie et al., 2018) or that suffer from PTSD (McNally et 
al., 1998). These outcomes reinforce the importance of understanding the effects of emotion on 
memory control in clinical populations (McNally et al., 2004; McNally et al., 1998), but do not 
take away from the argument that the influence of positive valence on memory is also worthy 
of further investigation. 
 





5.1.4 Study/Test Separations 
In the final experiment reported in this thesis an attempt was also made to separate 
effects of emotion at study and at test. The issue here is that when emotional material is used at 
study and test, distinguishing the effect of emotion on encoding and retrieval processes 
separately is difficult (Liu et al., 2017; Maratos & Rugg, 2001; Smith et al., 2004). For retrieval, 
the emotional attributes of a retrieval cue may trigger a sense of familiarity, which may 
influence memory judgements despite not being related to the presentation of the material in a 
prior study phase (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Maratos & Rugg, 2001). For encoding, there are 
several arguments for how and why materials with different valences might be subject to 
different operations (Dolan et al., 1999; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004). A solution to this confound 
is to have an emotion manipulation only at one of the two stages. In line with the work of Liu 
et al. (2017) (see also Maratos & Rugg, 2001; Smith et al., 2004), in the final experiment 
reported in this thesis, this was achieved by manipulating the emotional encoding context at 
study in which neutral words were shown. In a subsequent recognition memory task, memory 
for the neutral words was tested.   
 
5.1.5 Potential Confounds 
5.1.5.1 Multiple study-test cycles 
The approach taken for the experimental designs in this thesis was to implement several 
study-test cycles. This increased the number of items per critical condition (particularly 
important for the ERP studies) and enabled maintenance of a level of memory performance 
sufficient to permit changes in sensitivity with experiment manipulations to be observed. Of 
course, one concern with this approach is the possibility that participants did not adhere to the 
directed forgetting instructions after the first study-test cycle. 





Can we be confident then that the directed forgetting effect observed in this thesis 
consistently across experiments is robust? Several factors suggest that we can. First, the directed 
forgetting effect is observed consistently across experiments, which in and of itself suggests a 
robust effect. Second, participants were aware at the start of the experiment that memory would 
be tested for both TBR and TBF items, so the first study-test cycles is comparable to the others 
to some extent. Finally, analyses of the directed forgetting effect between the study-test cycles, 
in Experiment 1 (see Table 2.5), suggest that participants were performing in a similar manner: 
there were no reliable differences according to block. 
 As discussed in the introduction (see section 1.3.3.1), another possibility is that 
participants experience reduced motivation to retrieve TBF items (MacLeod, 1999), and this 
might change over multiple study-test cycles. Two observations are relevant here. First, 
MacLeod (1999) examined whether the motivation of participants influenced the directed 
forgetting effect by implementing a reward system for additional TBF items retrieved in a 
second memory test. A directed forgetting effect remained evident. Second, the results from 
block analyses in this thesis (no differences according to block) suggest that whatever 
participants were doing, they were adhering to the directed forgetting instructions. 
 
5.1.5.2 Gender differences 
The majority of the participants across the experiments discussed in this thesis were 
females. This raises the possibility that gender differences are in play when examining emotion 
and memory control. Based on prior literature, for example, memory for details is enhanced in 
females whereas males tend to remember the ‘gist’ of events (Loprinzi & Frith, 2018). In 
addition, females tend to describe their memories using emotional terms more than males do 
(Loprinzi & Frith, 2018). Linking this with the effects of valence on memory, details of negative 
information tend to be better remembered than for positive and neutral material. In contrast, it 





is the general scope of positive information which is often better remembered (Bowen et al., 
2018; Kensinger & Kark, 2018; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006). Taken together, these 
considerations raise the possibility that memory control for emotional material is different 
between males and females, and some of the results in this thesis are gender-specific. To the 
best of my knowledge, gender differences in directed forgetting for emotional materials has not 
been investigated. In addition, the majority of published studies report a broadly similar set of 
participants to those in the experiments in this thesis, although there have been some studies 
that included either a balanced set of participants (Hauswald et al., 2011; Nowicka et al., 2011; 
Xie et al., 2018; W. Yang et al., 2012), or a majority of males (Liu et al., 2017). Based on the 
unbalanced set of participants in this suite of experiments it may well be that the results 
presented in this thesis do not generalize equally to individuals identifying as men and women.   
 
5.2 Summary of Findings and their Implications 
5.2.1 Effects of Instruction and Valence 
In all experiments, memory was superior for words that participants were instructed to 
remember compared to words that they were instructed to forget. This is consistent with the 
modal finding in directed forgetting studies (MacLeod, 1975, 1999). Strikingly, in none of the 
experiments in this thesis, did the directed forgetting effect vary with valence. These consistent 
outcomes are in line with some previous findings (Gallant et al., 2018; Gallant & Yang, 2014; 
Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006), but not with others (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Berger et al., 
2018; Hauswald et al., 2011; Payne & Corrigan, 2007; Taylor et al., 2018; but also see Brandt 
et al., 2013). Considering the consistency of this observation throughout this thesis, this strongly 
suggests that confounding factors may explain at least some of the inconsistencies observed in 
the literature. Theoretically, these findings also reject the assumption that, at least under certain 
circumstances, the ability to control memory for emotional material is not different from neutral 





material. This gives some indication that, clinically, when people experience pathological 
patterns of memory control this is not explained by simply an increased difficulty of forgetting. 
However, some explanation might be found in the direction of the quality of processing 
memories for negatively challenging events (Brewin, 2018). These are merely speculations, 
which based on the work presented here are not possible to either confirm or reject. 
In Experiment 2 and 3 there was also a directed forgetting effect for recollection and 
familiarity. Previously in this thesis the prediction was made that memory control would be 
specifically difficult for recollection and not necessarily for familiarity. This prediction was 
made based on the assumption that under certain circumstances people with PTSD may re-
experience an event when remembering occurs. Meaning that some recollection of contextual 
details is occurring and there is an inability to distinguish memories from the actual presence. 
This is of course when the inability to control memory becomes pathological, but it provides 
some indication that perhaps recollection is specifically difficult and necessary to control 
memory. However, these assumptions are purely speculative and extended research is necessary 
to understand memory control for recognition memory. Moreover, the findings in this study do 
not support this rationale. In contrast, the findings here strongly suggest that (i) the ability to 
control memory is equal for recollection and familiarity and (ii) memory control occurs for both 
recollection and familiarity.  
The lack of an effect of emotion on directed forgetting may be due to the control of 
semantic relatedness that was exerted in these experiments. Minnema and Knowlton (2008) 
controlled for semantic relatedness and observed a smaller DF effect for negative words relative 
to positive and neutral words. Minnema and Knowlton (2008), however, used free association 
norms to measure the degree of relatedness, and ensured that any related words were put in 
different lists. The association norms were collected from subjective judgements from 
participants (Nelson et al., 2004). For the word lists employed in this thesis semantic relatedness 





was measured using an online tool ‘snaut’, which measures the degree of relatedness based on 
computational prediction models. These models predict a word, given the context (associated) 
words and calculate the semantic distance between word pairs (Mandera et al., 2017). The 
degree of relatedness was then matched between valence categories.  
A limitation of the free association norms approach is that it is defined only for a subset 
of words, whereas this is not the case for the ‘snaut’ tool. Additionally, according to a 
comparison of various methods used for the measurement of semantic relatedness, the 
computational prediction model ‘snaut’ (together with Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA; 
Landauer et al., 1998)) is a superior method to measure the degree of relatedness compared to 
the human association norms method (Mandera et al., 2017). In addition, it is worth 
emphasising the consistency of the findings here: the absence of an effect of emotion on 
directed forgetting was observed in all experiments reported in this thesis. 
There are also, however, examples of the absence of DF effects when relatedness has 
not been controlled for. Berger et al. (2018), for example (see also Gallant et al., 2018; Gallant 
& Yang, 2014; Taylor et al., 2018), used negative, positive and neutral words in a DF study and 
did not report any procedures involving the control of the level of semantic relatedness between 
emotional and neutral words. They did not find any effects of emotion on the DF effect. Of 
course, there is a possibility that, in this experiment and other similar ones, there are in fact no 
differences in relatedness according to valence.  
Superior memory for emotional material was found in Experiment 1, which is consistent 
with findings in some other DF studies (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Brandt et al., 2013; 
Hauswald et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2017; McNally et al., 1998; Myers et al., 1998; Payne & 
Corrigan, 2007), as well as in a variety of other paradigms in which memory has been assessed 
(Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Talmi et al., 2007, 2008). This 
consistency, however, does not extend to some other studies in which memory was not 





enhanced for emotional material (Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006; Windmann & Kutas, 2001). 
Perhaps most importantly, and as anticipated earlier, there were differences in criterion with 
valence in Experiment 1 (discussed in greater detail below). In Experiment 2, there were three 
studies where paired valence categories were used (confidence judgements were also required), 
and sensitivity did not vary between emotional and neutral material. These outcomes are 
consistent with those of Dougal and Rotello (2007), as are the findings in two of the three 
studies in Experiment 3. In these studies, the R/K procedure was employed.  
In the only divergence from this broadly consistent pattern, memory was superior for 
neutral relative to positive words in Experiment 3, and there was a trend in the same direction 
in Experiment 2, although this was not significant. This means that under both ROC and R/K 
methods, memory was somewhat superior for neutral relative to positive material. One reliable 
consistency, however, between these two experiments is the observed superior memory for 
negative relative to positive material. This observation may be a result of attentional biases 
being more pronounced for negative material for the purpose of attending to threatening stimuli 
in the environment (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Ochsner, 2000). In addition, negative material 
may benefit from prioritization of processes (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004), which has been 
referred to as natural selective attention (Dolan et al., 1999). Taken this together, this may lead 
to superior memory for negative material relative to positive material. 
In Experiment 4 (where ERPs were acquired) and Experiment 5 (where emotion was 
manipulated at study only) there were no differences in sensitivity with valence. The 
consistency of Experiment 5 with other outcomes is arguably unsurprising. For Experiment 4, 
the most directly relevant contrast is with Experiment 1, because in both cases only recognition 
memory judgements were required. To re-iterate, in Experiment 1 sensitivity was superior for 
emotional relative to neutral material. One way of explaining the differences across the 
experiments is to note the sensitivity/criterion confound. This is also emphasized by the 





discrepancies in findings for response criterion. In Experiment 1, there was a relatively more 
conservative response criterion for positive relative to neutral and no differences between 
negative and neutral material. In Experiment 4 response criterion was liberal for emotional 
relative to neutral material.  
Perhaps of equal or greater importance, the number of valence categories used in the 
two cases might be responsible for the different findings across experiments. In Experiment 1, 
an equal number of negative, positive and neutral words were used. The ratio between 
emotional and neutral words is therefore unequal, which is not the case in Experiment 4 (in 
each of the three studies – the two primary ones and the replication – only two valence 
categories were used). This suggests one explanation for the different findings across the 
experiments. In contrast to Experiment 1 (and Experiment 5, which is somewhat different in 
other ways), in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 only negative or positive words were contrasted with 
neutral words or with each other in paired contrasts. 
How is this relevant to the design differences across experiments in this thesis? When it 
is the case that two-thirds of the words are emotional compared to one-third neutral words 
(Experiment 1), the emotional material may be relatively more salient. This may lead to 
emotional material receiving greater attention thereby resulting in memory enhancement for 
emotional material (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000), as was observed in Experiment 1. Another 
possibility is that due to a greater range in valence (the distance in the valence dimension 
between negative and positive) in Experiment 1, making valence an important dimension that 
influences memory, there is a greater effect of emotion on memory. In the case of the 
experiments described in this thesis, this is observed in Experiment 1. 
 





5.2.2 Response Criterion 
A consistent finding throughout this thesis, except in Experiment 1 and 5, was a more 
liberal response criterion for emotional material relative to neutral material. What 
considerations are relevant when looking to explain these outcomes? One answer, articulated 
earlier, is that emotional materials are associated with higher levels of familiarity (Kensinger 
& Corkin, 2003; Ochsner, 2000). If this is the case for old as well as new items, then it can 
manifest as differences in criterion with no change in memory sensitivity (Dougal & Rotello, 
2007). This would be the case if the familiarity changes came about at study, test, or at both 
time points. 
One way in which this possibility has been developed is to argue that emotional 
materials tend to be more interrelated, and as a result encourage more categorical, gist-based 
thinking (White et al., 2015; Windmann & Kutas, 2001). Gist has been identified as one basis 
for memory judgements (Budson, Todman, & Schacter, 2014; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; 
Reyna & Brainerd, 1995; Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999; Schacter et al., 1998; Schacter & 
Slotnick, 2004). In addition, at least for negative material, of relevance are considerations that 
an adaptive cognitive function is to prioritise potentially harmful events or information 
(Johansson et al., 2004; Windmann & Kutas, 2001). If negative emotional materials fit in this 
category, their level of salience might be amplified. If salience leads to an increased sense of 
familiarity (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Lavoie & O’Connor, 2013; Talmi et al., 2008), this can 
also explain criterion changes according to emotion.  
Another possibility is that the differences in criterion do not come about because of 
differences in familiarity, but genuinely differences in criterion. When test items are intermixed 
this might seem implausible, but perhaps the salience argument above is relevant. If salient 
material is particularly relevant, then it might be beneficial to judge that material to be old. 
These salience considerations also draw support from the fact that there were also differences 





in response criterion between negative and positive valence when these two were contrasted 
together. Response criterion was more liberal for negative relative to positive words in 
Experiments 2 and 3. These outcomes can be accommodated by a salience account, and similar 
effects have been observed by Bailey and Chapman (2012).  
The more liberal criterion for emotional material is consistent with what has been 
observed in a subset of DF studies (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Berger et al., 2018; Gallant et 
al., 2018; Hauswald et al., 2011; Marchewka et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2012), and with other 
studies outside the DF literature (e.g. Dougal & Rotello, 2007). A rather unexpected finding, 
however, in Experiment 1, contrasting negative, positive and neutral words, was a relatively 
more liberal response criterion for neutral words relative to positive words. Moreover, there 
were no differences between negative and neutral words. As discussed above, one reason for 
these discrepancies might be the sensitivity/criterion confound, which is the difficulty of 
interpreting sensitivity measures when response criterion changes across condition and single 
point measures only are employed (Dougal & Rotello, 2007). 
 In what might be one of the most substantive findings in this thesis, in Experiment 5 
there were no differences in response criterion across emotional and neutral conditions. The 
rationale for Experiment 5 was to remove the emotional attributes of the retrieval cue in order 
to separate effects of emotion on encoding and retrieval processes. The null result for response 
criterion in this case suggests that what happens during retrieval processing is what matters 
when it comes to criterion changes for emotional material. One of the arguments developed 
above is that familiarity changes are responsible for the differences in estimates of criterion 
across valence categories. If these familiarity changes were products of the retrieval cues 
themselves, then the outcome of Experiment 5 makes sense, in so far as the neutral words (all 
of the test stimuli) did not elicit differences of this kind.  





In the most similar published study, Liu et al. (2017) found a diminished DF effect for 
words embedded in a negative context. This differs from the findings in this experiment and 
they did not report effects of emotion on response criterion. Based on a hits and false alarm 
calculation for criterion from their data, however, there is the suggestion of a relatively more 
liberal criterion for words in a neutral (0.28) relative to a negative (0.33) context. This pattern 
of data – and of course this is only an observation – is the opposite to what is observed in 
comparison to Experiment 5 (see Table 4.1). One explanation for the inconsistent findings in 
sensitivity is that whereas Liu et al. (2017) did not include matching the images for visual 
complexity, in Experiment 5 the negative, positive and neutral images were matched on visual 
complexity. As described earlier the degree of complexity differs between emotional and 
neutral images and may therefore influence the effects of emotion on memory. 
 
5.2.2.1 Directed Forgetting and Criterion 
Participants also adopted a more liberal response criterion for words that they were 
instructed to remember relative to words that they were instructed to forget. This was observed 
consistently across the 5 reported experiments. White et al. (2015) proposed that the extent to 
which items in a list can be separated into categories, for example emotional or neutral material, 
influences response criterion (see Introduction, section 1.4.3). They only found differences in 
response criterion when the proportion of words that could be affiliated with distinct categories 
was different. When ‘categorical’ levels were matched there were no differences in response 
criterion. Linking this with present findings, it is in principle possible that TBR words shared a 
common category relative to TBF words, which resulted in a more liberal response criterion for 
TBR words. However, the designation of the directed forgetting instructions to words was 
counterbalanced. Thus, each word was followed by a remember instruction for half the 
participants whereas the other half of participants were instructed to forget the word. This 





makes it unlikely that the categorical similarities were different between TBR and TBF words 
and influenced response criterion.  
A somewhat more likely interpretation – at least intuitively – is that TBR words received 
enhanced encoding relative to TBF words (Basden et al., 1993; MacLeod, 1975), resulting in 
an increased sense of familiarity and therefore leading to an increase in the likelihood of 
perceiving a stimulus as old rather than new. As a result, this may have led to a more lenient 
response criterion. This interpretation is compatible with the observed DF effects across all 5 
experiments.  
 
5.2.3 Recollection and Familiarity 
The influence of emotion on the processes of recollection and familiarity differed 
between Experiments 2 (ROCs) and 3 (R/K procedure). In Experiment 2, recollection was 
superior for neutral relative to negative words, whereas in Experiment 3 there were no 
differences between emotional and neutral words for recollection. The differences between 
neutral and negative words in Experiment 2 are not in line with findings that remembering or 
recollection is greater for negative material (Ochsner, 2000; Sharot et al., 2007). As a result of 
extensive encoding (Hamann, 2001) and negative material being accompanied with 
remembering greater details (Bowen et al., 2018), arguably memory retrieval based on 
recollection should be increased for negative material. In Experiment 3, however, recollection 
was superior for negative relative to positive words. These outcomes fit with the view that 
general details of negative material tend to be better remembered relative to those of positive 
material (Kensinger & Kark, 2018). Alternatively, or perhaps as well, it may be that negative 
material receives prioritised processing, perhaps because of its salience, and hence more 
extensive encoding compared to positive material (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004). The same 
reasoning explaining the differences in memory sensitivity can be applied here; enhanced 





attention and encoding process are allocated towards negative material relative to positive 
(Johansson et al., 2004; Windmann & Kutas, 2001), which explains increased recollection for 
negative relative to positive material. In addition, in Experiment 3 valence interacted with 
recollection; recollection was superior for negative TBR words relative to positive TBR words 
and no differences were observed for TBF words. This suggests that whatever different 
processing negative material is subjected to, it results in negative material being easier to 
remember but not differentially resistant to forgetting. 
With respect to familiarity, consistent across Experiments 2 and 3 was superior 
familiarity for negative relative to positive words. However, in contrast to Experiment 2, 
familiarity was also superior for emotional words relative to neutral words in Experiment 3. 
This is not surprising if emotional material has a higher degree of associations with personal 
experiences, which may lead to increased associated familiarity, as proposed by Kensinger and 
Corkin (2003). These findings are consistent with the findings for response criterion; a more 
liberal response criterion for emotional relative to neutral words and for negative relative to 
positive words. Presumably, familiarity influences response criterion and the more familiar an 
item seems the more liberal the response criterion that is adopted (Yonelinas, 1994). This has 
also been suggested by Windmann and Kutas (2001), who argued that the more liberal criterion 
for emotional material was linked with increased familiarity-based memory judgements for 
emotional relative to neutral material. In contrast, the absence of variability between emotional 
and neutral material in Experiment 2 is consistent with others observing little evidence of 
variability in familiarity due to emotion (Sharot et al., 2007; Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). The 
differences in familiarity according to negative and positive material in Experiment 2 and 3 also 
indicate that the contributions of recollection and familiarity differ between negative and 
positive material. Somewhat similar findings have been reported by other studies between 





negative and positive material (Ochsner, 2000), although the comparison of valence was not 
restricted to only negative and positive material in these cases. 
The R/K procedure was used in Experiment 3 to examine the generality of findings in 
Experiment 2, where confidence judgements were employed. The relationship between 
recollection and familiarity in the two methods is based on somewhat distinct but also somewhat 
overlapping assumptions. In both methods (at least in the way they are used here) it is assumed 
that recollection and familiarity are independent (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995): the likelihood of 
one process being engaged is not influenced by the engagement of the other process. In the way 
that recollection and familiarity are computed here, it is also assumed that judgements are based 
on recollection when that occurs, and familiarity when it is above threshold and recollection 
fails. There is no scope in these models for recollection and familiarity signals to sum in any 
way to support a judgement, as has been suggested by Wixted and colleagues (Wixted, 2007; 
Wixted & Mickes, 2014; Wixted & Stretch, 2004; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). In the R/K 
procedure, Remember judgements are assumed to reflect recollection. However, based on the 
independence assumption, Know judgements are an underestimate of familiarity because some 
Remember responses may actually have some degree of familiarity that would have elicited a 
Know response if recollection had failed (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). For this reason, a 
correction was applied to the data (the independence R/K calculation) as described earlier in 
section 2.3. 
In the ROC method, the highest level of confidence judgements is assumed to reflect 
recollection, with the remainder of the confidence judgements reflecting familiarity (Yonelinas 
& Parks, 2007). However, it has been argued that recollection may also be reflected by medium 
confidence judgements (Wixted, 2007). If this is the case, then discrepancies in the findings 
between Experiment 2 and 3, at least for recollection, are not surprising. This could also be the 
case for familiarity if high confidence judgements could also reflect familiarity-based 





judgements. Hence, one way of explaining the discrepancies between the two experiments is 
because both methods have somewhat different assumptions. This is also illustrated by the 
direct comparison using both methods to estimate recollection and familiarity in Experiments 
2 and 3. This was done by analysing the ROC data in Experiment 2 using the R/K method and 
analysing the data from Experiment 3 using the ROC method. The rationale for doing this was 
to examine whether different methods would result in similar patterns of data. However, this 
was not the case, suggesting that at least one of these assumptions does not hold, although a 
caveat is that there were different participants in each experiment. 
According to Parks and Yonelinas (2007), however, the assumptions underlying ROCs 
and the R/K procedure are accurate. They locate the reasons for any discrepancies across 
outcomes with the instructions provided to participants in the R/K procedure (Parks & 
Yonelinas, 2007). They argued that instructing participants to only respond Remember when 
they were able to provide contextual information when asked, results in responses actually 
based on recollection (e.g. Yonelinas et al., 1996). In Experiment 3, however, participants were 
simply instructed to respond Remember whenever they could remember any contextual details 
without the possibility of being asked for this information, which was also the case in other 
studies that argue against the similarities of the assumptions underlining these methods (Rotello 
et al., 2005; Wixted, 2007). This is another explanation for the discrepancies observed between 
Experiment 2 and 3. A comparison of Experiment 2 and 3 and previous literature illustrates that 
using different methods that are based on somewhat distinct assumptions make it challenging 
to compare findings across studies. Perhaps of most importance here, the present findings 
reinforce that negative and positive valence have distinct effects on memory, and therefore need 
to be considered separately. 
    





5.2.4 ERPs, Encoding and Retrieval Processes 
5.2.4.1 Encoding Processes 
There were no reliable subsequent memory effects, which is arguably not too surprising 
considering that previously reliable effects have been observed for the most part when using 
memory tasks that rely heavily on recollection, and where the separation between ‘remembered’ 
and ‘forgotten’ items is not just based on the accuracy of ‘old’ judgements (Friedman, de 
Chastelaine, Nessler, & Malcolm, 2010; Otten et al., 2001; Otten & Rugg, 2001; Otten et al., 
2010).  
To examine the encoding processes linked to instructions to remember and forget, and 
to determine whether these were modulated by emotion, another set of analyses was conducted. 
These were conducted on the ERPs elicited by the remember and forget cues that followed each 
item during the study phase. In the replication of study 1, there was a greater relative positivity 
for TBR cues relative to TBF cues over posterior scalp. This posterior positivity for TBR cues 
has also been reported in previous DF studies (Bailey & Chapman, 2012; Gallant et al., 2018; 
Hauswald et al., 2011). Furthermore, in the replication of study 1 and in study 2, there was a 
greater relative positivity over posterior scalp for TBR cues that was preceded by an emotional 
word relative to a neutral word. This effect had an onset of around 300ms and extended for the 
remainder of the recording epoch, at least in the replication of study 1. This suggests that 
emotion influences the encoding processes linked with TBR cues and not with TBF cues, which 
is consistent with the view that following TBF cues little effortful processing occurs. 
Previously, this greater positivity has been linked to enhanced attention allocation to emotional 
material (Hauswald et al., 2011; Kok, 1997), and is also consistent with observations in other 
studies (Brandt et al., 2013; Gallant & Dyson, 2016; Liu et al., 2017). However, in study 2, 
there was also a greater relative positivity over anterior scalp for TBF cues that were preceded 
by a neutral word relative to a positive word. The positivity over anterior scalp has been linked 





to inhibitory control processes (Yang et al., 2012), and has been argued to indicate that 
inhibitory processes are partially responsible for the DF effect (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014).  
While these findings indicate that TBR and TBF cues elicit different activity and vary 
according to emotion, it is not clear on the basis of a simple pairwise comparison if this reflects 
simply more of the same kind of processing in one case rather than the other, qualitatively 
different processing in the two cases, or in fact active encoding processing in only one case. 
Thus, the finding of a difference is an important first step, but it does not permit strong claims 
to be made, for example, about the merits of a selective rehearsal or an active inhibition account 
(Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Basden et al., 1993; MacLeod, 1975). Moreover, there is some 
indication based on these findings that negative and positive material relative to neutral material 
influence encoding processes linked with DF instructions differently. Whereas negative and 
positive materiel seemed to influence TBR encoding processes similarly, this was not the case 
for TBF cues.  
  
5.2.4.2 Retrieval Processes – Recollection and Familiarity 
There were no reliable mid-frontal or left-parietal ERP old/new effects in the three 
studies. In study 1 the ERP old/new effects, while not reliable, also showed some polarity 
reversals that differ from what is typically observed (Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & 
Curran, 2007; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008). This motivated the replication study, where, while 
remaining non-significant, the old/new effects were qualitatively similar to effects observed 
previously (Rugg & Curran, 2007; Sanquist et al., 1980; Yonelinas, 2002). This was also the 
case for ERP study 2. In light of these outcomes the ERP data from test cannot provide any 
insights into the ways in which recollection and familiarity vary according to directed forgetting 
manipulations and emotion. Possible reasons for these null outcomes are discussed in Chapter 
3.2.3. 







5.3 Future Directions 
The findings reported here on the links between emotion, memory and memory control 
provide some new insights, and replicate some previous findings but not others. In the 
considerations for future directions articulated below, three possibilities are identified. Not 
because they are the only issues that merit further investigation, rather that they are matters that 
could be taken forward relatively straightforwardly in a way that builds on the findings that 
have been described. These issues are: the role(s) played by semantic relatedness, encoding 
processes engaged by remember and forget cues, and changes in response criterion with 
emotion. 
Overall, the outcomes reported here highlight that semantic relatedness among materials 
is an important factor that requires attention if the intent is to attribute confidently changes in 
memory and memory control to emotion as opposed to factors that variables correlate with 
changes in emotion. The limited studies that have controlled for semantic relatedness (Minnema 
& Knowlton, 2008) have still reported differences in DF effects according to emotion, which is 
not consistent with the outcomes reported in all of the relevant experiments in this thesis. In 
these experiments, however, care was taken to control for semantic relatedness throughout. A 
sensible extension of the work described here would be to manipulate relatedness within the 
same experiment designs, in an approach similar to that employed by Dougal and Rotello 
(2007).  
Another complementary approach would be to examine whether the degree of semantic 
relatedness was indeed different between emotional and neutral words in prior studies where 
this was not reported: the degree of semantic relatedness may or may not have been different 
between emotional and neutral materials. This observation does not only apply to semantic 





relatedness. Other word properties, notably word frequency, have not been controlled for 
consistently. In the case of studies that have used images, the same reasoning applies. Most 
studies have not included any control of visual complexity between emotional and neutral 
images (Nowicka et al., 2011; Otani et al., 2012; Payne & Corrigan, 2007), as was done in 
Experiment 5. Again, whether there were actual differences in visual complexity is hard to say 
when these measures have not been reported.  
A meta-analysis of previous studies has the potential to shed some light on whether 
stimulus properties differed between emotional and neutral material and how these might relate 
to the links between emotion and memory control. This might lead to a clearer picture of the 
reasons for the variability reported in the existing literature. 
 The ERP data in this thesis that provide new insights are those effects elicited by the 
remember and forget cues. These data highlighted the sensitivity of ERPs to encoding 
processes, offered indications that some encoding processes vary with emotion, and suggested 
that TBF instructions do not simply result in the absence of encoding operations. The key 
findings that suggested these outcomes were in separate experiments, and in each case two 
valence categories were used: negative vs neutral and positive vs neutral. Because the key 
outcomes were not the same in each of these experiments, they suggest that the encoding 
operations afforded positive and negative materials are not the same. These data points therefore 
argue strongly for a direct investigation of this possibility by including positive and negative 
material in the same experiment. As elsewhere in this thesis, when negative and positive 
materials are contrasted together, differences in memory, response criterion and recollection 
and familiarity arise. Analyzing ERPs elicited by remember and forget cues offers a means of 
identifying the precursors of these outcomes that are seen in the behavioral outcomes in the test 
phases of experiments. 





 In Experiment 5, response criterion did not change across the emotional and neutral 
conditions. In the majority of the preceding experiments there was a consistently more liberal 
criterion for emotional contents. The most likely reason for the absence of a comparable change 
in Experiment 5 is the fact that neutral words were employed throughout, with the emotion 
manipulation occurring via the use of background images at study that varied with emotion. 
The outcomes therefore suggest that processes engaged during retrieval rather than during 
encoding are what result in differences in response criterion. The design of Experiment 5, 
however, is markedly different from that of the preceding experiments, so in principle other 
unidentified elements of the design might be responsible for the null outcome for criterion. 
There are two designs that merit consideration. First, the use of a valence manipulation at test 
only – perhaps via the use of incidental background images that differ in valence. Second, an 
extension of Experiment 5 where words from more than one valence category are employed. If 
factors at test are in fact responsible for criterion changes, then there should be a liberal criterion 
for emotional words, but no differences in criterion according to study background. 
 
  
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
The work in this thesis highlights the importance of careful experimental design in order 
to compare findings between studies and further the understanding of the links between 
emotion, memory and memory control. The approach taken here was to exert tight control over 
stimulus properties and to maintain that consistently across a set of studies designed to address 
an overlapping set of questions. Among many findings, perhaps the key ones to highlight are: 
(i) when semantic relatedness is controlled for, there is little evidence that directed forgetting 
varies with emotion; (ii) via demonstrations using ROCs, emotion influences criterion and not 
memory sensitivity consistently – a conclusion that could not have been drawn on the basis of 





many prior studies in which only single point measures were employed; (iii) emotion influences 
the encoding operations that are engaged by remember and via forget cues; (iv) when emotion 
is manipulated only at study, there were no changes in response criterion. At the very least, the 
findings reported here can be seen as a set of pointers to guide the direction of the subsequent 
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Table A1  
Outcomes of Independent Sample T-tests for Assessments on Equality for Valence, Absolute Valence, Arousal, Word Length, Word 
Frequency and Semantic Relatedness for the three Lists of 96 Words between Valence Type (Negative, Positive and Neutral) in 
Experiment 1. SD = standard deviation 
  Negative vs. Neutral Negative vs. Positive Positive vs. Neutral 
 Negative Neutral  Negative Positive  Positive Neutral  
 M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) 
Valence 2.92 (0.63) 5.45 (0.42) 
-32.66 
(<.001)*** 
2.92 (0.63) 7.34 (0.49) 
-54.41 
(<.001)*** 





2.08 (0.63) 0.53 (0.32) 
21.52 
(<.001)*** 
2.08 (0.63) 2.34 (0.49) 
-3.18 
(.002)** 
2.34 (0.49) 0.53 (0.32) 
30.37 
(<.001)*** 
Arousal 4.67 (0.90) 3.92 (0.77) 
6.25 
(<.001)*** 





6.96 (2.07) 6.99 (2.03) -0.11 (.916) 6.96 (2.07) 7.33 (2.38) -1.17 (.245) 7.33 (2.38) 6.99 (2.03) 1.08 (.283) 
Word 
frequency 
2.76 (0.68) 2.96 (0.79) -1.70 (.091) 2.76 (0.68) 3.03 (0.67) 
-2.59 
(.010)** 
3.03 (0.67) 2.96 (0.79) 0.68 (.495) 
Semantic 
distance 
0.88 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) -0.57 (.572) 0.88 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) -1.01 (.313) 0.89 (0.03) 0.89 (0.03) 0.43 (.670) 
Notes. ** p < .01, *** p < .001.             
 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Experiment 1 – Emotion Regulation and Memory Control of Emotional Material 
 
Scatterplots illustrating the relationship between emotion regulation strategies (cognitive 
reappraisal and expressive suppression) and memory sensitivity separated across each critical 







































Figure B1. Scatterplot of the mean cognitive reappraisal scores 
































Figure B2. Scatterplot of the mean cognitive reappraisal scores 
against memory sensitivity in the forget condition for negative 
items  
 






































Figure B3. Scatterplot of the mean cognitive reappraisal scores against 






























Figure B4. Scatterplot of the mean cognitive reappraisal scores 
































Figure B5. Scatterplot of the mean cognitive reappraisal scores 































Figure B6. Scatterplot of the mean cognitive reappraisal scores 
against memory sensitivity in the remember condition for neutral 
items  





































Figure B7. Scatterplot of the mean expressive suppression scores 

































Figure B8. Scatterplot of the mean expressive suppression scores 

































Figure B9. Scatterplot of the mean expressive suppression scores 
against memory sensitivity in the remember condition for 






























Figure B10. Scatterplot of the mean expressive suppression scores 
against memory sensitivity in the forget condition for positive 
items    
 





































Figure B11. Scatterplot of the mean expressive suppression scores 
against memory sensitivity in the remember condition for neutral 






























Figure B12. Scatterplot of the mean expressive suppression scores 
against memory sensitivity in the forget condition for neutral items   
 
 













Outcomes of Independent Sample T-tests for Assessments on Equality for Arousal, Word Length, Word Frequency and Semantic 
Relatedness for the Study and Tests Lists (for Each Valence) between Valence Type (Negative and Neutral, and Negative and Positive) 
for Studies 1 and 2 in Experiment 2 and 3. SD = standard deviation 
  
 
Study 1 Study 2 
  
 
Negative Neutral  Negative Positive  







A1 Arousal 4.87 (0.76) 4.40 (0.63) 2.62 (.011)* 4.71 (0.67) 4.54 (0.78) 0.93 (.358) 
 Word length 7.23 (2.14) 6.47 (1.57) 1.58 (.120) 7.40 (2.51) 7.27 (2.18) 0.22 (.827) 




0.89 (0.01) 0.89 (0.02) -0.17 (.862) 0.88 (0.02) 0.90 (0.03) -1.89 (.064) 
A2 Arousal 5.09 (0.97) 4.22 (0.82) 3.73 (<.001)*** 5.08 (1.02) 4.61 (1.00) 1.80 (.076) 
 Word length 7.50 (2.18) 7.33 (1.81) 0.32 (.748) 7.50 (1.93) 7.23 (2.34) 0.48 (.632) 




0.88 (0.02) 0.88 (0.03) -0.17 (.868) 0.89 (0.02) 0.88 (0.02) 1.28 (.206) 
B1 Arousal 5.09 (0.98) 4.36 (0.93) 2.97 (.004)** 5.04 (0.92) 4.60 (1.02) 1.75 (.085) 
 Word length 7.47 (2.11) 7.47 (2.26) 0.00 (1.000) 6.97 (2.20) 7.37 (2.50) -0.66 (.513) 




0.89 (0.02) 0.90 (0.03) -1.00 (.321) 0.88 (0.02) 0.88 (0.03) -0.17 (.863) 
B2 Arousal 4.86 (0.79) 4.25 (0.91) 2.74 (.008)** 5.00 (1.01) 4.79 (0.92) 0.86 (.393) 
Table C1  
Outcomes of Independent Sample T-tests for Assessments on Equality for Valence, Absolute Valence, Arousal, Word Length, Word 
Frequency and Semantic Relatedness for the Lists of 180 Words (for Each Valence) between Valence Type (Negative, Positive and 
Neutral) for Studies 1, 2 and 3 in Experiment 2 and 3. SD = standard deviation 
  Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 Negative Neutral  Negative Positive  Positive Neutral  
 M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) 
Valence 2.56 (0.63) 5.12 (0.42) 
-45.85 
(<.001)*** 
2.56 (0.63) 7.33 (0.57) 
-75.46 
(<.001)*** 





2.44 (0.63) 0.31 (0.30) 
41.19 
(<.001)*** 
2.44 (0.63) 2.33 (0.57) 1.84 (.067) 2.33 (0.57) 0.31 (0.30) 
41.80 
(<.001)*** 
Arousal 4.94 (0.92) 4.18 (0.82) 
8.27 
(<.001)*** 
4.94 (0.92) 4.61 (0.98) 
3.28 
(.001)** 





7.37 (2.17) 7.10 (2.06) 1.22 (.223) 7.37 (2.17) 7.38 (2.23) -0.02 (.981) 7.38 (2.23) 7.10 (2.06) 1.23 (.220) 
Word 
frequency 
2.72 (0.67) 2.78 (0.82) -0.72 (.474) 2.72 (0.67) 2.91 (0.67) 
-2.69 
(.007)** 
2.91 (0.67) 2.78 (0.82) 1.70 (.091) 
Semantic 
distance 
0.89 (0.02) 0.89 (0.02) -0.20 (.843) 0.89 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) -0.11 (.915) 0.89 (0.03) 0.89 (0.02) -0.06 (.954) 
Notes. ** p < .01, *** p < .001.       
        





 Word length 7.63 (2.54) 6.93 (2.29) 1.12 (.267) 7.40 (1.80) 7.10 (1.56) 0.69 (.492) 




0.89 (0.02) 0.90 (0.02) -1.85 (.070) 0.90 (0.02) 0.90 (0.03) 0.02 (.983) 
C1 Arousal 4.70 (1.03) 3.89 (0.73) 3.54 (.001)** 4.95 (0.76) 4.57 (0.96) 1.72 (.090) 
 Word length 7.10 (2.01) 7.17 (2.31) -0.12 (.905) 7.57 (2.58) 7.60 (2.28) -0.05 (.958) 




0.89 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) 0.30 (.767) 0.89 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) -0.64 (.525) 
C2 Arousal 5.08 (0.94) 3.95 (0.81) 4.99 (<.001)*** 4.59 (1.05) 4.63 (1.11) -0.14 (.886) 
 Word length 7.13 (2.21) 7.23 (2.03) -0.18 (.856) 7.43 (2.03) 7.73 (2.48) -0.51 (.610) 











A Arousal 4.97 (0.87) 4.31 (0.73) 4.56 (<.001)*** 4.87 (0.80) 4.74 (0.84) 0.83 (.406) 
 Word length 7.37 (2.15) 6.90 (1.73) 1.31 (.193) 7.51 (2.31) 7.47 (2.40) 0.12 (.908) 




0.88 (0.02) 0.88 (0.02) -0.32 (.748) 0.89 (0.02) 0.89 (0.02) 0.26 (.798) 
B Arousal 4.97 (0.89) 4.30 (0.92) 5.06 (<.001)*** 5.02 (0.96) 4.69 (0.97) 1.86 (.065) 
 Word length 7.55 (2.32) 7.20 (2.27) 0.84 (.405) 7.18 (2.00) 7.23 (2.07) -0.13 (.893) 




0.89 (0.02) 0.90 (0.02) -1.91 (.058) 0.89 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) -0.36 (.717) 
C Arousal 4.89 (0.99) 3.92 (0.77) 6.00 (<.001)*** 4.77 (0.93) 4.60 (1.03) 0.97 (.336) 
 Word length 7.12 (2.09) 7.20 (2.15) -0.22 (.830) 7.50 (2.30) 7.67 (2.36) -0.39 (.696) 




0.89 (0.02) 0.89 (0.02) -0.30 (.764) 0.89 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) 1.08 (.283) 
Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.      




Outcomes of Independent Sample T-tests for Assessments on Equality for Arousal, Word Length, Word Frequency 
and Semantic Relatedness for the Study and Test Lists (for Each Valence) between Valence Type (Positive and 






Positive Neutral  







A1 Arousal 4.45 (1.08) 4.24 (0.83) 0.84 (.405) 
 Word length 7.13 (1.78) 7.43 (2.18) -0.59 (.561) 
 Word frequency 2.88 (0.58) 2.90 (0.57) -0.10 (.920) 
 Semantic distance 0.88 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) -1.82 (.075) 
A2 Arousal 4.84 (1.09) 4.22 (0.85) 2.48 (.016)* 
 Word length 7.77 (2.76) 6.73 (1.82) 1.71 (.092) 
 Word frequency 2.12 (0.49) 2.53 (0.82) -2.40 (.019)* 
 Semantic distance 0.89 (0.03) 0.88 (0.03) 1.65 (.105) 
B1 Arousal 4.49 (0.88) 4.11 (0.75) 1.79 (.078) 
 Word length 6.93 (2.16) 7.03 (1.81) -0.19 (.847) 





 Word frequency 3.07 (0.67) 2.76 (0.94) 1.50 (.140) 
 Semantic distance 0.87 (0.03) 0.88 (0.03) -1.39 (.171) 
B2 Arousal 4.55 (0.97) 4.28 (0.80) 1.18 (.244) 
 Word length 7.23 (1.85) 6.57 (1.74) 1.44 (.156) 
 Word frequency 3.03 (0.57) 2.78 (0.81) 1.36 (.179) 
 Semantic distance 0.89 (0.03) 0.88 (0.02) 1.11 (.272) 
C1 Arousal 4.57 (0.90) 4.13 (0.72) 2.10 (.040)* 
 Word length 6.90 (2.29) 7.80 (2.52) -1.45 (.154) 
 Word frequency 3.26 (0.54) 2.72 (0.94) 2.72 (.009)** 
 Semantic distance 0.88 (0.03) 0.89 (0.02) -0.92 (.364) 
C2 Arousal 4.65 (0.96) 4.15 (1.03) 1.98 (.053) 
 Word length 8.10 (2.41) 7.13 (2.26) 1.60 (.114) 
 Word frequency 3.10 (0.55) 2.96 (0.76) 0.81 (.420) 







A Arousal 4.65 (1.09) 4.23 (0.83) 2.35 (.020)* 
 Word length 7.45 (2.32) 7.08 (2.02) 0.92 (.358) 
 Word frequency 2.50 (0.66) 2.72 (0.72) -1.72 (.089) 
 Semantic distance 0.89 (0.03) 0.89 (0.02) 1.03 (.304) 
B Arousal 4.52 (0.92) 4.19 (0.77) 2.09 (.038)* 
 Word length 7.08 (2.00) 6.80 (1.77) 0.82 (.414) 
 Word frequency 3.05 (0.62) 2.77 (0.87) 2.04 (.044)* 
 Semantic distance 0.88 (0.03) 0.88 (0.02) -0.64 (.526) 
C Arousal 4.66 (0.93) 4.10 (0.87) 3.39 (.001)** 
 Word length 7.60 (2.34) 7.42 (2.33) 0.43 (.668) 
 Word frequency 3.18 (0.54) 2.84 (0.86) 2.58 (.011)* 
  Semantic distance 0.89 (0.03) 0.90 (0.02) -1.61 (.110) 
Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01.   





















Experiment 1, 2 & 3 – Differences in Word Frequency 
 
The analyses of the word frequency data in Experiments 1 – 3 were completed over 
estimates obtained using the SUBTLEX-UK count variable, which is a widely used measure 
(Van Heuven et al., 2014). During the course of the PhD research, a decision was made to 
equate word frequency differently, by using values based on a log transformation, better 
reflecting the distribution of word frequencies among the words sets that were employed. This 
method was employed from Experiment 4 onwards. Re-analysing the stimulus-set data of the 
earlier experiments using log transformed values revealed reliable, although small, differences 
between frequencies (see Appendix A for Experiment 1 and Appendix C for Experiment 2 and 
3). 
How might these differences affect the interpretation of the results observed in these 
experiments? In recognition memory tests, sensitivity is commonly higher for low frequency 
words than for high frequency words (Glanzer & Bowles, 1976; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996; 
Rugg & Doyle, 1992). As a result, for any valence categories with reliable differences in word 
frequency, reliable sensitivity differences could be attributable to this variable rather than to 
valence. What the appendices show, however, is that there is no consistent relationship between 
the occurrence of differences in word frequencies and evidence for differences between 
sensitivities. To give two examples: in Experiment 2 the small differences between frequencies 
for positive and neutral words were not accompanied by differences in sensitivities. In 
Experiment 1, meanwhile, word frequencies estimated via the log correction were higher for 
positive than negative words and sensitivity was also higher. This outcome suggests that, if 
anything, the magnitude of the sensitivity advantage due to valence is an underestimate. Thus, 
overall, while it is not possible to rule out the potential influence of small differences between 





frequencies on some outcomes, there is no strong indication from the data sets overall that it 
















































Experiment 2 – Example of the Old/New Recognition Test 
 
An example of what the screen display looked like in the test phase, when participants were 





































Figure E1. One trial in the test phase showing a word presented on the screen with the 6-point 
confidence rating scale. 
 






Experiment 2 – Proportion of Responses on the Confidence Scale 
 
Figure F1 illustrates the proportions of responses for each confidence levels for old and new 
words for each valence type (negative, positive and neutral) in each study. The data are 
collapsed across the TBR/TBF dimension and the figures show that the proportions of old 
responses to old words are greater than the proportions of new responses to old words. The data 
in the right-hand columns show that the reverse is true for new words, with a markedly greater 













Figure F1. Response rates (proportions) for each confidence rating for old and new items across valence 
(negative, positive and neutral) in Experiment 2 for study 1 (A: negative vs. neutral), study 2 (B: negative vs. 
positive) and study 3 (C: positive vs. neutral). The left column illustrates responses to old words and the right 
column illustrates responses to new items. 
 
 










Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Instruction and Valence in Studies 1, 2 and 3 
Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 





























    Study 1   Study 2   Study 3 
Measure 
(DV)   
df F p ηp²   
df F p ηp²   
df F p ηp² 
Instruction 
 
1, 43 4.89 .032* .10 
 
1, 43 23.43 <.000*** .35 
 
1, 43 16.39 <.000*** .28 
Valence 
 
1, 43 1.49 .230 .03 
 
1, 43 7.80 .008** .15 
 
1, 43 0.18 .676 .00 
Instruction  
x Valence 
Interactions   
1, 43 0.51 .479 .01 
  
1, 43 0.08 .775 .00 
  
1, 43 2.25 .141 .05 






z-Transformed ROC curves for Experiment 2 and 3 
 
Figure H1. z-Transformed Receiver operating characteristic (zROC) data for study 1 (A), study 2 (B) and study 3 (C) 
in Experiment 2. The red curves denote the negative condition, the green curves denote the positive condition and the 
black curves denote the neutral condition. The curves indicate memory strength and the circles indicate the level of 
response confidence (response criterion). 










Figure H2. z-Transformed Receiver operating characteristic (zROC) data for study 1 (A), study 2 (B) and study 3 (C) in 
Experiment 3. The red curves denote the negative condition, the green curves denote the positive condition and the 
black curves denote the neutral condition. The curves indicate memory strength and the circles indicate the level of 
response confidence (response criterion). 






Experiment 3 – Proportion of Responses on the Confidence Scale 
 
Figure H1 illustrates the proportions of responses for each confidence levels for old and new 
words for each valence type (negative, positive and neutral) in each study. The data are 
collapsed across the TBR/TBF dimension and the figures show that the proportions of old 
(Remember or Know (sure old and maybe old)) responses to old words are greater than the 
proportions of new responses to old words. The data in the right-hand columns show that the 
reverse is true for new words, with a markedly greater proportion of new words attracting the 












Figure I1. Response rates (proportions) for each response possibility (confidence ratings and remember 
response) for old and new items across valence (negative, positive and neutral) in Experiment 3 for study 1 
(A: negative vs. neutral), study 2 (B: negative vs. positive) and study 3 (C: positive vs. neutral). The left 
column represents responses to old items and the right column represent responses to new items 
 
 






Experiment 3 – Instructions Provided during the R/K Test Phase 
 
 
Below are the instructions that were provided to the participants on how to respond and how 




Instructions Test phase: 
A test phase follows each study phase. In each test phase you will again be shown 
words one at a time on the screen. Some of these (‘old’ words) will have been shown 
in the study phase. Others (‘new’ words) will be shown at test for the first time in the 
experiment. 
For each word please make one of five response options. The sheet beside you 
shows you which key corresponds to which response option. 
1= Sure new 
2= Maybe new 
3= Maybe old 
4= Sure old 
5= Remember 
 
You should make a Remember response if you can recall specific information about 
when you encountered the word in the preceding study phase. For example, you 
might remember where it was in the study list, or what you thought at the time you 
saw it. For some words you might believe that you saw them at study but not be able 
to remember specific details. If this is the case, then please make either a ‘Sure old’ 
or ‘Maybe old’ response, depending upon how confident you are that you studied the 
word. Similarly, if you see a word at test that you think you did not study, please 





























Figure K1. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) data for study 1 (A), study 2 (B) and study 3 (C) in 
Experiment 3. The red curves denote the negative condition, the green curves denote the positive condition and 
the black curves denote the neutral condition. The curves indicate memory strength and the circles indicate the 
level of response confidence (response criterion). 










Table L2  
Outcomes of Independent Sample T-tests for Assessments on Equality for Arousal, Word Length, Word Frequency and 
Semantic Relatedness for the Study Lists (for Each Valence) between Valence Type (Negative and Neutral, and Negative 
and Positive) for Studies 1 and 2 in Experiment 4. SD = standard deviation 
    Study 1 Study 2 
  Negative Neutral 
 Positive Neutral  
    M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) 
A1 
Arousal 4.58 (0.94) 3.92 (0.78) 2.45 (.019)* 4.63 (1.03) 4.14 (0.98) 1.55 (.131) 
Word length 7.60 (2.01) 6.95 (2.50) 0.91 (.371) 7.20 (2.04) 6.55 (1.73) 1.09 (.284) 
Word frequency 2.60 (0.54) 2.72 (0.92) -0.49 (.629) 3.11 (0.48) 2.94 (1.02) 0.70 (.489) 
Semantic relatedness 0.88 (0.04) 0.88 (0.02) -0.24 (.809) 0.90 (0.02) 0.90 (0.03) 0.58 (.569) 
A2 
Arousal 4.78 (1.12) 4.14 (0.61) 2.24 (.031)* 4.42 (1.06) 4.13 (0.89) 0.92 (.365) 
Word length 6.90 (2.20) 6.90 (1.52) 0.00 (1.000) 7.45 (2.63) 8.00 (2.36) -0.70 (.490) 
Word frequency 2.87 (0.89) 2.84 (0.81) 0.11 (.916) 2.86 (0.77) 2.73 (0.86) 0.50 (.617) 
Semantic relatedness 0.88 (0.03) 0.89 (0.03) -0.58 (.566) 0.90 (0.03) 0.89 (0.03) 1.31 (.197) 
B1 
Arousal 4.92 (0.81) 3.91 (0.52) 4.70 (<.001)*** 4.64 (0.90) 4.11 (0.83) 1.95 (.059) 
Word length 7.15 (1.76) 7.00 (2.68) 0.21 (.835) 7.80 (2.29) 7.40 (2.74) 0.50 (.619) 
Word frequency 2.84 (0.72) 2.90 (0.96) -0.21 (.827) 2.74 (0.64) 2.93 (0.75) -0.84 (.408) 
Semantic relatedness 0.89 (0.03) 0.90 (0.02) -1.55 (.130) 0.91 (0.03) 0.91 (0.02) 0.27 (.791) 
B2 
Arousal 4.94 (0.79) 4.29 (0.89) 2.47 (.018)* 4.34 (0.98) 4.23 (0.68) 0.40 (.690) 
Word length 6.80 (2.21) 7.25 (1.37) -0.77 (.445) 7.50 (2.19) 7.30 (2.92) 0.25 (.808) 
Word frequency 2.84 (0.72) 2.98 (0.72) -0.61 (.548) 2.83 (0.83) 2.50 (0.52) 1.52 (.137) 
Semantic relatedness 0.89 (0.02) 0.90 (0.03) -0.83 (.415) 0.89 (0.03) 0.90 (0.03) -1.38 (.177) 
C1 
Arousal 4.91 (1.11) 4.23 (0.74) 2.25 (.030)* 4.68 (1.07) 4.10 (0.75) 1.98 (.055) 
Word length 7.00 (2.13) 6.45 (1.61) 0.92 (.362) 7.85 (2.39) 6.65 (2.03) 1.71 (.095) 
Word frequency 2.75 (0.61) 2.80 (0.62) -0.25 (.804) 3.09 (0.70) 2.87 (0.61) 1.04 (.304) 
Semantic relatedness 0.90 (0.03) 0.90 (0.02) -0.14 (.893) 0.89 (0.03) 0.90 (0.03) -1.01 (.320) 
Table L1 
Outcomes of Independent Sample T-tests for Assessments on Equality for Valence, Absolute Valence, Arousal, Word Length, 
Word Frequency and Semantic Relatedness for the Lists of 240 Words (for Each Valence) between Valence Type (Negative, 
Positive and Neutral) for Studies 1 and 2 in Experiment 4. SD = standard deviation 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 Negative Neutral 
 Positive Neutral  
  M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) 
Valence 2.70 (0.67) 5.12 (0.38) -48.52 (<.001)*** 7.28 (0.48) 5.12 (0.38) 54.96 (<.001)*** 
Absolute Valence 2.30 (0.67) 0.27 (0.29) 42.96 (<.001)*** 2.28 (0.48) 0.27 (0.29) 55.78 (<.001)*** 
Arousal 4.85 (0.97) 4.11 (0.76) 9.27 (<.001)*** 4.58 (0.94) 4.11 (0.76) 5.94 (<.001)*** 
Word length 7.42 (2.17) 7.16 (2.17) 1.31 (.193) 7.51 (2.11) 7.16 (2.17) 1.77 (.077) 
Word frequency 2.69 (0.67) 2.77 (0.81) -1.29 (.198) 2.83 (0.71) 2.77 (0.81) 0.78 (.436) 
Semantic relatedness 0.90 (0.02) 0.90 (0.02) -1.62 (.107) 0.89 (0.03) 0.90 (0.02) -1.72 (.087) 
Notes. *** p < .001.       
 






Arousal 4.79 (1.12) 4.10 (1.01) 2.05 (.047)* 4.57 (0.93) 4.12 (0.76) 1.70 (.097) 
Word length 8.60 (2.64) 7.45 (2.06) 1.53 (.133) 7.85 (2.32) 7.45 (2.46) 0.53 (.600) 
Word frequency 2.44 (0.67) 2.69 (0.61) -1.23 (.228) 2.53 (0.62) 2.77 (0.84) -1.02 (.313) 
Semantic relatedness 0.91 (0.03) 0.90 (0.02) 0.81 (.421) 0.91 (0.03) 0.91 (0.02) -0.08 (.940) 
D1 
Arousal 4.73 (0.82) 4.11 (0.71) 2.56 (.014)* 4.53 (0.80) 3.99 (0.69) 2.28 (.028)* 
Word length 7.85 (2.37) 8.45 (1.99) -0.87 (.391) 7.55 (1.67) 6.70 (1.66) 1.62 (.114) 
Word frequency 2.79 (0.55) 2.34 (0.84) 1.99 (.054) 2.67 (0.77) 2.62 (0.83) 0.19 (.852) 
Semantic relatedness 0.91 (0.03) 0.92 (0.02) -1.88 (.067) 0.87 (0.03) 0.88 (0.04) -0.51 (.613) 
D2 
Arousal 4.84 (0.95) 4.27 (0.72) 2.16 (.037)* 4.58 (0.78) 4.12 (0.56) 2.13 (.040)* 
Word length 7.75 (2.24) 7.00 (1.75) 1.18 (.246) 7.30 (2.32) 7.70 (2.39) -0.54 (.594) 
Word frequency 2.65 (0.66) 2.81 (0.79) -0.71 (.483) 2.78 (0.77) 2.48 (0.99) 1.08 (.289) 
Semantic relatedness 0.89 (0.03) 0.90 (0.02) -1.62 (.114) 0.90 (0.03) 0.90 (0.02) -0.39 (.699) 
E1 
Arousal 5.01 (0.89) 4.19 (0.75) 3.14 (.003)** 4.80 (0.89) 4.18 (0.64) 2.55 (.015)* 
Word length 6.95 (2.39) 6.40 (2.28) 0.74 (.462) 6.60 (1.54) 7.30 (1.78) -1.33 (.191) 
Word frequency 2.80 (0.73) 2.73 (0.77) 0.31 (.761) 2.98 (0.57) 2.98 (0.57) 0.94 (.352) 
Semantic relatedness 0.90 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) 0.17 (.864) 0.90 (0.03) 0.90 (0.03) -.24 (.812) 
E2 
Arousal 4.85 (1.14) 4.12 (0.91) 2.24 (.031)* 4.61 (1.08) 4.30 (0.62) 1.10 (.280) 
Word length 7.15 (2.08) 7.55 (2.63) -0.53 (.597) 7.70 (1.66) 6.70 (1.66) 1.65 (.108) 
Word frequency 2.52 (0.60) 2.81 (0.84) -1.28 (.207) 2.96 (0.69) 2.89 (0.74) 0.30 (.765) 
Semantic relatedness 0.89 (0.02) 0.88 (0.04) 0.83 (.411) 0.89 (0.03) 0.89 (0.02) 0.77 (.447) 
F1 
Arousal 5.02 (0.82) 3.94 (0.66) 4.59 (<.001)*** 4.71 (0.94) 4.19 (0.81) 1.87 (.069) 
Word length 7.45 (1.79) 7.35 (2.46) 0.15 (.884) 7.75 (1.83) 6.75 (1.92) 1.69 (.100) 
Word frequency 2.70 (0.68) 2.62 (0.91) 0.28 (.779) 2.60 (0.73) 2.96 (0.68) - 1.64 (.109) 
Semantic relatedness 0.89 (0.02) 0.90 (0.02) -1.87 (.070) 0.88 (0.03) 0.88 (0.02) 0.32 (.750) 
F2 
Arousal 4.86 (1.18) 4.16 (0.84) 2.17 (.037)* 4.44 (0.90) 3.85 (0.89) 2.10 (.042)* 
Word length 7.85 (1.90) 7.20 (2.50) 0.93 (.361) 7.55 (1.91) 7.25 (1.65) 0.53 (.598) 
Word frequency 2.41 (0.53) 3.02 (0.80) -2.80 (.008)** 2.76 (0.75) 2.73 (0.89) 0.10 (.919) 
Semantic relatedness 0.90 (0.03) 0.91 (0.03) -0.48 (.633) 0.90 (0.03) 0.91 (0.03) -1.91 (.064) 
Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.      




Table L3  
Outcomes of Independent Sample T-tests for Assessment on Equality for Arousal, Word Length, Word Frequency and 
Semantic Relatedness for the Test Lists (for Each Valence) between Valence Type (Negative and Neutral, and Negative 
and Positive) for Studies 1 and 2 in Experiment 4. SD = standard deviation 
  Study 1 Study 2 
  Negative Neutral 
 Positive Neutral  
    M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) 
A 
Arousal 4.68 (1.02) 4.03 (0.70) 3.33 (.001)** 4.52 (1.03) 4.14 (0.93) 1.76 (.082) 
Word length 7.25 (2.11) 6.93 (2.04) 0.70 (.486) 7.33 (2.33) 7.28 (2.17) 0.10 (.921) 
Word frequency 2.73 (0.74) 2.78 (0.86) -0.24 (.808) 2.99 (0.65) 2.83 (0.94) 0.85 (.398) 
Semantic relatedness 0.88 (0.03) 0.89 (0.02) -0.23 (.820) 0.90 (0.03) 0.89 (0.03) 0.48 (.633) 
B 
Arousal 4.93 (0.79) 4.10 (0.74) 4.86 (<.001)*** 4.49 (0.94) 4.17 (0.75) 1.68 (.097) 
Word length 6.98 (1.98) 7.13 (2.10) -0.33 (.743) 7.65 (2.21) 7.35 (2.80) 0.53 (.596) 
Word frequency 2.84 (0.71) 2.94 (0.84) -0.57 (.572) 2.79 (0.73) 2.71 (0.67) 0.47 (.639) 
Semantic relatedness 0.89 (0.02) 0.90 (0.03) -1.66 (.101) 0.90 (0.03) 0.91 (0.02) -1.89 (.063) 






Arousal 4.85 (1.10) 4.17 (0.88) 3.06 (.003)** 4.63 (0.99) 4.11 (0.75) 2.64 (.010)** 
Word length 7.80 (2.50) 6.95 (1.89) 1.71 (.091) 7.85 (2.32) 7.05 (2.26) 1.56 (.123) 
Word frequency 2.60 (0.65) 2.75 (0.61) -1.05 (.250) 2.81 (0.71) 2.82 (0.73) -0.07 (.943) 
Semantic relatedness 0.91 (0.03) 0.90 (0.02) 0.76 (.449) 0.90 (0.03) 0.90 (0.02) -1.44 (.153) 
D 
Arousal 4.78 (0.88) 4.19 (0.71) 3.35 (.001)** 4.56 (0.78) 4.02 (0.66) 3.29 (.002)** 
Word length 7.80 (2.29) 7.73 (1.99) 0.16 (.876) 7.43 (2.00) 7.30 (2.21) 0.27 (.791) 
Word frequency 2.72 (0.61) 2.58 (0.84) 0.85 (.386) 2.72 (0.76) 2.58 (0.93) 0.74 (.462) 
Semantic relatedness 0.90 (0.02) 0.91 (0.02) -1.64 (.105) 0.89 (0.03) 0.90 (0.03) -1.62 (.110) 
E 
Arousal 4.93 (1.01) 4.16 (0.82) 3.75 (<.001)*** 4.70 (0.98) 4.24 (0.63) 2.53 (.013)* 
Word length 7.05 (2.22) 6.98 (2.50) 0.14 (.887) 7.15 (1.93) 7.00 (1.73) 0.37 (.715) 
Word frequency 2.66 (0.67) 2.77 (0.80) -0.68 (.502) 2.97 (0.63) 2.84 (0.76) 0.88 (.383) 
Semantic relatedness 0.89 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) 0.14 (.886) 0.90 (0.03) 0.89 (0.03) 0.98 (.331) 
F 
Arousal 4.94 (1.01) 4.05 (0.75) 4.48 (<.001)*** 4.58 (0.92) 4.02 (0.86) 2.81 (.006)** 
Word length 7.65 (1.83) 7.28 (2.45) 0.78 (.441) 7.65 (1.85) 7.00 (1.78) 1.60 (.113) 
Word frequency 2.56 (0.62) 2.82 (0.87) -1.56 (.122) 2.68 (0.73) 2.85 (0.79) -1.00 (.323) 
Semantic relatedness 0.90 (0.02) 0.90 (0.03) -1.08 (.282) 0.89 (0.02) 0.90 (0.02) -1.82 (.072) 
Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.      
      
 
 






Experiment 4 – Effects of Valence on Dm Effects 
 
Based on previous reports of analyses of subsequent memory effects and emotion in 
experiments involving a recognition memory test (Yick et al., 2015), mean amplitudes were 
targeted for two time windows: 200-400ms and 400-1000ms. Data from 30 electrode locations 
were grouped in 5 scalp regions: Frontal (F5, F3, F1, F2, F4, F6), Fronto-central (FC5, FC3, 
FC1, FC2, FC4, FC6), Central (C5, C3, C1, C2, C4, C6), Centro-parietal (CP5, CP3, CP1, CP2, 
CP4, CP6) and Parietal (P5, P3, P1, P2, P4, P6). For each time window repeated-measure 
ANOVAs were computed. They included the following factors: Response (correct vs incorrect), 
Valence (negative vs neutral or positive vs neutral), Anterior-Posterior (Frontal vs Fronto–
Central vs Central vs Centro–parietal vs Parietal), Hemisphere (left vs right) and Site (Inferior 
vs Mid-lateral vs Superior).  
 
Results 
Grand average waveform data are displayed below for the following electrodes: Fz, 
FCz, Cz, CPz and Pz for each valence condition, and separated by accuracy (response category). 
The scalp maps at the foot of each figure are computed on the basis of difference scores obtained 
by subtracting the mean amplitude measures for incorrect responses from those for the correct 
responses. 
 
Effect of Valence on Dm Effects 
In study 1 (see Figure L1) and in the replication of study 1 (see Figure L2) there were 
no differences according to valence. In study 2 (see Figure L3), however, there are marked 
differences for both positive and neutral words. The figure shows a greater relative positivity 





for incorrect responses than correct responses which onsets at around 250ms post-stimulus and 
continues for the duration of the recording epoch.  











Figure M1. (A) Grand average ERPs for channels Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz and Pz for negative (left column) and neutral (right column) 
words, separated for correct and incorrect responses. (B) Scalp maps showing the differences between the neural activities elicited by 
correct and incorrect responses in each targeted condition: negative and neutral words for the time windows 200-400ms and 400-
1000ms. 
Neutral 









Figure M2. (A) Grand average ERPs for channels Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz and Pz for negative (left column) and neutral (right column) words, 
separated for correct and incorrect responses. (B) Scalp maps showing the differences between the neural activities elicited by correct 
and incorrect responses in each targeted condition: negative and neutral words for the time windows 200-400ms and 400-1000ms. 
Negative Neutral 









Figure M3. (A) Grand average ERPs for channels Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz and Pz for positive (left column) and neutral (right column) 
words, separated for correct and incorrect responses. (B) Scalp maps showing the differences between the neural activities elicited by 
correct and incorrect responses in each targeted condition: positive and neutral words for the time windows 200-400ms and 400-
1000ms.  
Positive Neutral 





There were no interactions between valence and response category in all studies in either 
time windows (see Table L1 and L2). In study 2, there were main effects for response category 
in both time windows, due to a greater relative positivity for incorrect responses relative to 
correct responses with an onset of around 200ms and extended for the remainder of the 











Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Valence (Negative, Positive and Neutral) and 
Response (Correct and Incorrect Responses) in the 200-400ms time window for Study 1, Replication Study 1 and Study 2 
 Study 1  Study 1 (Replication)  Study 2 
Measure (DV) df F p ηp²  df F p ηp²  df F p ηp² 
Valence 1,15 0.02 .898 .00  1,15 0.01 .928 .00  1,15 3.27 .091 .18 
Response 1,15 1.19 .293 .07  1,15 0.00 .976 .00  1,15 13.53 .002** .47 
Valence*Response 1,15 0.90 .765 .01  1,15 0.54 .476 .03  1,15 0.02 .896 .00 
Note. ** p < .01.                          
df = degrees of freedom   
 
         
 
 
Table M2  
Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Comparisons between Valence (Negative, Positive and Neutral) and 
Response (Correct and Incorrect Responses) in the 400-1000ms time window for Study 1, Replication Study 1 and Study 2 
 Study 1  Study 1 (Replication)  Study 2 
Measure (DV) df F p ηp²  df F p ηp²  df F p ηp² 
Valence 1,15 0.00 .968 .00  1,15 0.02 .905 .00  1,15 1.79 .201 .11 
Response 1,15 0.32 .580 .02  1,15 0.05 .834 .00  1,15 28.60 .000*** .66 
Valence*Response 1,15 0.01 .920 .00  1,15 0.71 .414 .05  1,15 0.01 .946 .00 
Note. *** p < .001.                            
df = degrees of freedom   
 
         
 
 





























Outcomes of Independent Sample T-tests for Assessments on Equality for Arousal, Absolute Valence, Edge Density and Feature Congestion for 
the Images in the Study Phase between Valence Type (Negative, Positive and Neutral) in Experiment 5. SD = standard deviation 
  Negative vs. Neutral Negative vs. Positive Positive vs. Neutral 
 Negative Neutral  Negative Positive  Positive Neutral  
 M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) M (SD) M (SD) t-value (p) 
Arousal 1.09 (0.31) -0.03 (0.36) 
18.31 
(<.001)*** 





1.27 (0.36) 0.22 (0.14) 
20.94 
(<.001)*** 
1.27 (0.36) 1.22 (0.31) 0.97 (.332) 1.22 (0.31) 0.22 (0.14) 
25.97 
(<.001)*** 
Edge Density 0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02) 1.13 (.261) 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.02) 0.48 (.633) 0.04 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.82 (.413) 
Feature 
Congestion 
3.28 (1.38) 3.29 (1.15) -0.01 (.990) 3.28 (1.38) 3.56 (1.12) -1.20 (.231) 3.56 (1.12) 3.29 (1.15) 1.32 (.190) 
Notes. *** p < .001.             
       
